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Abstract
The articles in this thesis reect my work at the Centre for Study of Globalisation and
Regionalisation in Warwick, centred around two EU-funded projects: one relating global-
isation to social exclusion, and the second looking at the re-integration of the Central and
Eastern European transition economies into the main European economy. The papers in
this thesis are seen as new contributions. Chapter 1 is introductory, consisting of a brief
literature survey outlining a number of important debates. This is followed by a summary
of the contributions of the papers in subsequent chapters. Chapter 2, written with John
Whalley, is a general equilibrium decomposition of the widening wage gap in the United
Kingdom, utilising novel techniques of double calibration. The underlying question is
the degree to which widening inequality reects a change in world traded prices follow-
ing liberalisation. Chapters 3 and 4 refer to regional integration. In Chapter 3 I look
specically at the likely e¤ects of admitting several new Central and Eastern European
countries to the European Single Market, using a general equilibrium model combining
the new trade theory and the gravity model approach. Chapter 4 is more theoretical,
examining the perceived misuse of regulatory protection in determining national product
standards - in this case, in a cross-hauling duopoly. It is shown that several conclusions
of the recent literature regarding the trade volume e¤ects of regulation and the welfare
e¤ects of mutual recognition agreements, may be misleading. In Chapter 5 I delve into
a new issue in trade theory: namely the implications of imperfect information, match-
ing, search and networking. This chapter indicates a possible direction in which trade
theory needs to move to better understand the growing outsourcing trade, and also draws
important theoretical and policy implications. Chapter 6 draws brief conclusions.
Length: approximately 46,900 words.
2
0.1 Contents
Title Page, p. 1.
Abstract, p. 2.
Contents, p. 3.
Acknowledgements p. 4.
Declarations, p. 5.
Abbreviations, p. 6.
Chapter 1: Introduction p. 7.
Chapter 2: Short- and long-run wage inequality decompositions. With John Whalley,
p. 29.
Appendix 2.1: Elasticity sensitivity of model based decompositions
Chapter 3: An economic assessment of EU single market enlargement, p. 61.
Appendix 3.1: Derivation of border and comparative production costs.
Appendix 3.2: General equilibrium model of European Enlargement.
Chapter 4: Trade and strategic regulatory bias, p.108.
Appendix 4.1: Welfare and pure, horizontal trade barriers.
Appendix 4.2: Properties of the Cournot-Nash model with constant
elasticity demand.
Appendix 4.3: The e¤ects of mutual recognition in a cross-hauling
duopoly in the presence of a nonnegative prot constraint.
Chapter 5: Search and the path-dependency of trade, p. 231.
Chapter 6: Conclusions/Afterword, p. 271.
Bibliography, p. 277.
3
0.2 Acknowledgements
I am especially grateful to Professor Carlo Perroni, my PhD supervisor, for guidance and
advice during this project. Also to Professor John Whalley, now at University of Western
Ontario, who was my supervisor during the early stages of the project, as well as to my
two examiners, Professor David Collie and Geo¤ Reed. Much of the work was funded
through two EU-funded research projects, and I should like to thank Dr Paul Brenton
(now at the World Bank) and Dr David Barlow (University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne)
for their work in organising and coordinating the two projects. I am also grateful to Dr
Lisandro Abrego, now at the International Monetary Fund, for allowing me to use his
data for the paper in Chapter 2, and to Liz Thompson for secretarial assistance. Others,
who have given advice and helpful information during the preparation of this work, are
mentioned in acknowledgements in the various chapters. A number of useful comments
have been provided by participants at seminars in Warwick, Loughborough and Notting-
ham and in a presentation at the Royal Economic Societys annual conference. Finally,
some thanks to Karligash Kenhjegalieva and Vasileis Zikos at Loughborough for help
with proof-reading.
4
0.3 Declarations
The work in this thesis is my own, excepting Chapter 2 which was co-authored with
John Whalley. The broad idea of this chapter, and some of the nal drafting, were Prof
Whalleys, while the modelling work and most of the text are primarily my responsibility.
The paper in Chapter 2 was presented at the Royal Economic Society conference in
Warwick in April 2003, and was published as an NBER discussion paper. A revised
version is currently forthcoming in the Bulletin of Economic Research. Chapters 3-
5 have appeared as working papers. A revised version of chapter 3 is forthcoming in
Applied Economics. Chapters 4 and 5 will shortly be submitted to journals.
This thesis has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.
5
0.4 Abbreviations used in this thesis
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CES Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CGE Computable General Equilibrium
CU Customs Union
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEMEE General Equilibrium Model of European Enlargement
GM Genetically Modied
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project
H-O Heckscher-Ohlin
HOS Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
IMP International Monetary Fund
NTB Non-Tari¤ Barrier
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
TBT Technical Barrier to Trade
UK United Kingdom
US United States
WTO World Trade Organisation
Other abbreviations used, for example, to denote specic data categories, are ex-
plained as they are introduced.
6
Chapter 1
Introduction
The world is becoming increasingly integrated economically. Between 1965 and 2001,
international trade grew faster than World GDP in all but three years. Global trades
share of World GDP rose from 13 percent in 1970 to 21 percent in 1995 (World Bank,
1998).1 Successive rounds of trade agreements have cut tari¤ and non-tari¤ barriers,
while policymakersopinions, under the inuence of the Washington Consensus of the
World Bank, IMF and US Treasury,2 have generally shifted in favour of freer trade,
compared to the general support for protectionism and managed trade (especially in
developing countries) during the immediate postwar years.
This increased international integration can be seen as having two major aspects:
both increased global integration (globalisation) and also increased integration of busi-
ness, rms and economic policy at a regional level (regionalisation). Both phenomena
are increasingly the centre of controversy, with politicians and activists protesting against
globalisation on the one hand, and with protest votes against the institutions which are
associated with regional integration (such as the European Union) on the other.
1See Hufbauer, 1998.
2See Stiglitz, 2002, for a critique.
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The economic arguments in this debate can be divided into a number of categories:
1.0.1 Standard arguments for greater global integration
The arguments in favour of reducing trade barriers are well-rehearsed. Not only does
freer trade allow countries to make specialisation gains, as indicated by classical and
neoclassical trade theory, but the advocates of newer trade theories (see, e.g. Baldwin
and Venables, 1995) would argue it also produces further gains in terms of increased
competition (driving down prices), increased variety of goods available to consumers
and increased capital ows into regions opening themselves up to increased trade. Em-
pirical evidence has increasingly supported the idea that more open economies tend to
outperform relatively closed economies.3 In neoclassical theory, countries as a whole
would expect to make specialisation gains from liberalising their own trade, unless there
is some other form of distortion present.4 In the new trade theory, integration on a
world scale also allows for increased technology ows and for countries to reap benets
of economies of scale in developing new products (see e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1993)
- consequently new trade theory approaches to estimating the gains from trade generally
yield greater potential global welfare gains from trade than standard theory, although
individual countries and groups within countries may lose.
3See e.g. Winters, 2004.
4At least one factor will lose from trade liberalisation. However, gains from liberalisation to owners
of the abundant factors within a country are usually expected to outweigh (in monetary terms) losses
to the owners of scarce factors, at least in the simpler two-country models. More complicated models of
free trade areas and customs unions will have a number of opposing e¤ects, and usually require analysis
on a case-by-case basis.
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1.0.2 Arguments for a deeper integration at the global or regional level
It is increasingly argued that removing formal trade barriers alone is not enough to
achieve economic optimality. A major source for this view is the empirical evidence that
trade between most countries - even within close trading areas such as the European
Union - falls well short of that within any single country. This conclusion stems primar-
ily from gravity analysis of trade patterns (see McCallum, 1995, Treer, 1995), which
suggests that even within a free trade area, country dummies are strong and signicant
and indicate powerful border e¤ectsimpeding trade.5
To a growing school of thought the logical explanation for these observed border
e¤ects is that they must reect some form of transactions costs on businesses wishing to
operate across national boundaries. However, despite attempts to explain the observed
patterns (see, e.g. Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000) the precise reason why trade between
countries seems to fall short of that within countries is still far from satisfactorily ex-
plained. For example, Obstfeld and Rogo¤ emphasise the importance of transport costs
- yet gravity models already implicitly proxy for transport costs with a distance variable,
and replacement of distance with more direct estimates of average trade costs does not
greatly a¤ect the conclusions regarding border e¤ects.6 There is evidence that freight
and insurance rates for di¤erent commodities vary, as do rates for sea as against land
transport, but again it is hard to build up a conclusive case that these di¤erences can
explain the estimated border e¤ects when these are present both for countries with land
and sea borders.7
5Though McCallums analysis has been challenged, e.g. by Hillberry (1999) or Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003).
6 In Chapter 2, below, I calibrate a variety goods model for European trade with explicit estimates of
transport costs, and nd results broadly in line with previous gravity simulations.
7 It is conceivable that gravity estimations may su¤er from aggregation bias, however, when one
category of commodities contains a number of subcategories with very di¤erent trade costs. There is also
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The alternative is to look at the e¤ects on trade of policies other than simply tari¤s
and formal non-tari¤ trade barriers. Obstfeld and Rogo¤ mention currency conversion
costs in this regard - and the argument that eliminating these would boost trade is
frequently cited as a motivation for the European common currency. However, many
forms of national policies may potentially a¤ect international trade ows. The costs of
certication and testing of goods to meet di¤erent health and safety standards, di¤erent
labelling or warranty requirements in di¤erent countries can be quite signicant, though
varying between goods and commodities (see e.g. Harrison et al, 1996).8
Not only is estimation of the trade costs imposed by national policy regimes a tricky
empirical task, but the interpretation of such costs is also di¢ cult. While, on the one
hand, national policies on product standards may act as impediments to trade, and may
even be systematically manipulated to form regulatory protection, particularly when
other forms of protection are ruled out (see e.g. Wallner, 1998, Baldwin, 2001),9 on the
other hand such policies may also serve important purposes of consumer protection, and
so the regulatory protectionclassication may be over-simplistic in many cases. The
degree to which such an interpretation applies in practice to policy di¤erences between
countries has important implications for policy (see Chapters 3 and 4 for more detail).
The belief that such di¤erences primarily reect protectionist motives has led to the
policy conclusion that internal product regulation policies are a legitimate eld of concern
to international trade negotiators, and has, in particular, encouraged the development of
regional agreements to reduce such barriers (notably the European Single Market). This
some possible validity in Hillberrys (1999) suggestion that estimated border e¤ects may in fact reect
the propensity of some footloose industries to move closer to their main potential customers.
8Zahariadis, 2002, using gures derived from Harrison et al (1996), suggests costs on Turkish imports
into the EU of 1.3 to 3.1 per cent for frictional/border costs, 1 to 2 per cent for testing/certication costs
and 1 to 2.5 per cent for standardisation costs.
9A classic example of regulatory protection in practice was the policy of the rst Mitterand government
in France to divert all imported video recorders for testing at a centre in the inland town of Poitiers.
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school of thought underlies much of the economic case for deeper regional integration.
In support of this view, it should be noted that advanced countries - such as those
which, until recently, dominated the European Union - are likely to share a high degree
of preference for reliability, safety and the like, so that mutual recognition of each others
standards (or harmonisation on a shared standard) is more likely to be benecial in that
context, though Chapter 4 shows there may still be strategic reasons why countries may
distort their choice of standards in the presence of trade. Where countries greatly di¤er
in income levels or consumer attitudes, this may not be the case - a matter which makes
the extension of the European Single Market to the poorer, new members relatively more
debatable.
To traditional trade theorists, regionalism - in the form of Free Trade Areas or Cus-
toms Unions - has a distinctly ambiguous nature, with o¤setting trade creation and trade
diversion e¤ects. There is also a more recent literature on whether regional trade areas
form a lasting barrier or a stepping stone to global trade liberalisation. The optimistic
interpretation stems particularly from Kemp and Wan (1976), who showed that, on not
particularly restrictive assumptions, when a country joins a Customs Union (CU), it is
always possible, by adjusting tari¤s (adopting the Vanek compensating tari¤10) and, if
necessary, by internal side-payments, to ensure that no country, inside or outside the CU
loses. In these circumstances, a Customs Union or Free Trade Area might be expected
to eventually expand to incorporate the whole World. It is not di¢ cult to show that this
result implies that members of a CU will gain if the CU sets optimum tari¤s vis-a-vis the
rest of the World, and nonmember states do not adjust their tari¤s.11 However, it does
10The Vanek compensating tari¤ is the tari¤ which maintains the level of trade with the rest of the
World at pre-CU levels.
11Since, by denition, the optimum tari¤ will leave member states at least as well o¤ as a Vanek
compensating tari¤.
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not necessarily hold if non-member countries alter their tari¤s in an optimum fashion
(Richardson, 1995).
A more critical view (Krugman, 1991b) is based on an imperfectly competitive model
where countries form a series of rival customs union blocs, which expand mainly in order
to increase their ability to impose higher tari¤s on the rest of the World. Recent studies12
seek to investigate empirically the circumstances in which trade blocs lead to greater
protectionism or greater trade.
Regardless of this debate, there is strong reason to believe the removal of regulatory
barriers between member states of a regional bloc is more likely to benet third party
countries than the removal of internal tari¤s within the bloc. The argument is that
di¤erent regulatory standards e¤ectively impose a real resource cost on companies trading
between two nations, often modelled as an iceberg cost13: while removing regulatory
di¤erences between country A and country B may increase A and Bs shares of each
others market at the expense of a third country C, the key di¤erence is that if the
regulatory cost is real and signicant, overall incomes in both A and B will rise, and
this will potentially produce an o¤setting income e¤ect on Cs exports. Under these
circumstances a regional agreement between A and B may well actually be of net benet
to C. Assuming this is the case, there is less conict between regionalism and the
promotion of global trade.
The two major methods by which an agreement of this sort can be implemented
are, rst, the application of a central harmonisation of standards and, secondly, the
use of mutual recognition agreements, under which country A will accept for sale any
12See, e.g. Abrego et al (forthcoming).
13An iceberg cost is a modelling device which assumes that, when a good is traded between two
countries, a xed proportion of its value is used up in the form of the transaction cost. The term iceberg
costderives from a metaphor to a proportion of an iceberg melting en route.
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goods from country B which meet the latter countrys own regulations, as long as this
is reciprocated. The latter, which e¤ectively devolve more decision-power to individual
nations, have tended to be favoured in the literature.14 In practice, the European Single
Market Initiative has used a combination of the two approaches, though mostly applying
mutual recognition where possible (see Brenton et al, 2001).
Mutual recognition has a further attraction: whereas harmonisation of product stan-
dards requires a harmonising body - usually a regional body, such as the European
Commission - to implement, mutual recognition agreements can be agreed between any
pair of governments or trade blocs. Mutual recognition agreements are increasingly
appearing on the trade agenda, forming the basis of agreements between the EU and
Asia-Pacic countries, for example.
1.0.3 Distributional arguments for protection
While the case both for trade liberalisation and for the removal of other types of barriers
(as discussed above) has been inuential in furthering global and regional integration in
recent years, there are also powerful counter-arguments. Let us start with the standard
arguments on freer trade and globalisation: while trade theory generally suggests freer
trade should benet output and welfare globally, it has always been recognised that cer-
tain groups will lose out. Following Stolper and Samuelson (1941), the argument has been
generally accepted that trade will tend to bring about a movement towards equalisation
of factor prices worldwide.15 For any given country, trade can serve to remedy relative
factor shortages by allowing the country to import goods intensive in the factors more
14Again, see Wallner (1998), or Lutz (1996 (1) and (2)).
15The argument that it will result in full factor price equalisation requires a number of further assump-
tions. See chapter 2.
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abundant elsewhere. Trade liberalisation between the developed world and less developed
countries (LDCs) should therefore result in the richer countries, which are assumed to
be more abundant in skilled relative to unskilled labour, exporting skill-intensive goods
and importing less skill-intensive goods. This has the consequence (unfortunate in terms
of income distribution) that unskilled labour demand in wealthy countries should fall,
leading either to a fall in wages or (in more rigid labour markets) unemployment.
In this context, it is worth bearing in mind that, during the trade liberalisations
of the past 2 or 3 decades, wealthy countries have indeed seen falls in unskilled labour
demand (see, e.g. Slaughter, 1999 or Leamer, 1998), taking the form of rising wage
di¤erentials in the USA and UK, and of rising unemployment elsewhere. However,
correlation does not necessarily imply causality, and there has been a vigorous debate
among economists as to whether the observed labour demand changes really reect trade
e¤ects, or whether the more important factor is simply technological change, for example
with computers displacing unskilled workers. Most studies using aggregate data have
concluded the latter, technology e¤ect is probably the more important (see the survey
in Abrego and Edwards, 2003), although some authors have argued this may reect a
failure to disaggregate su¢ ciently industries in which outsourcing is taking place.16
1.0.4 The clash between regional governance and national sovereignty
While the case for deeper regional integration, going beyond simply the removal of formal
trade barriers, as outlined above, has been cited in support of the European Single
Market and the Euro currency - classic cases of governance on a regional level - the
economic analysis underlying this is still relatively novel and, on a theoretical level,
16See Anderton and Brenton, 1999.
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under-developed. The currency debate - the choice between potentially trade-promoting
stable exchange rates or more exible rates to suit di¤erent national macroeconomic
conditions - is well-rehearsed and beyond the scope of this thesis.
Less familiar is the parallel debate over regulatory standards. For example, in the
instance of product standards, the case for regional or even global governance, either
in the form of agreed harmonisation or mutual recognition, is based upon the perceived
threat of regulatory protection. However, there is no common economic textbook treat-
ment of such protectionism to compare with the chapters on tari¤s and quotas found
in any standard trade text. Rather, work to date either consists of empirical studies
characterised by sweeping assumptions, special case studies of individual industries (e.g.
Gandal, 2001) or a few rather abstract theoretical pieces.17 The claim that increased
regulation hampers trade has rarely been investigated empirically, and what evidence
there is (e.g. Swann et al, 1996) rather points in the opposite direction.
The problem is the dual nature of regulatory policy - whether implemented on a
national or international level. Regulatory policies can be justied from the point-of-
view of protecting consumer health, safety and providing insurance against substandard
goods (c.f. Akerlofs lemons) in the presence of externalities or costs of information
acquisition. Regulations of this type can be classied as verticalstandards regulation, in
the sense that they tangibly improve some aspect of quality as experienced by consumers.
Alternatively, regulations of a horizontalnature (e.g. in telecommunications) can often
be justied on the grounds of the need for di¤erent users to use compatible technology,
which produces network externalities.18
17See Lutz, 1996 (1) and (2) or Wallner (1998).
18See the discussion in Maskus and Wilson (2001), particularly the chapters by Markusen and by
Gandal.
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The potential clash comes because on the one hand, regulation can be used potentially
for protectionist reasons - hence providing a case for international intervention to avoid
this - yet, on the other hand, di¤erences in national regulations may well reect a rational
response to national di¤erences in consumer preferences. For example, one would expect
a poor country to be less willing to raise costs to consumers in order to improve, say,
product safety than a rich country would be. The danger, from a policy point-of-view,
is that if national regulations are weakened by harmonisation or by mutual recognition,
there may be an undermining of quality, safety or reliability of goods, and this may
reduce consumer utility in those countries where the preference is for higher quality or
safety standards19. The rather bold conclusion of several studies that mutual recognition
is necessarily welfare-improving are based upon rather specic assumptions about the
nature of regulatory protection: studies either tend to concentrate upon the specic case
of pure horizontal protection (Wallner, 1998) or to assume zero demand elasticity in
response to vertical quality changes (Lutz, 1996 (1) and (2)).
In practical terms, the danger is that, unless analysis of quality regulation takes
account of the vertical quality/utility e¤ects as well as potential trade e¤ects, there may
be a tendency to over-prescribe either international harmonisation or mutual recognition,
to the extent where the ability to vary national policy in response to national variations
in preferences is undermined.
19This is essentially an adverse selection argument: consumers, arguably, lack information on di¤erent
products (or the capacity to absorb such information), so that poor-quality goods drive out good ones.
However, it may well be that in many circumstances, an optimal solution is international collaboration
on a clear common labelling and testing system, which still allows for variation in product quality, rather
than detailed harmonisation of product specications. Such an agreement would, of course, have to rule
out any deliberate attempt by one countrys government to mislead consumers abroad.
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1.0.5 Incomplete information, trade and national border e¤ects
As an alternative to viewing border e¤ects as reective simply of protectionist barriers,
a recent development in the trade literature has been to relax the assumption of per-
fect information. Where goods quality, or the reliability of a supplier, is important, or
even more where the success of business connections depends upon a variety of factors,
summarised as match qualitybetween two agents, then the quality of information one
agent holds about potential partners in various parts of the globe will play a key part in
determining where (s)he seeks to trade. This information, in turn, may depend upon his-
torical and ethnic connections between countries, including cross-border migration ows,
as well as geographical proximity, and such factors have been shown to be signicant in
gravity studies, especially in products which are qualitatively less standardised.20 Search
for such information is likely to be important,21 as well as that of networks such as trade
associations or common intermediaries in spreading information about potential match
partners.22
It follows that trade patterns may well reect historical, cultural and sociological
factors, as well as current trade policy. The literature to date has not really taken
much account of the policy implications of this (the eld of informational barriers to
trade is, admittedly, fairly novel). There is a distinct possibility that, in the presence
of informational imperfections, while the scale of existing regulatory barriers may be
exaggerated by gravity studies of border e¤ects, the e¤ects of relatively modest trade
or regulatory barriers may be greater than estimated by standard models, and that
past barriers may continue to inuence trade long after they are removed. My paper in
20Rauch, 1999.
21Rauch, 1996.
22See Rauch and Trindade (2003) or Feenstra et al (1999).
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Chapter 5 is probably one of the rst serious attempts to investigate the implications of
search theory for trade policy.
Going beyond the material in Chapter 5 and speculating, a model where information
about trading possibilities is spread by networking and informational spillovers from one
agent to another is also likely to have important welfare properties. In particular, if
some of the benets of search for trading partners are external to the agent doing the
searching (i.e. there is free-riding on otherssearch activities),23 then we might expect
the acquisition of trade information to be suboptimal. This provides a new potential
explanation for the apparent correlation between openness to trade and economic growth,
as well as scope for much further investigation, not only of the links between trade policy
or regulatory policy and the growth of international trade, capital and knowledge ows,
but also on the signicance of di¤erent models of industrial organisation and interaction
between rms, trade associations, ministries and other bodies.
1.1 Organisation of this thesis and chapter summary
The thesis comprises four articles investigating a selection of topics relevant to the above
debates.
1.1.1 Short- and long-run wage inequality decompositions
Chapter 2, written jointly with John Whalley, explores the issue of trade and wages in
the advanced countries - in particular the question of whether trade liberalisation with
LDCs can explain the relative fall in unskilled wages in the UK (and perhaps by analogy
23When there is networking, search information can be regarded as a type of public good.
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the United States) since the 1970s. It forms part of a series of such papers24 investigat-
ing the implications of variations in the specication of the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson trade model for the quantitative relationship between the traded prices of
unskilled-intensive versus skill-intensive goods upon relative wages. Most of these mod-
els use fairly simple assumptions (2 sectors, 2 factors both xed in total volume within
a nation, and treating the UK as a small, open economy). The justication for using a
computable general equilibrium approach to decomposing observed changes is that stan-
dard econometric studies, which use a single equation, mandated wage approach, su¤er
from a number of aws: specically, the putative causal relationship between trade prices
and/or technology and relative wages implied by trade theory works through changes in
relative trade volumes, industry outputs and factor intensities. While it is possible to
bypass any analysis of these stages, and derive and estimate a single-equation mandated
wage model simply relating trade to either computerisation or prices, many such models
are, in fact, inconsistent with the observed changes in industry outputs and employment.
In particular, most Heckscher-Ohlin applications imply a far greater change in industrial
structure than has actually occurred.
General equilibrium decompositions are, in theory, a means around this problem. The
procedure adopted in various papers by Abrego and Whalley, as well as in the paper in
Chapter 2 here, is decomposition by double calibration. The structure of the model and
various key behavioural parameters are specied, and the model is then tted to two
yearsdata - one before, the other after the World price change. Estimates are then
obtained for the shifts in various technology parameters, which are e¤ectively derived
as implicit residuals of the model, and a series of counterfactual model simulations is
24See Abrego and Edwards, 2003, for a summary.
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then carried out, changing each technology parameter, or relative prices, individually. In
the paper in Chapter 2 this is done by means of a series of chained steps to reduce the
inevitable index number problems inherent in this type of decomposition.
The problem is that decomposition results for the United Kingdom turn out to be
highly sensitive to variations in the specication of the model concerned. In our paper in
Chapter 2, the specication variation under investigation is factor xity. The Heckscher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework generally assumes that all factors are mobile between
sectors (though not between countries). In fact this has very important implications for
the e¤ects of traded prices upon wage inequality - a nding rst derived with regard to
the labour/capital di¤erential in papers by Mayer and Mussa (both 1974) and Neary
(1978). In the HOS framework, most of the e¤ect of traded prices or technology upon
wages comes from the magnication e¤ect. This is the result, associated with Jones
(1965), that a shift in relative traded prices causes a larger change in relative factor
rewards. On certain model parameterisations,25 a relatively modest change in goods
prices can produce a large shift in relative factor demands. However, the magnication
result critically assumes factors are fully mobile between sectors. Any factor immobility
which hampers that structural change will reduce the e¤ects of trade prices upon wages.
In our paper, two forms of immobility are investigated: rst, a partial mobility
assumption for unskilled labour. We assume that unskilled labour will only move from a
declining to an expanding sector if the wage di¤erential exceeds a certain iceberg mobility
cost. The second specication is a three-factor model with capital as well as two kinds
of labour, but where capital is sectorally immobile in the short-run.
25The scale of the magnication e¤ect upon relative industry size and the scale of the consequent
impact upon relative factor rewards depends upon a combination of relative initial factor intensities and
the elasticities of substitution between factors within industries, as well as upon the degree of initial
specialisation.
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Numerical simulations show that even relatively modest mobility costs or modest
endowments of a sectorally-immobile factor reduce the e¤ect of trade prices upon wages,
and this reduction can be large on plausible model parameterisations. In turn, this will
greatly a¤ect the residual technology parameter changes required for the model to be able
to t observed output and employment data in both start and end years. In fact, a fully
factors-mobile model is shown to be quite implausible, since trade prices would produce
a far larger shift in output towards skill-intensive industries than has been observed,
and the model could only t the data if there were strong sector-biased technological
progress in the opposite direction (something inconsistent with Haskel and Slaughters
1998 observations on computerisation).
In general, if we assume that factors are more mobile in the long- than in the short-
run, then explaining the observed changes in wage inequality between 1979 and 1995 will
depend to a large extent upon whether we consider this time-period to be more long-
runor short-runin terms of factor mobility. If the latter, then it is likely that the full
e¤ects of trade price changes between 1979 and 1995, which favoured skilled labour, will
be much less than the long-run e¤ects implied by HOS. Consequently, it is likely that a
higher proportion of the factor price changes which occurred are, in fact, attributable to
technological change within the UK - while we would expect in future further increases
in inequality as the longer-run e¤ects of the trade price shift work through.
1.1.2 An economic assessment of EU single market enlargement
Chapters 3 and 4 address issues of quality standards and regional integration. In Chap-
ter 3, which is a study commissioned by the European Commission, I investigate the
implications for both existing EU members and accession states of enlargement of the
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EUs Single Market to incorporate a number of Central and Eastern European Countries
(CEECs). This analysis is done upon the assumption, common to previous studies by
Baldwin et al (1995) and LeJour et al (2001), that di¤erent national regulations im-
pose an iceberg cost upon rms trading across borders, while any other e¤ects upon
consumer utility are assumed to be negligible (i.e. we are talking about pure horizontal
regulations). This assumption is examined more critically in Chapter 4.
The analysis in Chapter 3 utilises a 10 region, 8 commodity static general equilibrium
model, where trade is based upon a love of variety(Dixit-Stiglitz) formulation. The
specication of the model used (GEMEE) is laid out in detail in an appendix to the
chapter. The love of variety framework was chosen partly because it has properties
akin to the empirical gravity model frequently used in analysing trade patterns,26 partly
because it implies (at least in the short- to medium-term) trade patterns which are not
totally price-elastic (and hence has implications in terms of optimal tari¤ and customs
union theory), and partly because it incorporates some of the scale, variety and capital
stock e¤ects which Baldwin and Venables (1995) show to be important aspects of regional
trade agreements. This approach is consistent with the recent literature on trade costs,
as surveyed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).27
The model is calibrated upon the assumption that, once transport costs and country
size/variety a¤ects have been corrected for, di¤erences in shares of CEECs in the EU
market in our base year (1997) compared to those attained by existing EU states in other
EU markets (which we could call the implicit EU border e¤ect) reect extra trading costs
- a combination of tari¤s and NTBs (though these were almost entirely phased out even
26See Bergstrand (1989). However, Deardor¤, 1998, has shown that on some assumptions gravity
properties can also be derived from more traditional Heckscher-Ohlin-type models.
27The model in Chapter 3 is a novel form of what Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) term a theory-
consistent gravity modelapproach to deriving trade costs.
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by 1997, except in agriculture) and the costs of regulatory di¤erences. The residual
border costs implied by this model (which correspond to EU membership dummies in
more traditional gravity models) vary between 7 and 15 per cent of total cost of goods
traded - which suggest they are roughly twice as large as implied by bottom-upestimates
such as those by Harrison et al (1996) or Zahariadis, 2002. When converted to gravity
dummy equivalents, the costs are, however, broadly similar to those estimated by gravity
models, such as by LeJour et al (2001).
Simulations show that accession to the Single Market is potentially much more im-
portant than reform of the existing tari¤ structure (this is hardly surprising, given that
the Europe Agreements of the 1990s removed all bar agricultural tari¤s between the EU
and the accession states). The estimated welfare gains to the accession states from EU
entry could be of the order of 11-20 per cent of GDP, slightly larger than the estimates
by LeJour et al (2001). This perhaps reects the di¤erence between trade gains in a
monopolistically competitive market compared to perfectly competitive national mar-
kets. Since the CEEC economies are small relative to the pre-2004 EU, their accession
does not greatly a¤ect welfare in existing EU states, but, on the assumption that Single
Market enlargement consists of the removal of resource costs on trade, all member states
gain, as do the states of the former Soviet Union.
1.1.3 Trade and strategic regulatory bias
In Chapter 4, I look more critically at the assumptions underlying the idea that reg-
ulatory di¤erences between nations constitute regulatory protection. In particular, I
investigate one of the possible motives for quality regulation: namely the presence of
monopolistic distortions, primarily using theoretical models of a monopoly and a cross-
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hauling duopoly.
If it costs more to produce goods of higher quality, then one would expect a monop-
olist (or oligopoly) to choose lower-than-optimal quality standards, for much the same
reason as he will produce a smaller volume than optimal. I set up a model based on fairly
simple homotheticity assumptions, where consumer utility depends on an aggregate of
quantity consumed and quality (=quality adjusted output). I assume that national
regulators have power to set minimum quality standards, but not to regulate prices.
Consider rst a simple monopoly: if a regulator sets a minimum quality standard higher
than the producer would choose, prots are lower, but consumer welfare is higher. For
the socially optimal standard (assuming price regulation is infeasible), the regulator will
set a standard at the point where the marginal loss of prot to the monopolist exactly
o¤sets the marginal gains to consumers from higher quality (unless this causes prots to
fall below zero28) . However, if the monopolistic producer is foreign, the regulator will
set a higher standard than this, to the point where prots fall to zero.29
The approach is extended to a cross-hauling duopoly with identical consumers, pro-
ducers and countries. However, in this case, the strategic game is more complicated.
If national regulators do not cooperate, then in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium they will
again set product standards which are higher than socially optimal, since each regula-
tor does not take account of the e¤ect of higher regulatory standards upon the foreign
producers prots. Consequently, there are potential welfare gains from cooperation in
standard setting. However, in the absence of cooperation, trade (at least in terms of
28This is a feature which almost certainly depends upon the functional form selected. On the form
investigated in Chapter 4, the non-negative prot constraint does not intervene in the monopoly case,
so that the regulator in an importing country will always set a higher standard than that in a producing
country.
29This result might potentially be modied if regulators were to engage in strategic games of retaliating
in di¤erent sectors against a country which strategically overregulated a monopoly exporter.
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quality-adjusted units) will be higher, not lower than socially optimal. The nonnegative
prot constraint generally limits the degree of overregulation, but does not eliminate it.
Also, if rms are identical, there is no discrimination in favour of the domestic against
the foreign rm: in other words, this is an over-regulation bias, rather than regulatory
protection. Against this, it is worth noting that mutual recognition also produces non-
optimal results, though whether over- or under-regulation is not always clear: if each
countrys regulator knows that it can allow its domestic producer to cut quality and sell
goods abroad at greater prot (but at a loss to foreign consumers), then there could po-
tentially be a bias under mutual recognition to under-regulation and suboptimal trade.
In other circumstances, raising regulatory standards at home may increase the rms
export share (causing a prot shift). Which e¤ect dominates depends upon model pa-
rameterisations and the assumed setup of the regulatory game. However, in numerical
simulations based upon the chosen functional form, I nd that the prot-shifting motive
outweighs the quality-cutting motive, so that mutual recognition consistently leads to
standards above the global optimum for a wide range of parameter values. In some
of these cases, the nonnegative prot constraint intervenes (so that the standards set,
in practice, both with mutual recognition and with noncooperation are the zero prot
standards). In these cases, mutual recognition will not alter standards or trade. In
other cases, mutual recognition leads to a reduction in overregulation, which will almost
certainly be welfare-improving, even if it is trade-reducing.
If the two rms di¤er, or if countriestastes di¤er, then there may be a motivation
to manipulate product standards in order to benet the market share and prots of the
domestic producer at the expense of its foreign rival. This is a prot-shifting motive for
regulatory protection. However, in order for there to be such a prot-shifting motive,
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prots have to be signicant.
A pure horizontal barrier, which raises the costs for the foreign rm, without raising
the quality experienced by consumers, is unattractive when the option of tari¤ protec-
tion is also available. If tari¤s are ruled out, there is a potential prot-shifting motive.
However, to be attractive to a regulator, the prot-shift has to outweigh the loss to con-
sumers: in the case of the Cobb-Douglas/linear functional form investigated in Chapter
4, this is not the case.
I also carry the model across to the case where it is impossible for a monopolistic
producer to vary quality between one market and another, and where one country is
an exporter and the other an importer of the good in question (a case in point being
genetically modied foodstu¤s). In these circumstances, if there is mutual recognition,
the good will be produced at suboptimal quality. In this case, quality is being interpreted
broadly, so that suboptimal quality may take the form of inadequate testing or labelling.
By contrast, if countries set their standards separately, then if the producer is to supply
both markets, we would expect it to set its quality at the standard in the importing
country, which will generally be higher than those in the exporting country. However,
the importing country will not be able to set standards too far above those in the
exporting country, or the rm would cease to export to it. Consequently, there is a
bargaining game between the two countriesregulators. The possibility that trade may
be blocked completely in the short run, as countries regulators ex their muscles (or
while they wait upon a judgement from the WTO) cannot be ruled out.
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1.1.4 Search and the path-dependency of trade
The paper in Chapter 5 is a contribution to a relatively new area of trade theory: namely
the application of searching and matching theory to trade. The theoretical model is
partly derived from Rauch and Casellas (2003) matching model of interrm trade -
however, it di¤ers in that Rauch and Casella assume rms have only one opportunity
to match with a foreign partner, and that if it is unsuccessful they can return to their
previous domestic partner. By contrast, I postulate the development of trade as the
outcome of a match-searching process, where rms search for information on potential
partners (domestic or foreign) by undertaking a series of potential matches, until a match
which exceeds their reservation match quality is achieved.
This model can be seen as rather schematic - in practice there may be plenty of ways in
which rms can shorten the search process, by sharing information and the like. However,
the key feature which comes across from the match-searching schema, which is perhaps
overlooked in previous matching models of trade, is the importance of trade history
as a determinant of the information which in turn inuences current trade decisions.
Consequently, trade would be expected to have strongly path-dependent properties, and
perceived home bias in todays trade may be, at least in part, the legacy of a past where
trade and international contact were more costly to undertake than today.
The paper draws a number of potential implications from this model. Entering into
trade can be seen as a search investment (and matching information as a form of business
capital) - so that greater ease of search and cheaper or better nance for trade would be
expected to produce both greater trade and better eventual equilibrium match quality.
Firms that have found an existing partner of greater than reservation match quality will
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be much less price sensitive in their choice of partner than rms who are still searching:
it is an expensive and risky option to ditch a good match in the hope of nding a better
one. Consequently, countries or trade blocs in a mature state, where most rms have
reached at least reservation match quality, will have less price sensitive import demand
than newer trade blocs. This has implications for the e¤ects of timing and sequencing
of trade decisions: an eventual free trade outcome may produce quite di¤erent trade
patterns and welfare results depending upon the sequencing of the intervening trade
liberalisation stages. The implications of this are investigated numerically.
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Chapter 2
Short- and long-run wage inequality decompositions.
2.1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the causes of increased wage inequality in OECD countries in recent
years, more specically its decomposition into the component factors of trade surges in
low wage products and technological change that has preoccupied the trade and wages
literature.1 We argue that if we assume that the observed wage inequality response
to price and technology shocks reects a short-run response in which factor allocations
and output have not fully adjusted across industries, then decomposition analysis of the
causes of the observed increases in inequality is substantially altered relative to a long-
run world in which all factors are mobile. This nding is important because most data
used in the debate are interpreted as reective of a long-run full mobility response, when
this may not be the case. Incorrect conclusions as to how trade surges and technology
contribute to wage inequality can be easily drawn if the data are generated by a short-run
adjustment process.
1See Wood (1994), Haskel and Slaughter (1998), Slaughter (1999) and Leamer (1998).
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We examine two cases of factor immobility: a two-factor model where one factor is
subject to mobility costs, and a Ricardo-Viner model with a third factor, immobile in
the model run. In both cases, relatively small departures from the fully mobile Hecksher-
Ohlin model noticeably change the decomposition results.
2.2 Long- and short-run models for trade and wages analy-
sis
We use trade-based models to decompose the observed change in skilled-unskilled wage
inequality in the UK between 1979 and 1995 to evaluate the relative importance of world
prices (trade changes) and technological progress (whether sector- or factor-biased) in
generating wage change. We compare results from short-run models in which some
factors are either immobile or face adjustment costs moving between sectors, to those
from a longer-run Heckscher-Ohlin type model where all factors are fully mobile between
industries.
Models where not all factors can move easily between sectors (Mayer, Mussa, 1974,
and Neary, 1978) have been used to investigate the implications of this feature for relative
incomes in a two-factor model (such as whether the Stolper-Samuleson theorem still
holds) and are the starting point for this paper. In these papers, the factor inputs are
labour and capital, with capital immobile between sectors.
We discuss the case where the factor inputs are unskilled (U) and skilled (S) labour,
with U being the factor subject to adjustment costs. In this case, if there is a fall in the
world price of the U -intensive good, with S freely mobile between sectors, then since U
cannot easily move towards the S-intensive sector in the short run, its wage will rise in
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the expanding sector and fall more steeply than the goods price in the declining sector.
The wage of S will fall in the short run, though by less than the fall in the price of
the U -intensive good. In the longer run, as factor U becomes free to move towards the
S-intensive sector where its wage is higher, the output of this sector will expand. Given
the shift towards the S-intensive sector, Ss wages will rise, while Us wage will fall
further in both sectors. This relative wage e¤ect reecting the shift over time in factors
can be more marked than the initial impact e¤ect of the price shock, and is the main
factor behind the long-run Stolper-Samuelson inuences on relative wages (a fall in the
U -intensive good price will reduce Us wage and raise Ss wage).
Although Us income will fall sharply in the U -intensive sector when the goods price
falls, it will actually fall further, rather than be mitigated, once U becomes free to move
to the other sector, as Ss share of income gets bid up by the shift of output to the S-
intensive sector. This suggests that some of the conclusions of the short-run model may
di¤er from those predicted by the longer-run H-O model, in that much of the impact of
trade on relative factor rewards (the magnicatione¤ect2) requires factor rewards to be
equated across sectors (which, in turn, will lead to changes in output): something which
requires factor movement except in the polar case of Leontief production technologies.
Also factor price insensitivity to endowments does not apply when not all factors are
able to move, so any short-runstudy of the causes of changing wage inequality needs
to take account of changing endowments, not simply world prices and technology.
This conclusion is supported by our alternative, Ricardo-Viner case, where both types
2Jones (1965) identied the magnicatione¤ect of product prices on factor prices, whereby if the
price of a labour-intensive good (say good L) rises relative to a capital-intensive good (K), the e¤ect
upon relative factor rewards is greater than the change in relative goods prices, so that, if initial prices
are 1, w > PL > PK > r. This result assumes the market equates factor rewards across sectors.
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of labour are mobile, but capital is immobile. Again, the capital immobility reduces the
shift in output between sectors in response to a price change, with the e¤ects depending,
among other things, on relative factor intensities. On the simulations carried out for the
UK, this has a damping e¤ect on changes in labour demand and wages, which becomes
signicant even with relatively small amounts of the xed factor present. Sector output
movement and changes in factor demand are noticeably reduced even when only 2% to
5% of value added comprises a xed factor.
We consider the possibility that the changes in relative wages observed in a small
open economy reect the short-run response of the economy to a combination of world
price, technological and demographic shocks. The procedures we employ are to calibrate
a numerical general equilibrium model to the UK economy using data for 1979 and 1995,
and then to make computations to decompose the observed change into component
parts by considering the e¤ects of changes separately. We use a Heckscher-Ohlin model,
which assumes that factors can freely move between sectors, a short-term model which
incorporates adjustment costs for unskilled labour and a Ricardo-Viner model.
2.2.1 A long-run trade and wages model
For our long-run model, we use a 2-factor, 2-sector Heckscher-Ohlin type formulation
of a small, open economy.3 Of the two sectors, sector E (exportables) is assumed
to be intensive in the use of skilled factor S relative to sector M (importables): ie
UE=SE < UM=SM . This holds for any pair of wage rates Wu and Ws (i.e. there are no
factor intensity reversals). The factor input-output ratios for E andM , which we denote
3Strictly speaking, Heckscher-Ohlin trade models provide an explanation of trade patterns between
countries in terms of relative factor abundance. We use the term here to refer to a mobile factors
formulation of a single country.
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auE , asE , auM and asM ; are all functions of Wu and Ws.
We assume both labour markets are perfectly competitive. In equilibrium, these
markets will clear, and factor prices and the associated input-output ratios will all adjust
to clear the two factor markets. These equilibrium conditions imply that
auEfWu;WsgYE + auMfWu;WsgYM = U; (2.1)
asEfWu;WsgYE + asMfWu;WsgYM = S;
where YE and YM are outputs of the two goods and U and S are the economy-wide
endowments of unskilled and skilled labour.
Competition ensures prices equal unit costs in both sectors, ie
auEfWu;WsgWU + asEfWu;WsgWS = PE ; (2.2)
auMfWu;WsgWU + asMfWu;WsgWS = PM ;
where PE and PM are the two goods prices set on the world market.
In order to capture the separate e¤ects of factor- and sector-biased technical progress,
we use a CES production function for each sector of the form
Yi = Ai
h
i (uUi)
((i 1)=i) + (1  i) (sSi)((i 1)=i)
i(i=(i 1))
; (2.3)
where Ai is a scale parameter, i is the elasticity of substitution4 between skilled and un-
skilled labour in production, i is a share parameter and u and s are factor-augmenting
parameters. We can interpret an increase in Ai as representing a general increase in to-
4Note: we are dening the elasticity of substitution, i; here as being positive.
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tal factor productivity in sector i, which is purely sector-biased in its e¤ects. Changes
in u and s represent technical progress which increases the productivity of one fac-
tor across both sectors (factor-biased technological change), or, alternatively, changes
in factor quality over time. Henceforth, we assume u and s are the same across sec-
tors: the di¤erent factor shares in output between the sectors are determined by the i
parameters.
For simplicity, we assume the elasticity of substitution between factors, i, is the
same in both sectors. We can therefore amend (2.3) to read:
Yi = Ai
h
i (uUi)
( 1)=) + (1  i) (sSi)(( 1)=)
i(=( 1))
: (2.3a)
In the calibrations and simulations summarised below, a central case value is assumed
for the elasticity of substitution,  = 1:25, with sensitivity cases of 0:5 and 2 .
In a perfectly competitive industry, relative factor rewards will be equated to the
value of marginal product. Consequently, for any level of output Yi;Wu and Ws can
be derived by di¤erentiating (2.3a) with respect to Ui and Si respectively, setting the
marginal products of Ui and Si equal to the respective wages divided by the product
price, and then rearranging. Hence we derive
Wu = PiAi (Yi=AiUi)
1= i (u)
( 1)= ; (2.4)
Ws = PiAi (Yi=AiSi)
1= (1  i) (s)( 1)= :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (2.4):
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Rewrite (2.3a) as
Yi = AiZ
(=( 1))
i ;
where
Zi = i (uUi)
( 1)= + (1  i) (sSi)( 1)= :
Hence, by the chain rule of di¤erentiation
dYi=dUi = (= (   1))AiZ(1=( 1))i (dZi=dUi);
where
dZi=dUi = ((   1) =)i( 1)=u U 1=i ;
and
Zi = (Yi=Ai)
( 1)=:
By substitution we can write
dYi=dUi = (= (   1))Ai(Yi=Ai)1=((   1) =)i( 1)=u U 1=i ;
= Ai(Yi=AiUi)
1=i
( 1)=
u :
We then equate this to the real product wage Wu=Pi.
The derivation for factor S can be derived analogously.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Alternatively, we can rearrange (2.4) to derive (Ui=Yi) and (Si=Yi):
Ui=Yi = A
 1
i (Wu=(iPi))
  1u ; (2.4a)
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Si=Yi = A
 1
i (Ws=((1  i)Pi))  1s :
Noting that the zero prot conditions for each sector imply Pi = Wu(Ui=Yi) +
Ws(Si=Yi), we can substitute in for (Ui=Yi) and (Si=Yi) to obtain prices for the two
sectors, which are equated by competition to unit costs,
Pi = A
 1
i fW  1u i 1u +W 1 s (1  i) 1s g1=(1 ): (2.5)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (2.5):
Pi = Wu(Ui=Yi) +Ws(Si=Yi);
= Wu(A
 1
i (Wu=(iPi))
  1u ) +Ws(A
 1
i (Ws=((1  i)Pi))  1s );
P 1 i = A
 1
i [W
1 
u i
 1u +W
1 
s (1  i) 1s ];
Pi = A
 1
i [W
1 
u i
 1u +W
1 
s (1  i) 1s ]1=(1 ):
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Dening
si = (1  i)=1 s ;
ui = i
=1 u ;
i = fE;Mg; (2.6)
we can write
P 1 i A
1 
i = uiW
1 
u + siW
1 
s ;
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and cross-multiplying these equations for industries E and M gives us:
(PEAE)
1 (UMW 1 u + SMW
1 
s ) = (PMAM )
1 (UEW 1 u + SEW
1 
s ); (2.7)
W 1 u [(PEAE)
1 UM   (PMAM )1 UE ] = W 1 s [(PMAM )1 SE   (PEAE)1 SM ]:
Hence we can derive the ratio WS=WU .
(Ws=Wu)
1  = [(PEAE)1 UM   (PMAM )1 UE ]=[(PMAM )1 SE   (PEAE)1 SM ];
= [um (PEAE=PMAM )
1    uE ]=[SE   SM (PEAE=PMAM )1 ];
Ws=Wu = f[um (PEAE=PMAM )1    uE ]=[SE   SM (PEAE=PMAM )1 ]g1=1 :
(2.8)
In this formulation, Ws=Wu is higher the larger is PE or AE , and the smaller is PM or
AM . An increase in u=s will reduce Ws=Wu (this is the same result as in Davis (1997)
and Haskel and Slaughter (2002)). Changes in the CES share parameters, , however,
have ambiguous e¤ects on relative wages.
As Abrego and Whalley (2000) note, following Harry Johnson (1966), in the CES
case specialization can occur for relatively small changes in goods prices (depending upon
relative factor intensities and the elasticity of substitution). If specialization does occur,
beyond this point traded goods prices do not a¤ect relative wages, though changes in
factor supplies will have an inuence.
It is worth noting that the model equations outlined above do not contain any state-
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ment of consumer demand or utility. In this framework, prices of all goods are set on
the world markets, and consumer demand at home does not a¤ect prices or output if
we assume the economy is small and open. This means that the production and con-
sumption sides of the economy are separable; and given our focus on the determination
of relative wage change we can concentrate on modelling the production side alone. The
same argument applies for the short run model to which we turn next.
2.2.2 A short-run adjustment model of trade and wages
We formulate a short-run trade and wages model similar to the long-run model above,
but in which labour cannot move costlessly between sectors due to adjustment costs.
These may be search costs, transportation or removal costs, transactions costs in housing
markets, or even psychological costs and preference for location.
In the model, we assume these transactions costs create a wedge between the wage
o¤ered in the sector where labour is currently employed and the wage needed to be
o¤ered in another sector in order for a worker to move. Wage rates in sectors which are
expanding following an international price shock to the economy are thus higher than
those in contracting sectors where labour shedding occurs.
We start out by looking at the theoretical properties of this model. In this model,
factor U will only move from a declining sector M to an expanding sector E if wages in
E exceed those in M by some proportionate amount ui: ie if WuE  WuM  uWuM ,
and likewise for factor S if it also faces adjustment costs. This means that a sector can,
in principle, fall into one of three potential categories: (i) it can be an expanding sector,
where employers pay a high wage (gross of adjustment cost), (ii) it can be a declining
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sector, where the wage is lower, but adjustment costs are lower or (iii) it can be a static
sector. In this latter case, the sector concerned will pay wages high enough that its
labour force does not nd it attractive to move to another sector once adjustment costs
are taken into account, but not so high that it attracts labour from the other sector.
In expanding sectors (denoted sector i, a member of set e of all expanding sectors),
we dene the wage gross of adjustment costs asW gue. The wage net of adjustment costs is
thenWnue =W
g
ue=(1+U ). In declining sectors (i is a member of set d, the set of declining
sectors) the wage rate Wud will be the same as the wage in expanding sectors Wue net
of adjustment costs, which in turn equals W gue=(1 + U ): Potentially, there may also be
some sectors whose output may fetch a declining price, but where workers will take a
lower wage rather than become unemployed: these will have unchanged employment if
the wage lies between W gue and W
g
ue=(1 + U ).
To capture these features we modify equation (2.4) to apply di¤erent wages to di¤er-
ent sectors, expressing wages in all sectors in relation to the gross wage in the expanding
sectors, W gue. We will call this the reference wage, and label it as WRu . As we consider
a two sector model, there are, in theory, two possible outcomes - rst, one sector may
be expanding and the other contracting, or alternatively both sectors may be static. In
this latter case, one of the static sectors (call it the static, advantagedsector) may well
be paying a higher wage than the other static, disadvantagedsector, but the di¤erence
in wages is not su¢ cient to tempt the unskilled factor to move.5
For each sector, we express the proportional di¤erence between the wage received by
labour in the unskilled intensive sector WRu , and the (gross of adjustment cost) wage
paid by employers, W gu as lui. This allows us to characterise the di¤erence in sectoral
5 In practice, we note that a shift of factors and output between sectors is observed, which means that
the second case (both sectors static) is not observed.
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wage rates as follows:
In expanding sectors (i  e) : lui = 0; (2.9a)
In declining sectors (i  d) : lui = u; (b)
In static, advantaged sectors (i  e) : lui = 0; (c)
In static, disadvantaged sectors (i  e) : 0 < lui < u: (d)
In other words, the wage discount cannot exceed u, since otherwise labour would
move, reducing the discount back to this level.
We dene the benchmark (pre-shock) levels of employment of U and S in each sector
as Ui and S

i ; the levels of employment if nobody leaves the sector. In a declining sector
i (i  d; ) adjustment costs mean that the wage discount factor luj equals the maximum
permitted, u, and labour can move (ie the sector is declining).
The adjustment costs borne by those factors which move (which may be in the form
of either temporary unemployment or a loss of productive e¢ ciency) are given by:
u = W
R
u
X
i
lui (U

i   Ui) ; (2.10)
s = W
R
s
X
i
lsi (S

i   Si) :
If adjustment costs are denominated in units of labour, this reduces e¤ective economy-
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wide endowments
X
i
Ui = U   ui=WRu ; (2.11)X
i
Si = S   si=WRs :
The e¤ects of introducing adjustment costs into the model are thus: i) the wage of
each factor will now di¤er between sectors by a proportion u for U and s for S. (ii)
Factors are now less mobile in response to a price or other shock. In particular, there
is a range of traded goods prices over which factors will not move, and this is wider the
larger are u and s. (iii) Following Neary (1998), reduced mobility reduces the e¤ects
of product price changes on relative wage changes in both sectors. (iv) Because of the
e¤ects of the adjustment costs on factor movements and relative wages, the specialisation
e¤ects in a classical Heckscher-Ohlin model are less likely to occur. The modied model
is easier to reconcile with observed data, where extreme changes to specialisation are
not observed. (v) If we assume that in the long run u and s are zero, a price change
will have larger e¤ects on output, employment and wages in the long run than over the
short-run. (vi) the long-run model is simply the short-run model with the parameters
u and s set to zero.
2.2.3 A Ricardo-Viner xed factor model of trade and wages
Our Ricardo-Viner model utilises a nested CES function to combine three factors: un-
skilled labour, U , skilled labour, S, and capital. Skilled and unskilled labour are mobile
across sectors with a common wage, Ws or Wu respectively, while capital is sector spe-
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cic, set at a level Ki. A CES nesting structure is used in which the two types of
labour are used in each sector i are combined to form aggregate labour Li using a CES
aggregation. This is then combined with capital in a Cobb-Douglas function to yield
total sectoral output, Yi.
The CES aggregation function for the sectoral labour aggregate, Li, is of the same
form as equation (2.3)
Li = Ai
h
i (uUi)
( 1)= + (1  i) (sSi)( 1)=
i=( 1)
; (i = u; s): (2.12)
If we dene an aggregate labour wage, Wi, as a CES aggregation of skilled and un-
skilled wages for each sector, then the rst order conditions for employment of each
type of labour in a competitive market can be written as dLi=dUi = Wu=Wi and
dLi=dSi = Ws=Wi. We can obtain dLi=dUi and dLi=dSi by di¤erentiating (2.12). Con-
sequently we can rearrange this to express the two wages Wu and Ws in terms of Wi;
Li; Ui and Si:
Wu = WiAi (Li=AiUi)
1= i
=( 1)
u ; (i = u; s); (2.13)
Ws = WiAi (Li=AiSi)
1= (1  i)=( 1)u ; (i = u; s);
which implies that
Ui=Li = A
 1
i (Wu=(iWi))
  1u ; (2.13a)
Si=Li = A
 1
i (Ws=((1  i)Wi)) ii 1s ;
or
Si=Ui = (Ws=Wu)
 i((1  i)=i) i(u=s)(1 i):
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{Derivation of 2.13 follows that for 2.5}
The aggregate labour wage, Wi can be normalised to equal the average of skilled and
unskilled wages in the sector :
Wi = (WuUi +WsSi) =Li: (2.14)
The Cobb-Douglas aggregation of Li andKi to form Yi is given by: Yi = iK
i
i L
1 i
i ;
where 0 < i < 1:
i is the capital share coe¢ cient for industry I, i is a scale coe¢ cient and from the
rst order conditions
Li = (1  i)PiYi=Wi; (2.15)
Ri = iPiYi;
where Ri is the rental return to capital.
2.3 Calibration and data
To use these models in decomposition experiments to assess the relative importance of
trade surges and technological change for changes in wage inequality, we calibrate each to
observed data for 1979 and 1995 for the UK. Since we compare the e¤ects of alternatively
assuming changes between those dates represent either short- or the long-run responses,
we use three calibrations. In the Ricardo-Viner model we have three factors: capital,
skilled and unskilled labour. In the other two versions (Heckscher-Ohlin or H-O, and
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partial mobility) we reallocate capital income from our database to the other two factors
proportionately by sector, so the simplied model just has two factors. The H-O model
di¤ers from the partial mobility one in that u and s are set to zero: calibration based on
this assumption means assuming a long-run equilibrium in the economy (ie the standard
H-O model), whereas with u set at a non-zero level we are assuming the economy is at
a short-run equilibrium only. This latter treatment means that the adjustment process
for the unskilled factor reects an outcome inuenced by short-run adjustment costs.
In all three models calibrated here, both goods are fully tradable and perfect substi-
tutes for foreign goods. Consequently, if we assume the UK is a small, open economy,
prices of the two goods are determined on global markets and can be taken as exogenous
(although there is a downward shift in the price of the unskilled-intensive good over time,
reecting the opening up of new supply sources in Asia and elsewhere6). A consequence
of these assumptions is that the production and factor demand side of the economy can
be treated as separable from the goods demand side: we can simply treat World prices
as given, with no need to model domestic goods demand, import and export volumes.
One potential problem with the above trade formulations (indeed with all neoclassi-
cal trade models) is the di¢ culty of reconciling the model with observed two-way trade.
This is frequently used as a justication for the use of new trade theory models based
upon a love of varietyapproach (see chapter 3). However, while we acknowledge the
importance of two-way trade between advanced countries in the skill-intensive sectors,
arguably trade between the rich countries and the developing World is driven more by
specialisation, with the rich countries as a group exporting skill-intensive goods and ser-
vices and importing less skill-intensive goods. In this context, it may well be appropriate
6Physical and human capital accumulation in the Asian economies (see A.Young, 1995) and techno-
logical improvement in the transport sector will also play a role here.
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to use more factor-driven models of trade, such as in this paper.7 Consequently, we have
used data for net imports/exports in this model.
To calibrate either the H-O or partial mobility models to the start- and end-years, we
solve the model for parameter values given data for the two years, 1979 and 1995 with
prices, wages, output and employment set at their observed values. We assume a value
for the elasticity of substitution between factors in production  (we assume the same
elasticity for both sectors, to rule out the possibility of factor intensity reversals), and we
assume values for the di¤erential between skilled and unskilled wages in the expanding
and declining sectors E and M .
Note that, for our central case we assume an elasticity of substitution between factors
in production,  = 1:25: In the Appendix, we investigate sensitivity cases where  = 0:5
and  = 2:The unknowns at this stage are the model parameters for each sector and
each time period (uit; sit; it and Ait).
We use the eight rst-order conditions for cost-minimising behaviour (equations for
2 factors for 2 sectors for 2 years, (1979 and 1995)).
Wuit = PtiAit (Yit=AitUit)
1= it
( 1)=
uit (2.16)
Wst = PitAit (Yit=AitSit)
1= (1  it)( 1)=sit
We assume a value for the elasticity of substitution between factors in production,
which we also assume to be constant across sectors (we carry out the calibration and
7Note that Abrego and Whalley (1999a) investigate the e¤ects of introducing di¤erentiated goods
into general equilibrium trade-wages decompositions (a simple form of Armington model). In this paper,
we prefer to investigate the e¤ects of factor immobility separately from those of product di¤erentiation.
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simulations for a central case  = 1:25 with sensitivity values of  = 0:5 and  = 2:0).
Using this, it is possible to calibrate the model, i.e. to generate values of the technical
coe¢ cients (u, s; , and A) for each sector. The other constraint we assume is that
there is no decline in industry-specic technology in either sector (i.e. Ai cannot decline
from period 0 to period 1), based on the assumptions that technological innovations will
not be unlearnt once developed.
For the Ricardo-Viner model, we calibrate capital share coe¢ cients i from income
shares. The calibrated values of the unskilled share parameters, i, and the labour
quality coe¢ cients, ui and si; are unchanged compared to the calibrated H-O model,
while the Ai scale parameters for labour income are smaller.
Having determined parameter values in each of the models using the calibration
procedures described above (which we use for the long-run model where u; s = 0 and
the short-run model where u > 0), we then compute counterfactual equilibria with each
model. Using the 1979 UK price, technology and endowment data as inputs, we compute
equilibria for the UK economy if endowments, prices and/or technological parameters
are separately changed to their 1995 model values. We then compare these computed
model equilibria to the actual 1995 data in which all these changes jointly appear.
Previous studies (e.g. Abrego and Whalley (2000)) have decomposed the causes of
increased inequality by carrying out simulations, rst altering prices, then technological
parameters (or vice-versa). Due to model nonlinearities, the order of decomposition can
make a di¤erence to how much change is attributed to which cause. For this reason, we
follow a method (similar to that in Kose and Riezmans (1999) study of customs unions),
in which endowments, trade and technology are changed in a series of small steps (rst
1/10 of the total change in endowments, then 1/10 of the total change in prices and 1/10
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of the total change in technology, then repeating the cycle): the smaller the steps, the
less the order matters.8
2.3.1 Data
We use data for the UK for 1979 and 1995 for our model analyses, similar to those used
by Abrego and Whalley (1999b). They used data on skilled and unskilled employment
and wages for two broad categories of industry, taken from the UK Labour Force Survey.
We use an estimate of a 7.9 per cent fall in the relative price of unskilled imports between
1979 and 1995 based on an estimate derived by Abrego and Whalley (1999) from Neven
and Wyplosz (1999).9
As two of our models have only two factors, against the three in Abrego and Whalley
(1999a), we reallocate income accruing to the xed factor in each sector between skilled
and unskilled labour in the proportions used in that sector. Following Abrego and
Whalley, value added is rounded to equal gross output.
The 1979 and 1995 UK data we use are shown in Table 2.1 below. Price and wage
data are in real terms. An important feature of the data used is the marked di¤erence in
skilled/unskilled labour usage between the two sectors: the ratio of skilled to unskilled
workers is more than twice as great in sector E as in sector M in both years.
The rise in the average real wage of unskilled labour was approximately 23 per cent
between 1979 and 1995,10 reecting an increase in the premium for skilled over unskilled
8This was conrmed by carrying out decompositions in di¤erent orders with progressively smaller
steps. As the steps grow smaller, the decompositions converge.
9Although Neven and Wyplosz nd that prices of imports from OECD countries or from developing
countries do not vary much by sector skill-intensity, imports from developing countries fall relatively in
price to those from OECD countries, and these weigh more heavily in total UK imports in the skill-
intensive sectors.
10This is calibrated to UK GNP growth see the UK national accounts 1996 Table 1.3.
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wage rates from 22% in 1979 to over 59% in 1995. This occurs despite the ratio of
skilled/unskilled labour inputs rising in both sectors. While there is an increase in the
share of skilled intensive exportables in total production, both sectors show rising output.
The change in industrial structure in the data is therefore a relatively minor factor
compared with what a Heckscher-Ohlin model would usually be expected to produce in
response to the assumed 7.9% fall in the relative goods prices.11
11With an elasticity of substitution of 1.25 between the two fully-mobile factors, and starting with
output and employment as in our database for 1979, we show complete specialisation in good X after
a price fall of just 6.3% in good M. This corresponds to a change of nearly 40% in relative skilled
wages. Details of this calculation are available on request from the authors. The fact that relative factor
intensities di¤er greatly across sectors is one reason for the speed at which specialisation is reached.
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Table 2.1: 1979 and 1995 UK data used in calibrating short-run models
1979 1995
Labour Input (bn hrs) Good M Unskilled 36.0 26.4
Skilled 19.0 25.2
Total 55.0 51.6
S/U 0.5 1.0
Good E Unskilled 24.3 16.5
Skilled 33.4 34.8
Total 57.7 51.4
S/U 1.4 2.1
Total Unskilled 60.3 42.9
Skilled 52.4 60.1
Total 112.7 103.0
Hourly wage pounds Average Unskilled 5.47 6.45
1995 prices Skilled 6.67 10.23
Average wage ratio 1.22 1.59
Output index Good M 100.0 134.0
Good E 100.0 138.1
Goods prices Good M 1 0.921
Good E 1 1
Good M % of total value added 47.5% 44.7%
The unskilled labour mobility cost, u, reects studies which tend to indicate that
unskilled labour may be less mobile between sectors than skilled. Kruse (1988) suggest
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unemployment periods in the US are generally longer for unskilled rather than skilled
workers, which, in terms of our model, might suggest a higher threshold wage di¤eren-
tial for the unskilled before they start to move between sectors. This is borne out by
Haynes, Upward and Wrights (2000) UK study, which suggest that those with lower
skills experience longer unemployment duration.
We have chosen, for simplicity, to assume that only unskilled labour, factor U , is
a¤ected by mobility costs (ie s = 0;u  0) and we use a gure of 13.7 % for 1995,12
an upper endestimate of mobility costs. In later sensitivity analysis, we also evaluate
models with lower values.
2.4 Model results
We use three calibrations to the 1979 and 1995 data: one involving the long-run two-
factor model in which all factors are able to move freely in response to price and technol-
ogy shocks; a second short-run model in which unskilled labour is only partially mobile,
if intersectoral wage di¤erentials exceed a threshold, assumed to be 13.7% of wages;
and a third using a three-factor Ricardo-Viner model with sectorally xed capital. We
concentrate initially on the case where the elasticity of substitution between factors of
production is 1.25 in both sectors.
Table 2.2 outlines our decomposition results for observed changes in relative wages of
skilled and unskilled labour between 1979 and 1995 using these three calibrated models.
The contribution of various causal factors to the observed change in the average skilled to
12This assumes that the 7 3
4
% di¤erence in wages between sectors reported by Greenaway et al.
(1999) for the UK in 1990 is explained entirely by lower unskilled wages in the declining sectors, in turn
reecting an unwillingness to move due to mobility costs. We assume the 7 3
4
% di¤erence in average
wages comprises no di¤erential for skilled workers and a 13.7 % di¤erential for unskilled.
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unskilled wage ratio, which Table 2.1 indicates increased from 1.22 to 1.59, is expressed
by the contribution of each causal factor as a percentage of the total change.
Table 2.2: Model decomposition of wage inequality
Central case changes Long run Short run Ricardo-
Component factors: factors mobile adjustment cost Viner
World price change 152% 83% 19%
Technology:
-sector bias -491% -228% -43%
-skill bias 184% 187% 256%
-capital bias 0% 0% -8%
-factor quality 255% 151% 67%
Endowments 0% -92% -191%
Total 100% 100% 100%
In the long-run Heckscher-Ohlin factors mobile model (rst column of numbers), the
increase in skilled and fall in unskilled factor endowments has no e¤ect, as the factor
price insensitivity result (see, e.g. Leamer and Levinsohn (1995)) suggests. However, the
model shows substantial sensitivity to the change in world prices, which alone accounts
for 152 % of the total observed wage change. There is also substantial factor bias in
favour of the skilled factor (skill bias +184% and factor quality +255%), and rise in the
skilled share of output. These results t the observed wage and output changes due to a
sizeable sector-biased technical change in the opposite direction (-491%), favouring the
unskilled intensive sector M .
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In the second column, the partial mobility model shows di¤erent results. The change
of endowments has a large e¤ect on relative wages narrowing the gap between skilled and
unskilled wage rates (-92% of the total net observed change). The e¤ect of world prices
is reduced to around 83% of the observed total wage change, while sector bias, which still
favours the unskilled-intensive good, is also smaller in this model compared to the factors
mobile model (-228% of the observed change against -491%). The main factor in this
model behind the increased inequality is the change in the skill share within industries
(187% of the observed change), with a slightly smaller contribution from factor quality.
The nal column of Table 2.2 reports results for the Ricardo-Viner xed factors model
sectoral output and employment are less sensitive to price or sector-biased technical
changes. World price changes account for just 19% of the total observed change in relative
wages, 1/10 of the change in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Sector-biased technical change
has a moderate damping e¤ect on inequality (-43%). The main picture conveyed by
this model is strong factor-biased change within industries (+256% of the observed net
change) in favor of skilled labour, o¤set partially by large e¤ects of endowment changes
(-191%).
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Table 2.3a: Sensitivity of decomposition in short run models to key parameters
Per cent of total change
in ratio of skilled Long-run model Short run
/unskilled earnings adj cost 5% 10% 14%
World Price Change 152% 126% 99% 83%
Technology bias:
-sector bias -491% -387% -288% -228%
-skill bias 184% 186% 186% 187%
-capital bias 0% 0% 0% 0%
-factor quality 255% 212% 173% 151%
Endowments change 0% -37% -70% -92%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2.3a reports the sensitivity results for the partial mobility model to changes
in the assumed mobility cost. Moving rightward the columns show adjustment costs
for labour increasing from zero (Long-run model) to our maximum 13.7 %, and shows
that the e¤ect of trade upon wage changes falls markedly as the adjustment cost rises,
from 152% of total observed changes in the Heckscher-Ohlin case to 83% in our maxi-
mum adjustment cost case (in other words, nearly halved). The latter is still, however,
somewhat larger than estimated by most other empirical studies of the contribution of
trade. The roles of factor-biased technology changes, in the opposite direction: the role
of endowment changes rises rapidly as factor mobility costs are introduced.
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Table 2.3b: Sensitivity of decomposition in short run models to key parameters
Per cent Ricardo-
of total change Long-run Viner
in ratio of skilled Fixed fctr
/unskilled earnings share 2% 5% 10% 20% 30%
World Price Change 152% 101% 65% 41% 24% 17%
Technology bias:
-sector bias -491% -324% -201% -119% -60% -36%
-skill bias 184% 204% 207% 210% 213% 214%
-capital bias 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
-factor quality 255% 188% 137% 102% 77% 66%
Endowments change 0% -70% -108% -134% -153% -161%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2.3b summarizes the sensitivity of the Ricardo-Viner xed factor model to
di¤erent assumptions about the share of xed factors in value added. The higher the
assumed share of xed factors in value added, the less role for trade or sector bias and the
greater the role of endowment changes. However, the most revealing columns are those
where we have assumed just 2% or 5% of value added consists of xed factor payments.
Introducing relatively small amounts of these xed factors modies the behaviour of the
model quite rapidly compared to to the Heckscher-Ohlin model: the e¤ect of traded
prices, for example, is cut from 152% of observed changes to 101% with 2% of factors
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xed, and 65% with a 5% xed factor share.13
The tables in the Appendix explore the sensitivity of our decomposition results in
the three models to the elasticity of substitution between unskilled and skilled labour in
production, which we set at 0.5 and 2 instead of our central case value of 1.25.
Comparing estimates of the contribution of various factors when the assumed elastic-
ity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is changed shows that the rela-
tionship between elasticity and decomposition estimates is neither simple nor monotonic.
In most cases the e¤ects of skill bias (positive) and endowments change (negative) on rel-
ative wages are higher when the elasticity of substitution between factors is lower. Factor
quality is more important in explaining relative wage changes with higher substitution
elasticities. The relationship to price changes and sector bias seems to be non-monotonic.
13The result that the presence of a xed factor alters the e¤ect of trade upon factor returns is, of
course, not new. However, the quantitative assessment of the degree of e¤ect of small amounts of a xed
factor upon the response of factor returns to traded goods prices has not been shown before.
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2.5 Conclusions
In this paper, we compare the use of short-run and long-run trade models to decompose
changes in observed wage inequalities between skilled and unskilled labour over the period
1979-95 for the UK into trade and technology, and endowment change components.
Results of these decompositions are very di¤erent depending upon whether a short-
run model, with limited mobility of unskilled labour, or a long-run model is used to
explain the observed changes. This emphasises that di¤erent assumed model structures
applied to the same data in decomposition will substantially a¤ect the perception of
the role of trade in wage inequality change. The main contribution of this paper is to
demonstrate the degree to which factor mobility assumptions are likely to a¤ect the
response of factor prices to traded goods prices in an advanced economy such as the
United Kingdom. A clear conclusion is that modellers need to be explicit about the
factor mobility assumptions they are making when carrying out decompositions of wage
inequality changes. Since factors are generally believed to be more mobile in the long-run
than the short-run, the time scale over which the decomposition is being carried out is
also important.
In the long-run model, the factor-bias of technical change has no e¤ect (except insofar
as the relative quality of skilled labour has risen). As theory would suggest, factor
endowments have no e¤ect in the long run. In contrast, the e¤ects of observed world price
increases are very large: on its own this price increase would cause a larger shift in output
towards the skill-intensive goods, and a larger rise in skill premia than actually observed.
The long-run model can only be made consistent with the observed output and income
changes if the sector-bias of technical change (the residual category of the decomposition)
is in the opposite direction: for UK total factor productivity in the unskilled-intensive
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sector to have risen faster than in the skill-intensive sector, so damping the tendency of
output to switch.
By contrast, when we use a short-run model for these decompositions, one in which
unskilled labour is only partially mobile, the decomposition results are quite di¤erent.
The rise in the relative supply of unskilled labour now has a sizeable damping e¤ect on
inequality. Factor-biased technical change (leading to a rise in skilled/unskilled input
ratios in both sectors) despite rising skill premia will raise relative skilled wages in a
short-run model. The e¤ect of trade is less marked in the short-run model, though
still quite substantial. The sector-bias in technical progress (which had been large and
favoured the unskilled-intensive sector in the long-run model) is relatively minor in our
short-run model.
The other short-run model specication we examine is a Ricardo-Viner model, where
capital is assumed to be sector-specic. The e¤ects of this are even more marked than
in the partial mobility case - prices and sector-biased technical change have only a small
e¤ect, while factor-biased change is the main cause of insensitivity in inequality, o¤set by
endowment changes. Sensitivity analysis shows that, even when only a small proportion
of valued added is linked to xed factors; behaviour of the model can be noticeably
changed compared to the Heckscher-Ohlin formulation.
There are a number of reasons, we believe, for the short-run model decomposition to
be the more plausible. First, the sign of the sector bias in our calibrated long-run model
is contrary to what comparisons the e¤ects of computerisation on wage inquality (eg by
Haskel and Slaughter, 1998) would indicate. Second, the e¤ects of labour upskilling and
of factor-biased technical change in the short-term models are more consistent with what
studies by labour economists would indicate (eg Borjas et al., 1992; Murphy and Welch,
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1991; and Katz and Murphy, 1992).
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Appendix 2.1: Elasticity sensitivity of
model-based decompositions
Table 2.A.1: Elasticity sensitivity of model based decompositions - substitution elas-
ticity between skilled and unskilled set at 0.5
Factors mobile SR Ricardo-
LR adj cost Viner
World price change (trade) 86% 41% 34%
Technology Sector bias -330% -137% -106%
Skill bias 290% 315% 631%
capital bias 0% 0% -7%
factor quality 54% -6% -83%
Endowments 0% -113% -369%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
Table 2.A.2: Elasticity sensitivity of model based decompositions - substitution elas-
ticity between skilled and unskilled set at 1.25
Factors mobile Short run Ricardo-
Long Run adj cost Viner
World price change (trade) 152% 83% 19%
Technology Sector bias -491% -228% -43%
Skill bias 184% 187% 256%
capital bias 0% 0% -8%
factor quality 255% 151% 67%
Endowments 0% -92% -191%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
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Table 2.A.3: Elasticity sensitivity of model based decompositions - substitution elas-
ticity between skilled and unskilled set at 2
Factors mobile SR adj cost Ricardo-
LR adj cost Viner
World price change (trade) 155% 67% 12%
Technology Sector bias -400% -132% -22%
Skill bias 42% 19% 64%
capital bias 0% 0% -5%
factor quality 303% 221% 171%
Endowments 0% -75% -120%
TOTAL 100% 100% 100%
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Chapter 3
An economic assessment of EU
single market enlargement.
3.1 Introduction
This paper represents a study modelling the costs and benets of the recent and likely
forthcoming waves of EU enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European
Countries (henceforth referred to as CEECs). In particular, I look at the e¤ects of
accession to the EUs Single Market, with its harmonisation and mutual recognition
agreements, which eliminate many non-tari¤ barriers to trade between EU members.
This is investigated using a computable general equilibrium model based upon an im-
perfectly competitive love of varietymodel, using the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, which
has been shown (e.g. Baldwin and Venables, 1995) to generate much more signicant
potential welfare gains from trade than the more traditional Armington models.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the literature
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to date, particularly focusing on the methodology and assumptions of major previous
studies of EU accession by Baldwin et al (1997) and LeJour et al (2001). Section 3
summarises the modelling approach and data used in this paper: in particular the novel,
model-consistent calibration procedure to estimate country bias e¤ects. In section 4, I
outline the results of simulations of accessions of Poland, Hungary and an Other CEEC
Region into the EU, and of accessions of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe1. The
simulations are based upon an intermediate-term Dixit-Stiglitz model, which incorpo-
rates scale and variety e¤ects, but does not allow rm numbers to change, which would
happen in a longer-term model.
The nal section discusses the ndings of these simulations. If we assume that trade
between the EU and accession states moves into line with that between existing EU
members, then the e¤ects on the accession states, particularly Poland, could be very
large, with sizeable increases in trade with the EU and income gains of up to 20 per cent.
However, the assumptions upon which this conclusion is based are rather contentious:
in particular our current theoretical understanding of the working of mutual recognition
agreements and of the relationship between non-tari¤barriers and trade volumes is rather
sketchy. Some of these issues are investigated in more depth in subsequent chapters.
3.2 Background
Early studies of the economics of EU enlargement into the former Soviet bloc (e.g. Brown
et al, 1995) concentrated on the e¤ects of removal of tari¤s and formal non-tari¤ barriers
1Due to data limitations, I am unable to carry out simulations on the precise accession list of 2004.
The other CEEC region comprises the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria. The
latter two are not on the 2004 EU accession list, whereas the 3 Baltic States, as well as Cyprus and
Malta, are.
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(NTBs). Such barriers, except in agriculture, were removed in the mid 1990s by the
Europe Agreements. The issue has then moved to the e¤ects of joining the EUs Single
Market, with its associated mix of regulatory harmonisation and mutual recognition
agreements.
Studies (e.g. Baldwin et al, 1997, or LeJour et al, 2001) which focus on this aspect
have assumed that EU membership for CEECs would have large e¤ects upon trade with
the EU. The justication comes mostly from empirical observation: it is known that
trade between countries falls well short of trade within a single country2, and that signif-
icant country bias also exists for members of trade blocs vis-à-vis non-member countries.
Baldwin in particular has attributed much of this to di¤erences in product standards,
trade law and other informal barriers to trade, which supposedly constitute regulatory
protection3, in many cases higher than formal trade barriers. When combined with
models based upon the new trade theory, the removal of such protection can have size-
able e¤ects, due not just to standard specialisation gains, but also to the diminution of
local monopoly power, the widening of consumer choice and the achievement of scale
economies in a larger market.
Estimates of the scale of non-tari¤ barriers are generally imputed from the empirical
gravity modelling literature. It has long been believed that trade between two countries
is roughly proportional, ceteris paribus, to the product of size of the economies, corrected
for distance and formal trade barriers. However, there are residual di¤erences, which we
shall henceforth call residual country bias. Most notable is home bias: the preference
2McCallum (1995) found a national border e¤ect reducing trade between Canadian provinces and
neighbouring US states by a factor of 22, compared to between Canadian provinces.
3For the arguments on regulatory protection see, e.g., Baldwin, 2001, Maskus and Wilson, 2001 and
Wallner, 1998. However, for counter-arguments, see Swann et al, 1996, Moenius, 1999 and Edwards,
2003(1). Also DTI (2005).
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of consumers for produce of their own country, rather than any other, which seems
empirically to be very strong, even when a country joins the single market. Beyond that
is a lesser, but still signicant bias towards produce of other countries within the same
trade bloc.
These biases are usually picked up in gravity equations, which might typically take
a form such as:
Xi;c;cc = g + 1iD
EU
c;cc + 2gdc;cc + 1sYc + 2syc + 3sYcc + 4sycc +X
d
dDd;i;c;cc + 1sTMi;c;cc + v2sTEi;c;cc + i;c;cc (3.1)
where all variables (except the dummies) are in logs. Xi;c;cc is exports of industry i
from country c to country cc, Y is GDP and y is GDP per capita, d is distance between
capitals of the countries c and cc. DEU is an EU membership dummy, set to 1 if both c
and cc are EU members, otherwise set to zero. D is a set of other dummies for border
e¤ects. TMg;c;cc is the import tari¤ on imports of i from country c to country cc. TEi;c;cc
is the export tari¤ levied by country c on country cc. Table 3.1 summarises LeJour et
als (2001) estimated of residual country bias dummies for EU membership.
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Table 3.1 EU dummies in gravity equations (LeJour et al, 2001)
Sector EU dummy Trade increase%
Agriculture 2.25* 249
Raw materials -0.10 94
Food processing 0.66*
Textiles & leather 0.85* 134
Non-metallic minerals 0.73* 107
Energy-intensive products 0.13
Other manufacturing 0.08
Metals -0.10
Fabricated metal products 0.44* 56
Machinery & equipment 0.31* 37
Electronic equipment 0.58* 79
Transport equipment 0.66* 94
Trade services 0.76* 113
Transport & communication 0.03
Financial services -0.14
Other services 0.27* 31
The rather strong assumption made by both the LeJour et al and the Baldwin et al4
studies is that this residual border e¤ect of EU membership corresponds to an unspecied
set of trade costs (henceforth referred to here as the residual border trade cost), whose
assumed removal or reduction by joining the single market is a sizeable source of potential
economic benet for the CEECs5. However, it must be stressed that there are plenty of
alternative explanations other than iceberg-style trade costs for residual border e¤ects
in empirical models, such as di¤erences in consumer preferences - companies producing
goods suited, say, to French rather than British taste would be more likely to set up in
4 In their earlier paper, Baldwin et al. (1997) assume rather arbitrarily that joining the single market
would mean a reduction in trade costs (real term costs, assumed to be measured as an iceberg cost - a
loss of value of all goods traded between exporting country c and country cc of fraction c;cc) of 10 per
cent across the board.
5The economic interpretation LeJour et al. attach to these dummies stems from the well-known link
(following Bergstrand, 1989) with a general equilibrium trade framework based upon an imperfectly
competitive framework (though, in fact, LeJour et al. use an Armington rather than a Dixit-Stiglitz
model for simulations). Though Deardor¤ (1998) points out that a frictionless Heckscher-Ohlin model
and an Armington model (which may be the result of countries specialising on sub-categories within the
measured goods categories of a H-O model) will also produce gravity relationships.
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France rather than the UK - or historical search-related factors6.
The two above studies both found signicant welfare and trade gains from EU en-
largement. Baldwin et als (1997) simulation results, based on an assumed 10% iceberg
cost on trade between the EU and CEECs, are shown in Table 3.2 (below).
Table 3.2 Baldwin et al. (1997) simulation results for
EU enlargement
Real income changes from EU enlargement (% change on base)
Conservative case Less conservative case
trade gains only with risk premium reduced
CEEC 2.5 18.8
EU15 0.2 0.2
EFTA3 0.1 0.1
Ex-USSR 0.3 0.6
LeJour et al (2001) also nd substantial benets for the accession countries, partic-
ularly Poland, though not as sizeable as in Baldwin et al (1997). This is not surprising
since LeJour et al use an Armington model, which assumes perfect competition within
countries, and so does not provide any estimates of the potential benets (particularly
those linked to increased competition and scale economies) which a Dixit-Stiglitz model
captures7. Both studies are agreed that enlargement involves few costs for existing EU
members, though LeJour et al imply France may have lost slightly from the 1997 tari¤
changes.
6See, e.g., Rauch, 1997, Edwards 2003(2).
7See the discussion in Baldwin and Venables (1995).
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Table 3.3: LeJour et al. (2001) simulation results of
EU enlargement
Volume of GDP e¤ects of Accession
removal of 1997 bilateral to the
tari¤s and adoption of internal
Common External Tari¤ market
CEEC7 1.3 5.3
Hungary 1.9 9.0
Poland 4.3 5.8
CEEC5 1.0 3.4
EU15 0.0 0.1
Germany 0.0 0.1
France -0.2 0.1
United Kingdom 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 0.0 0.0
South Europe 0.0 0.1
Rest EU 0.0 0.1
Third Countries 0.0 0.0
Rest OECD 0.0 0.0
Former Soviet Union 0.0 0.0
ROW 0.0 0.0
3.3 Methodology
Despite the doubts expressed above, this paper proceeds upon the assumption that
residual border e¤ects do indeed reect residual border trade costs, as in the Baldwin
et al and LeJour et al papers. Nevertheless, the approach here di¤ers somewhat. First
of all, in this paper I derive residual border e¤ects by direct calibration of a theoretical
Dixit-Stiglitz model, which is then used for simulation. Unlike previous studies the
calibration and simulation models are fully consistent.
Secondly, I calibrate residual border e¤ects for imports and exports between each
pair of countries (though averagesare then constructed for inter-EU trade using model-
consistent CES functions for aggregation). Since gravity studies typically use a much
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more parsimonious set of dummies (e.g. just a home dummy and a second dummy if
both countries are EU members) they are e¤ectively constraining many residual border
e¤ects to be equal.
The third di¤erence from standard gravity approaches is that more specic account
is taken of the importance of relative output prices. While we do not know exactly
what the relative costs of production in di¤erent countries are (particularly when quality
is corrected for), we can calibrate for revealed comparative costs, once a certain set of
restrictive assumptions has been made about border e¤ects. However, the assumed levels
of relative production prices will directly a¤ect the calibration of residual border e¤ects8,
and di¤erent restrictions on border e¤ects will consequently change the calibrated values
of relative competitiveness of the CEECs in di¤erent industries. In this paper, in the
absence of other data, I derive estimates of relative production prices from market shares
in the Other OECDregion.
3.3.1 Outline of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach
Dixit and Stiglitzs (1977) model is the most widely-used formulation of the love of
varietyapproach to international trade. The presence of a number of di¤erent varieties
or brands of a particular good in consumer demand is explained by the taste of each
individual consumer for variety. We assume each of ni rms within industry i produces
a single, distinct variety, and that the rms compete symmetrically with one another.
This is expressed by a modied CES utility function for utility gained from consuming
8This follows from the algebraic relationships set out in Appendix 3.1. In order to calibrate border
costs to observed trade ows, if we alter our assumption about trade costs, to reduce the assumed
production cost of good g in country A relative to country B, then we would have to assume higher
border costs on As exports of i to country B (and lower border costs in the opposite direction).
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ni di¤erent varieties of goods class i: This takes the form
Ui = (
niX
g=1
aiC

ig)
1=; (3.2)
where Ui is utility in country i, Cig is consumption of good g in country i, ai is the share
parameter for the rms in industry i and  is a substitution parameter. Subscript g refers
to goods variety, where g  f1::nig, so that there are ni varieties of goods within industry
i. One key di¤erence to the standard CES function is that the number of varieties, ni,
need not be xed. As long as 0 <  < 1; utility will increase with ni. Consequently,
for the model to work, we need to have a value of  between zero and unity.9 Since the
substitution parameter, ; is related to the elasticity of substitution10, , by the formula
 = 1=(1  ); (3.3)
this feasible range corresponds to elasticities of substitution, ; which are greater than
unity. This makes sense in two respects: rst because it implies a taste for (rather than
dislike for) increased goods variety, and secondly because it reduces the chances of rms
having own-price elasticities so low that prot-maximising prices tend to innity.11
9This property, which is explained in detail in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) paper, can perhaps be seen
most easily by examining the price of utility, which is PU = (nia
1=(1 )
i P
=( 1)
)( 1)=, where PU is the
unit cost of utility from consuming the produce of industry i and P is the unit price charged by each of
ni identical rms. Hence it can be seen that dPU=dni = (( 1)=)n 1=i (a1=(1 )i P
=( 1)
)( 1)=;which
will only be negative (assuming ni; ai and P are positive) when 0 <  < 1: These are the circumstances
under which increasing variety leads to an increase in utility (for a given level of expenditure).
10Di¤erentiating (3.2) with respect to Cig, and setting the marginal utility of consuming Cig equal
to Pig=PUi, the ratio of price of rm gs output relative to the unit cost of utility from consuming the
aggregate bundle of all varieties of good i, we obtain the equations dUi=dCig = ai(Ui=Cig)1  = Pig=PUi:
Comparing this with the equivalent equation for rm hs output, and dividing dUi=dCig by dUi=dCih;
we derive (Cih=Cig)1  = Pig=Pih; which implies (Cih=Cig) = (Pig=Pih)1=(1 ): Hence the elasticity of
substitution,  = 1=(1  ):
11Firmsown-price demand elasticities are a function of the elasticity of substitution between varieties,
the top-level demand elasticity for the good concerned and the demand elasticity for the aggregate good.
The relationship is given by equation (3.A2.19) in Appendix 3.2. As the number of rms increases, the
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The second aspect of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach is the use of Chamberlinian monop-
olistic competition. Under this approach, rms are assumed to be subject to increasing
returns to scale (usually modelled as a xed cost plus constant marginal cost), but rm
gs size is limited by the assumption that marginal revenue declines with output. Mar-
ginal revenue is diminishing even under Bertrand competition, where the rm perceives
its rivalsprices to be exogenous, so long as all rmsoutput is di¤erentiated.
If new rms enter the market, each existing rms market share, Sg; falls, which
usually reduces its own-price elasticity of demand12 (if the top-level demand for all goods
within an industry is held constant, then gs own-price demand elasticity is (1  Sg)).
A consequence of this is that an increase in rm numbers is expected to lead to a decline
in prices, beneting consumers.13
In a Dixit-Stiglitz model of trade, increased openness leads to a number of benets,
as outlined by Baldwin and Venables (1995). In addition to the standard trade creation
e¤ect (o¤set by trade diversion where liberalisation is only between a subset of countries)
there are gains from allowing consumers to spread their consumption more evenly across
a variety of products from di¤erent nations. Also, there are competitive benets from
prices being forced down (rising imports generally have a similar e¤ect on prices to an
increase in the number of domestic rms) and, in versions of the model where the number
of rms is endogenous, a shake-out of capacity worldwide, making it easier for rms to
gain economies of scale. Agglomeration economies may take place, if production of goods
which are inputs into one anothers production can be concentrated more easily in one
value of the own-price elasticity will approach the elasticity of substitution.
12There is an exception to this, where the top-level substitution elasticity between di¤erent industries
products is high.
13Dixit and Stiglitz showed that, in the case of a constant elasticity of substitution between varieties,
assuming no distortions were present, monopolistic competition would produce an optimum number of
varieties, though this result did not hold with variable elasticities.
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area, saving transport costs. Finally, there may be capital inows into regions beneting
from increased trade openness.
Against these factors must be borne in mind the loss of tari¤ revenue and the e¤ects
of prot-shift e¤ects, the sign of which is harder to determine for individual countries
(though the net e¤ect over all countries will be zero) .
3.3.2 Methodology for estimating border costs
Appendix 3.1 shows the derivation of the equations for estimating comparative costs
and assumed border costs of trade in this study, and how they relate to more orthodox
gravity studies. Basically, I estimate the border iceberg cost on trade in goods in sector
i from country c to country cc, i;c;cc; using the equation:
(1  i;c;cc)(1  i;cc;c) = hEi;c;cc(1 +  i;c;cc)1 (1 + ti;cc;c) 
 Ec;cc(1 +  i;cc;c)1 (1 + ti;cc;c)  j Hi;cHi;cci1=( 1); (3.4)
where Ei;c;cc is export value of i from c to cc,  is transport cost, t is the import duty
rate, Hi;c is consumption of home-produced i in country c, Hi;cc is consumption of home-
produced i in country cc, and  is the constant elasticity of substitution.
<For derivation of equation (3.4), see Appendix 3.1.>
Data on sales prices of each countrys goods at home, Pc, may not be easy to obtain
(and anyway, prices may not be directly comparable if quality varies). For that reason,
it may be better to use a revealed comparative advantage approach, and actually incor-
porate calibration of Pc into the general calibration. This means we are calibrating the
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model for both prices and residual border trade costs.
3.3.3 Calibration
For calibration, I start with equation (3.4). In the absence of better data, it may well
be most sensible to assume initially that average rm size within a particular industry is
the same across countries. Hence turnover, Ti;c; of a typical rm in industry i in country
c will satisfy Ti;c = Ti;cc = Ti for all c and cc.14
If the only unknowns are the residual border trade costs, i;c;cc, then if we assume
i;c;cc = 0 if c = cc and  0 if c 6= cc we need only t for the (probable) non-zero elements
of , where c 6= cc.
 To model the e¤ects of the single market in terms of these border costs, I make
the following denitions and assumptions about the structure of (non-tari¤ and
non-transport) border costs: 	i;c is dened as home bias in country c. This cost
is applied to import of good g in industry i; from any other country cc into c
(regardless of whether or not cc and c are both members of the EUs Single Market).
 'i;CEEC;EU is the additional cost for imports from CEEC countries to EU members
(compared to imports from other EU members). This means that the total border
cost for importing from a CEEC country to an EU country is: i;cc;c = 	i;c +
'i;CEEC;EU ; where cc is a member of the CEEC region and c is a member of the
EU.
 'i;EU;CEEC is the additional cost for importing from the EU to the CEEC. The
14Typical rm sizes have been assumed to be larger in manufacturing sectors than in services, and
smallest in agriculture.
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total border cost for imports from the EU to the CEEC is therefore: i;c;cc =
	i;cc + 'i;EU;CEEC ; where cc is a member of the CEEC region and c is a member
of the EU.
 'i;ROW;EU reects additional costs for imports from the rest of the World to either
the CEEC or EU countries.
To calibrate, I assume 'i;CEEC;EU = 'i;EU;CEEC = 'i: It is this cost on trade (which
I assume to be the same in both directions) between the EU and CEEC which is removed
once the CEEC country joins the Single Market.
3.3.4 The model for simulations
The model equations are summarised in detail in Appendix 3.2.
Simulations are carried out using a multi-country static computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) model. Goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of intermediate
inputs and 4 primary factors: unskilled labour, skilled labour, capital and land. Land
is xed sectorally. Both types of labour are mobile between sectors, but not between
countries. For capital, I investigate two variants, one where it is xed in total within a
country, and one where it is internationally mobile.
Intermediate inputs and nal consumption goods are CES aggregates of home pro-
duction and imports from various sources. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
sources of a good is set at 4 in all sectors. This lies at the lower end of elasticity es-
timates surveyed by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004), which vary from 4 to 5 up to
around 10. However, it is relatively high compared to the elasticities traditionally used in
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Armington-based15 general equilibrium models.16 A key factor may be time-scale (in this
model I am interested in medium-run simulations, where perhaps long-run elasticities
would be higher). There are also transport costs (modelled as iceberg costs17), iceberg
unspecied trade costs (see above) and tari¤s, as well as taxes/subsidies on output and
use of a commodity.
Firms both at home and abroad are imperfectly competitive (competing within a
Dixit-Stiglitz, symmetrical CES function), and charge prot markups dependent on their
market shares. For computational reasons, the number of rms per industry and per
country is however assumed to be xed in simulations - I suggest these might be inter-
preted as intermediate-term simulations, assuming that the entry and expansion of new
rms is a long-term process.
The top level of the utility function, where di¤erent industriesproducts are aggre-
gated, uses a Cobb-Douglas structure.
3.3.5 Data
I use the GTAP18 version 5 database. This database has harmonised trade and input-
output data for regions across the world in 1997. GTAP potentially has a large number
of goods and regions, so for practical purposes I aggregate data into 8 goods and 10
regions, chosen for their relevance to the issue of enlargement.
15 It is also worth noting that it satises the Dixit-Stiglitz restriction that the elasticity of substitution
should be greater than unity (see the discussion in 3.3.1).
16See Shoven and Whalley, 1992.
17The notion of an iceberg trade cost is based upon the assumption that a good loses a constant
proportion of its value when it is traded across a particular border, so that the number of units arriving in
the importing country is lower than that leaving the exporting country, and the unit price correspondingly
higher.
18Global Trade Analysis Project, an international collaborative data-sharing e¤ort, coordinated from
Purdue University.
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Goods
AG:- agriculture, forestry and shing
OP:- other primary
FP:- food processing
IS :-iron and steel
TX:- textiles
MH:- heavy manufacturing
ML:- light manufacturing
SV:- services
Regions*
PLD:- Poland
HUN:- Hungary
OCEC:- Other CEECs (Cz Rep, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria)
UK:- United Kingdom
GER:- Germany
OEUN:- Other EU Northern (Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, Fin-
land, Denmark, Ireland)
OEUS:- Other EU Southern (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece)
FSU:- Former Soviet Union
ODX:- Other OECD excluding EU and CEECs
LDC:- rest of the world (mostly less developed countries)
*note GTAP version 5 has only 3 CEEC regions.
For trade and protection, I use 4 principal data series from GTAP for these
countries and regions:19
GTAP data category:
 VXMD exports at market prices,
VXWD exports at world prices,
VIWS imports at world prices,
VIMS imports at market prices (i.e. sales prices in the importing country before
indirect tax).
The di¤erence between VXWD and VIWS is taken to be the transport cost margin.
19 In the latter case, capital rents are equated across the world at RBW. A country will then pay rent
at this rate to foreigners if it imports capital. This assumption, which follows Fehr et al. (1995) avoids
some of the problems Rodrik (1997) notes in the Baldwin et al. (1997) models treatment of changing
capital stocks.
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VXWD - VXMD is a value for net export tax/subsidy, and the GTAP estimates of
the tari¤ equivalent of some quantitative trade restrictions whose revenue accrues to the
exporting country.
VIMS - VIWS is the value for net import tax/subsidy and the tari¤ equivalent of
remaining NTBs.
Correction is made for some data errors in the GTAP Version 5. In particular, I
have removed tari¤s on trade between the EU and CEECs other than in agriculture and
food processing, as these had been abolished under the Europe Agreements. Revenue
has been reallocated to ensure the accounts continue to balance.
3.4 Results of the calibrations for border costs
Table 3.4 shows the formal trade barriers (tari¤s and tari¤ equivalent of NTBs) in exis-
tence between the EU and CEECs in 1997. These are CES weighted averages over the
various EU component regions (UK, GER, OEUN and OEUS). As can be seen, imports
from the CEECs into the EU faced sizeable barriers in agriculture and food processing,
but barriers elsewhere had been removed by 1997 under the Europe Agreements.20
Table 3.4 Net formal trade barriers (tari¤ equivalent)
Industry OCEC EU into HUN into EU into PLD EU into
into EU OCEC EU HUN into EU PLD
AG 0.178 0.107 0.166 0.177 0.308 0.253
FP 0.329 0.248 0.291 0.272 0.536 0.365
However, even when country size, transport costs and these formal trade barriers
20As pointed out in the previous section, adjustments had to be made to the GTAP data set to take
account of this.
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are taken into account, actual trade still exceeds that predicted in nearly all cases:
our model attributes this home bias to an iceberg cost of trade, g;c;cc. For example,
actual trade in agricultural produce between the EU and Other CEEC region (in both
directions) falls short of predicted trade by around 65 per cent. These di¤erences ((actual
- predicted)/actual) are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5 shows the calibrated comparative costs and country bias based on the
calibration assumptions in this paper. In this case, average excessEU bias against
CEEC goods has been set the same as average CEEC bias against EU goods. This
calibration suggests the CEECs are low-cost producers compared to the EU in almost all
industries, especially services21, agriculture, and light and heavy manufactures. Hungary
is low-cost in textiles, while the OCEC region is high-cost in iron and steel.
21Comparative costs in services would, of course, be expected to be lower in poorer countries (see
Balassa, 1962). However, it seems that, at least for Poland, the low relative costs apply to all sectors.
Only for the Other CEEC region does there seem to be clear evidence supporting the Balassa-Samuelson
relationship.
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Table 3.5 Calibrated relative production prices and
home/country bias
POLAND Average iceberg cost
Industry Relative Inter-EU EUvPLD PLDvEU
PLD Price Home Bias
AG -0.412 0.683 0.076 0.076
OP -0.210 0.500 0.201 0.201
FP -0.351 0.681 -0.050 -0.050
TEX -0.297 0.548 0.093 0.093
IS -0.006 0.556 0.158 0.158
MH -0.402 0.591 0.135 0.135
ML -0.405 0.529 0.166 0.166
SV -0.376 0.821 0.062 0.062
HUNGARY
Industry Relative Inter-EU HUNvOCEC HUNvEU
HUN Price Home Bias
AG -0.350 0.683 0.098 0.098
OP -0.495 0.500 0.334 0.334
FP -0.406 0.681 0.051 0.051
TEX -0.347 0.548 0.057 0.057
IS -0.138 0.556 0.185 0.185
MH -0.452 0.591 0.139 0.139
ML -0.385 0.529 0.092 0.092
SV -0.451 0.821 0.062 0.062
OTHER CEECs
Industry relative Inter-EU EUvOCEC OCECvEU
OCEC price Home bias
AG -0.359 0.683 0.093 0.093
OP -0.155 0.500 0.304 0.304
FP -0.410 0.681 0.064 0.064
TEX -0.196 0.548 0.081 0.081
IS 0.239 0.556 0.125 0.125
MH -0.310 0.591 0.109 0.109
ML -0.344 0.529 0.125 0.125
SV -0.360 0.821 0.038 0.038
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The average calibrated iceberg costs of trade in both directions vary from slightly
negative (for Polish food processing only) to around 15% for Polish manufactures, 10-
13% for other CEC manufactures and 9-14 per cent for Hungarian manufactures. For
agriculture they are around 7-10%.
3.4.1 Gravity equivalent
It is also possible to convert the iceberg trade costs, i;c;cc; into equivalent gravity dum-
mies. These can be derived from equation (3.A1.4) in Appendix 3.1, which shows that
expenditure on goods belonging to industry i from country cc in country c has an elas-
ticity with respect to the border cost of (   1):22 Consequently, the coe¢ cients on the
gravity dummies will equal  (   1) ln(1  c;cc). The extra dummies for imports from
the EU into CEECs and from CEECs into the EU (which are both zero or negative in
almost all cases) are as follows for calibration 3:
Table 3.6 Gravity dummy equivalents of calibrated
residual border e¤ects
INDUSTRY OCEC EU HUN EU PLD EU
into EU into OCEC into EU into HUN into EU into PLD
AG 1.041 1.041 1.109 1.109 0.816 0.816
OP 2.807 2.807 3.305 3.305 1.540 1.540
FP 0.665 0.665 0.521 0.521 0.049 0.049
TEX 0.596 0.596 0.402 0.402 0.694 0.694
IS 0.987 0.987 1.615 1.615 1.320 1.320
MH 0.930 0.930 1.244 1.244 1.199 1.199
ML 0.923 0.923 0.650 0.650 1.304 1.304
SV 0.714 0.714 1.280 1.280 1.260 1.260
The dummies for trade between the EU and CEEC are broadly of a similar order of
magnitude to those found by LeJour et al.s (2001) gravity model study, which estimated
22Note, the volume of sales has a price-elasticity of , but expenditure will have an elasticity of   1:
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an EU trade dummy of 1.25 for much of agriculture and around 0.7 for most industrial
sectors.
3.4.2 Enlargement simulations
The simulation runs are carried out on the CGE model, assuming the number of rms
per sector in each country does not vary. The welfare e¤ects are probably smaller than
would be expected in a fully long-run model, where scale and variety e¤ects of altering
rm numbers were included.
Table 3.7 (below) shows the e¤ects on consumer welfare in each region resulting from
(1) customs union (the removal of the remaining tari¤s on agriculture and foodstu¤s
between the EU and CEEC regions and harmonisation of the CEECs external tari¤s
with those of the EU) and (2) assumed abolition of iceberg unspecied trading costs
i;c;cc when countries join the EU single market. These simulations are carried out for
cases where capital is immobile between countries and where it is assumed to be mobile.
Customs union has only small simulated welfare e¤ects, though these generally benet
the accession states by 0-212% while having no signicant e¤ect on existing EU members.
The former e¤ect is not surprising, given the fact that most tari¤s have already been
abolished, while the latter reects the small size of the CEEC economies relative to the
existing EU.
Under (2), the CEEC trade shares with the EU, and the EU trade shares with
the CEEC are increased to reect the posited removal of trade costs when the CEEC
countries join the single market. Since it is assumed these costs are real resource costs,
it is possible in this case for all countries to gain, and this does indeed seem to be
the case. The biggest beneciaries are the CEEC countries, where welfare rises by 10-
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20% compared to 1997 base. Gains to the existing EU members are small, typically
around 12%. While Germany gains most, even the poorer EU countries in the South
experience gains of 0.4%, so that the benets of expansion of trade outweigh the cheap-
wage competition e¤ects even for these countries. The Former Soviet Union and LDCs
also see small welfare gains, so that trade diversion e¤ects are outweighed for them by
the e¤ects of the overall expansion of the EU and CEEC economies.
Table 3.7 Summary of results - change on 1997 base,
calculated consumer utility
1.EU-CEEC customs union 2. CEEC trade shares shift
in line with intra-EU trade
a) National b) Capital a) National b) Capital
capital mobile captal mobile
stocks xed internationally stocks xed internationally
% % % %
Poland 1.87 2.44 15.27 19.39
Hungary 0.17 0.17 14.62 17.56
Other 1.03 1.21 11.46 13.25
CEEC
UK -0.01 0.00 0.16 0.14
Germany 0.01 0.00 0.64 0.71
Other EU North 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.44
Other EU South 0.01 0.00 0.37 0.36
EU total 0.01 0.00 0.42 0.44
Europe total 0.06 0.06 0.94 1.09
Former Soviet Union 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.09
Other OECD 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LDCs 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01
Global total 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.29
Table 3.8 shows the change in trade volumes: these are typically of the order 50-100%
between the EU countries and CEECs on accession.
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Table 3.8 Changes in trade volumes with trade share
shifts and mobile capital assumed
Total trade volumes Before After % change
Pld to EU 4.98 9.12 83.35
Hun to EU 2.62 4.34 65.48
OCEC to EU 6.05 9.81 61.97
EU to Pld 1.88 3.77 100.44
EU to Hun 1.45 2.20 51.03
EU to OCEC 3.56 5.50 54.52
Table 3.9, which summarises changes in output by industry shows that gains in
output are spread widely across all industries in the CEEC region, though the biggest
gains are to agriculture, food products and manufactures (all sectors which bear high
implicit trade costs between the EU and various CEEC regions, according to Table 3.6).
Within the EU there appear to be few losers, though agriculture and heavy manufactures
decline marginally in the UK.
Table 3.9 Simulated change in output by country and
industry compared to 1997 base (%)
Industry AG OP FP TEX IS MH ML SV
PLD 17.07 -1.66 19.52 10.15 9.40 16.51 26.28 13.25
HUN 11.35 9.08 18.63 18.36 12.80 26.61 24.15 11.76
OCEC 13.72 0.85 18.54 8.54 7.75 12.49 23.10 7.33
UK -0.03 0.35 0.07 0.45 0.67 -0.03 0.03 0.07
GER 0.95 0.68 0.72 2.03 1.41 0.90 0.86 0.47
OEUN 0.41 0.96 0.49 1.02 1.35 0.68 0.37 0.32
OEUS 0.59 0.33 0.30 0.62 0.97 0.16 -0.11 0.21
FSU 0.76 0.36 1.23 -0.22 -0.89 -0.15 -0.15 0.01
ODX -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 0.00
LDC -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.15 0.15 0.03 -0.06 0.01
Table 3.10 shows that output prices in the EU generally fall as a result of the saving
in costs of inputs (the unskilled wage in Germany is set to 1 in this model, to act as a
numeraire). However in Poland output prices generally rise (and the same is true to a
lesser degree of some sectors in other parts of the CEEC region) as prices rise towards
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Western European levels.
Table 3.10 Simulated change in output price by country
and industry compared to 1997 base (%)
Industry AG OP FP TEX IS MH ML SV
Country
PLD 5.20 3.39 6.29 1.07 3.14 4.57 5.44 3.89
HUN -2.74 7.07 -3.07 -1.31 2.32 3.26 1.01 1.42
OCEC 2.71 1.01 3.01 -0.33 -0.25 1.28 0.99 2.22
UK -0.79 -0.49 -0.85 -0.71 -0.69 -0.72 -0.79 -0.55
GER -0.82 -0.40 -0.82 -0.66 -0.53 -0.91 -0.92 -0.49
OEUN -0.78 -0.36 -0.88 -0.76 -0.75 -0.91 -0.90 -0.51
OEUS -0.67 -0.55 -0.89 -0.77 -0.58 -0.80 -0.88 -0.51
FSU -0.10 -0.12 -0.09 -0.31 -0.20 -0.15 -0.23 -0.18
ODX -0.48 -0.46 -0.52 -0.57 -0.59 -0.54 -0.54 -0.47
LDC -0.47 -0.44 -0.55 -0.51 -0.61 -0.57 -0.60 -0.46
Table 3.11, summarising changes in factor returns, indicates that relative skilled/unskilled
wages do not change greatly in any country, though there are sizeable gains to both types
of labour in Poland in particular. The wages quoted are all relative to the German un-
skilled wage: the slight wage falls in some EU countries are only relative to this (consumer
goods prices fall by more). The lack of distributional changes between types of labour
may partly be because of the Cobb-Douglas production function structure, and partly
because the presence of a xed factor (land) in two sectors absorbs much of the e¤ects
of changes in output prices.
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Table 3.11 Simulated changes factor returns with trade
share shifts and mobile capital assumed (%)
Unskilled Skilled Capital Land Ag Other Prim
PLD 18.95 18.25 -0.29 23.16 1.68
HUN 14.71 14.15 -0.29 8.30 12.70
OCEC 12.36 11.08 -0.29 16.80 1.57
UK -0.51 -0.50 -0.29 -0.82 -0.24
GER 0.00 -0.01 -0.29 0.11 0.21
OEUN -0.23 -0.22 -0.29 -0.37 0.48
OEUS -0.34 -0.34 -0.29 -0.09 -0.16
FSU -0.12 -0.16 -0.29 0.66 0.25
ODX -0.54 -0.54 -0.29 -0.55 -0.53
LDC -0.47 -0.46 -0.29 -0.49 -0.47
(German unskilled wage kept constant).
3.5: Conclusions.
In this paper, I have extended the modelling approach of Baldwin et al (1997) and
LeJour et al (2001), introducing a model-consistent framework of calibration and simula-
tion to estimate the likely e¤ects of EU enlargement to incorporate the CEECs, assuming
that the 1997 residual country bias against the CEECs in EU trade (and vice-versa) re-
ects resource costs of regulatory di¤erences which can be eliminated by entry to the
single market. Since this observed country bias is large (EU countries trade far more with
each other than with the CEECs, even correcting for size and di¤erence), the regulatory
barriers which would be needed to explain such di¤erences would also be signicant -
of the order of 7 to 15 per cent on most goods. It follows that entry into the EUs
Single Market would have large e¤ects in terms of increasing trade between the EU and
CEECs - in fact simulations suggest that Polands trade with the EU could double, while
Hungary and the other CEECs would also see large trade increases. Such trade increases
would produce sizeable gains, not just from the elimination of the resource cost of trade
and from trade more accurately reecting comparative advantage, but also due to the
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e¤ects of increased competition and scale utilisation, particularly within the CEECs. As
a result, welfare in the CEECs could rise by between 11.5 and 20 per cent (Poland being
the largest gainer) while the existing EU countries would not lose from enlargement.
Output would rise almost across the board for all industries in the CEECs.
These calculations suggest that existing studies have, if anything, been quite cautious
in their optimistic assessment of EU enlargement. However, it must be borne in mind at
this point that these conclusions are highly dependent on the above assumptions. There
are a number of important cautions:
    There is considerable room for uncertainty over the comparative costs
of production of di¤erent industries in di¤erent regions, and over the
associated residual country biases, interpreted as iceberg trade costs
i;c;cc, depending on the prior assumptions made in order to carry out
the calibration (ie that 'i;CEEC:EU = 'i;EU;CEEC = 'i).
 It is probable that these prior assumptions are also important in gravity
studies. Gravity modellers typically measure residual country bias with a
set of trade dummies (e.g. a dummy set to 1 if both countries are members
of the EU and 0 otherwise). The number of these dummies is typically
much less than the number of calibrated i;c;cc coe¢ cients in our study,
meaning that the gravity modellers are imposing far more restrictions on
the relative sizes of di¤erent country bias e¤ects.
 Whether accession to the EU would in fact lead to the elimination of the
tted biasagainst CEEC imports into the EU compared to the produce
of other EU countries is not certain. Indeed, gravity studies of the single
market (Brenton and Vancauteren 2001) cast doubt on the e¤ects to date
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of institution of the single market.
 It is possible that the use of transport costs alone may underestimate
the e¤ects of distance upon trade (a weakness of the direct calibration
approach compared to standard gravity models).23 An extra regression
of estimated i;c;cc coe¢ cients on distance might be worthwhile, to see if
there are additional distance e¤ects at work.
 The assumption that the residual country bias represents unmeasured
trade costs, i;c;cc, rather than, say, di¤erence in tastes, perceived prod-
uct quality or familiarity of products,24 and that these costs would be
reduced or removed by countries joining the EU, is a strong one. For
one thing, reorientation of production and consumption is unlikely to be
costless. Estimates of the savings from double-testing and frontier con-
trols due to the Single Market are typically closer to a 5% saving25 on
the cost of traded goods, rather than the 15% typically inferred by com-
paring trade shares. To what extent the remainder of the 15 % actually
represents other trading costs such as the e¤ects of di¤erent product stan-
dards, labelling procedures, legal and guarantee systems etc. is hard to
23Both estimated transport costs (as in this study) and distances (as used by most gravity modellers)
have advantages and disadvantages. Gravity models typically use arc distances between capital cities,
which may be misleading where the capital cities are not centrally located, or where the countries are
adjacent (so that individual regions in the two countries may abut one another, even if the capitals are
some distance apart). Also, they fail to take account of the di¤erence between land and sea borders, or
of the quality of transport infrastructure on the connections, as well as of factors not directly linked to
transport costs, such as the roles of ethnic or colonial ties, migrant communities or common languages.
Some gravity studies incorporate extra dummy variables in an attempt to correct for these problems.
Our estimated transport costs overcome some of these di¢ culties, but may underestimate the role of
communication other than simply the bulk transport of goods (such as the need for executives in di¤erent
countries to meet and communicate). In addition, the precise derivation of the cost data by the GTAP
team is not transparent.
24See Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis for discussion of these points.
25Zahariadis, 2002, using gures derived from Harrison et al (1996), suggests costs on Turkish imports
into the EU of 1.3 to 3.1 per cent for frictional/border costs, 1 to 2 per cent for testing/certication costs
and 1 to 2.5 per cent for standardisation costs.
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tell. Whether the harmonisation of product standards in CEEC coun-
tries to conform to the existing EU standards would benet the accession
countries, or would impose unwanted costs on producers and consumers
in the accession countries merits further research.
 It is also possible, indeed likely, that over time CEEC consumers and pro-
ducers may become more oriented towards trade with the EU even if the
countries do not formally join the single market, so the i;c;cc coe¢ cients
might well reduce over time anyway.
 It is also likely that in 1997 the CEEC countries were far from in equilib-
rium: real exchange rates and trade barriers had changed very substan-
tially in just the preceding 4 years. For that reason, export and import
volumes might well not be at an equilibrium level relative to prices and
trade barriers.
Some of these points are investigated in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
Notwithstanding the above reservations, this paper provides at least provisional
grounds for optimism that the EU enlargement will provide signicant benet to the
accession economies and marginally benet the existing member states as well.
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Appendix 3.1: Derivation of border and
comparative production costs
It is possible, in principle, to estimate border e¤ects directly by calibration of a
general equilibrium model, rather than relying on indirect methods such as estimation
of a gravity model. This is most clearly seen in the case of a Dixit-Stiglitz model, as
described in section 3.3.1 in the main chapter.
The theoretical relationship between a gravity model and Dixit-Stiglitz model, with
monopolistic competition between a number of di¤erentiated varieties of products, each
produced in one country only, is well-established since Bergstrand (1989). More recent
work on theoretical gravity models includes Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and
Eaton and Kortum (2002).
For simplicity, consider a Dixit-Stiglitz model where goods are consumed in countries
c 2 1:::C yielding consumer utility.26 Consumption of good g in country cc is Qg;cc. Total
consumer utility in country cc is assumed to reect the function:
Ucc =
"X
c
X
g2c
((1  c;cc)Qg;cc)( 1)=
#=( 1)
; (3.A1.1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods varieties, and c;cc is an iceberg
cost reducing by a xed proportion the usable value of all goods from country c consumed
in cc. With a Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the assumed value for  must exceed unity, with
the corresponding substitution parameter,  = (   1)=; lying between 0 and 1.
We di¤erentiate (3.A1.1) and set the marginal utility of consumption of g equal to
its relative price.
26All equations in this appendix relate to an industry i, but the subscript i has been dropped for
simplicity.
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dUcc=dQg;cc = (=(   1))
"X
c
X
g2c
((1  c;cc)Qg;cc)( 1)=
#1=( 1)
(1  c;cc)( 1)=((   1)=)Qg;cc 1=;
=
"X
c
X
g2c
((1  c;cc)Qg;cc)( 1)=
#1=( 1)
(1  c;cc)( 1)=Qg;cc 1=;
= (1  c;cc)( 1)=Qg;cc 1=U1=cc :
We then set dUcc=dQg;cc equal to the ratio of the price of Qg;cc, including transport
costs and tari¤s, Pc(1 +  c;cc)(1 + tc;cc); to the aggregate price of utility in country cc;
cc. Rearranging this yields
Qg;cc = Ucc
h
(1  c;cc)( 1)=(cc=Pc(1 +  c;cc)(1 + tc;cc)
i
; (3.A1.2)
where  c;cc is the proportionate transport cost between country c and cc, and tc;cc is
the net contribution of import and export tari¤s, subsidies and the tari¤ equivalents of
NTBs. Pc is the selling price of goods from country c at the point of export (i.e. prior
to trade costs and tari¤). cc is an aggregate consumer price index for country cc.
The next step is to rewrite the equation in terms of observable variables. The nominal
value of exports from c to cc, Ec;cc is the number of goods varieties produced in country
c, nc, times the volume of sales per good, Qg;cc(g 2 c), (upscaled by (1 +  c;cc) to take
account of the assumed iceberg transport cost) times the export price Pc. Since Ucc is
also not observable, I replace it with total expenditure in country cc, Ycc divided by the
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aggregate price index cc.
Ec;cc = 
(1  c;cc)( 1)nc(1 +  c;cc)Pc(Ycc=cc)
(cc=Pc(1 +  c;cc)(1 + tc;cc))
: (3.A1.3)
Next we can replace nc with the value of output in country c; Xc, divided by the size
of turnover of a representativerm Tc.
Ec;cc = 
(1  c;cc)( 1)XcYccT 1c P 1 c  1cc (1 +  c;cc)1 
(1 + tc;cc)
 : (3.A1.4)
It should be clear by taking logs that this is a very similar functional form to the equa-
tions estimated by gravity modellers, but with various parameter restrictions imposed in
order to achieve consistency with the general equilibrium Dixit-Stiglitz framework. This
is even clearer if we choose to model transport costs as a function of distance dc;cc of
form:
ln(1 +  c;cc) = a+ b ln dc;cc: (3.A1.5)
Substituting from (3.A1.5) into (3.A1.4), we essentially have a gravity model, but
unlike the econometrically estimated gravity models the coe¢ cients on industry output
in country c and on demand in country cc are constrained to equal 1, while production
prices are introduced as exogenous data (rather than being proxied by per capita income,
as in many gravity studies), and it is worth noting that the tari¤ term is ln(1+ tc;cc) not
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ln(tc;cc) as in many gravity models.
lnEc;cc =  ln + (   1) ln(1  c;cc) + lnXc + lnYcc   lnTc + (1  ) ln(Pc=cc)
+(1  )(a+ b ln dc;cc)   ln(1 + tc;cc): (3.A1.5a)
The number of tted residual border cost coe¢ cients, c;cc, is far greater than the
number of dummies estimated in a gravity model. E¤ectively the gravity modeller is
rewriting these as c;cc = DUMc;cc + (c;cc), where DUMc;cc is whatever combination
of country dummies happens to apply to trade between countries c and cc, and c;cc is
the estimated equation residual. Because there are more coe¢ cients to estimate in our
version, there are fewer degrees of freedom, making calibration more appropriate than
econometric estimation.
We are particularly interested in the tted residual border trade cost coe¢ cients,
c;cc. To derive this, we start with equation (3.A1.4):
Ec;cc = 
(1  c;cc)( 1)XcYccT 1c P 1 c  1cc (1 +  c;cc)1 (1 + tc;cc) 
To eliminate the consumer price indices, the easiest way is to say that for cc = c we can
replace Ec;cc with Hcc (home use). Also note that there are no tari¤s or transport costs
where c = cc: hence  cc;cc = tcc;cc = 0. This means that, dividing (3.A1.4) by the version
for Hcc gives us:
Ec;cc=Hcc = (1  c;cc)=(1  cc;cc))( 1)(Xc=Xcc)(Tcc=Tc)
(Pc=Pcc)
1 (+ c;cc)1 (1 + tc;cc)  (3.A1.6)
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We can rearrange this to put (1   c;cc) on the left hand side, and if we assume
c;cc = 0 for c = cc we can simplify somewhat:
(1  c;cc) = f(Ec;cc=Hcc)(Xcc=Xc)(Tc=Tcc)(Pcc=Pc)1  (3.A1.7)
(1 +  c;cc)
 1(1 + tc;cc)g1=( 1)
An interesting result is found if we multiply together these expressions for trade in
both directions between a pair of countries, c and cc, since a lot of terms can then be
eliminated:
(1  c;cc)(1  cc;c) = h
q
~Ec;cc ~Ecc;cj
p
HcHcci2=( 1) (3.A1.8)
where the tilde represents exports adjusted for the e¤ects of tari¤s, NTBs and transport
costs. E¤ectively, if the geometric average volume of trade between two countries, once
tari¤s and transport costs have been corrected for, is signicantly smaller than the
geometric mean of home-based consumption in the two countries, then the model implies
there must be residual border trade costs present.
Once an estimated value for the elasticity of substitution, ; has been chosen, all
the other terms on the right hand side of (A1.8) are given. This means that for given
observed output, consumption and trade and an assumed elasticity of substitution, the
higher the value of the trade cost for imports from c to cc, c;cc, the lower will be the
implicit trade cost in the other direction, cc;c: If we assume residual border trade costs
are the same in each direction, then
c;cc = 1  h
q
~Ec;cc ~Ecc;cj
p
HcHcci1=( 1): (3.A1.8a)
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Appendix 3.2: General equilibriummodel
(GEMEE)
Notes on the structure of the model:
The model is based on an imperfectly competitive structure, using a Dixit-Stiglitz
framework. In this framework, as outlined rst in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), an industry,
i; contains a large number of goods produced by closely competing rms in the various
regions. Each good, g; is produced in one country, c; only. Section 3.1.1 of the main
chapter summarises the theory of this type of model.
In this chapter I have used the simpler version of the model, where the number of
goods produced within each country and industry, nc;i, is xed. However, unlike many
Armington models, it does allow for monopolistic markups. The full Dixit-Stiglitz variant
allows the number of goods/rms to vary endogenously.
Another variant is to allow capital to ow between countries rather than be xed
within each country. The coding for this variant is also explained in this appendix.
Production of goods
The production function of each rm combines labour, land and capital using a
Cobb-Douglas function to form a value added input: i.e.
V Ag = c;iLg
(1 kc;i dc;i)Kkc;ig Dgdc;i ; (3.A2.1)
where V A is value added (quantity), L is labour,K is capital,D is land which is sectorally
xed, g denotes the good, i denotes industry and c denotes the country of production.
 is a scale parameter and k and d are share parameters. I also assume that total
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labour, L, is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of unskilled labour, LU , and skilled labour, LS.
This allows us to write:
V Ag = c;i(LU
uc;i
g LS
sc;i
g )
(1 kc;i dc;i)Kkc;ig Dgdc;i ; (3.A2.2)
where u and s are share parameters for unskilled and skilled labour within total labour
costs, and sum to 1 within any industry in any country.
To obtain an equation for the whole industry in country i, we assume all rms g
within i in a given country, c, are identical in terms of cost, inputs, output and market
share. We also choose units so that c;i = 1.
Di¤erentiating (3.A2.2) with respect to K;LU;LS and D and setting value of mar-
ginal products equal to the wage rate and price of capital gives
LUc;i = V Ac;iPVc;iuc;i(1  kc;i   dci)=WUc (3.A2.3a)
LSc;i = V Ac;iPVc;isc;i(1  kc;i   dc;i)=WSc (3.A2.3b)
Kc;i = V Ac;iPVc;ikc;i=Rc;i (3.A2.3c)
Dc;i = V Ac;iPVc;idc;i=LDPc;i; (3.A2.3d)
where WU and WS denote the wage rates for unskilled and skilled labour, R denotes
return on capital and LDP the sectoral return on land. Both types of labour are assumed
to be mobile between sectors, but not between countries, so that wage rates are equal
across sectors. Land is sectorally immobile, while we explore two variants in the case of
capital: in the rst, it is mobile between sectors but not between countries, while in the
second it is internationally mobile.
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Hence, in the rst variant, we x R within a country:
Rc;i = RBc: (3.A2.4)
The price of value added is given by
PVc;i = (WUcLUc;i +WScLSc;i +RcKc;i + LDPc;iDc;i)=V Ac;i: (3.A2.5)
Higher level of production function
The output of good i is produced by a combination of other goods, ii; and value
added, V A. This is done again using a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yc;i = 
c;iV A
vc;i
c;i
Y
ii
II
Ic;ii;i
c;ii;i ; (3.A2.6)
where Y is output, II is the input of good ii into good i and the  coe¢ cients are input
shares which sum to 1.
Assuming cost-minimisation, this gives inputs:
IIc;ii;i = Ic;iYc;iPYc;i=PUc;ii;i; (3.A2.7)
where PY is the output unit variable price and PU is the unit price of inputs, and
V Ac;i = vc;iYc;iPYc;i=PVc;i: (3.A2.8)
The marginal cost, PPY , of producing output, Y , is easily calculated from the cost
of inputs per unit output:
95
PPYc;ii = (V Ac;iiPVc;ii +
X
i
IIc;i;iiPUc;i)=Yc;ii: (3.A2.9)
This is then adjusted for output tax and subsidies, to give a marginal per unit price
including tax and subsidies:
PYc;ii = PPYc;ii(1 +OUTTAXc;ii)  SUBSIDYc;ii=Yc;ii: (3.A2.10)
Trade and the aggregation of goods
I assume the representative consumer in each country obtains utility by aggregating
goods using a two-stage nested utility function: rst, the various varieties of goods within
industry i are aggregated using a Dixit-Stiglitz utility function (see section 3.3.1 in the
main part of the chapter for an outline discussion). This is the lower level of aggregation.
Then the aggregate goods bundles for each industry, i, are combined to provide aggregate
utility using a Cobb-Douglas utility function. This is the top level of the utility function.
The total demand in country C for produce of industry i is taken to be TUc;i. This is
an aggregate bundle of all the goods, g; which belong to industry i, using a Dixit-Stiglitz
demand function:
TUc;i =
0@X
g2i
g;cU

g;c
1A1= ; (3.A2.11)
where Ug;c is use of good g in country c and  is a parameter reecting qualitative factors
(e.g. compatibility of standards) and home bias in consumption.  is a substitution
parameter, where  = (  1)=, where  is the elasticity of substitution between goods
g in industry i (assumed to be the same in all countries and industries).
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If we assume there are ncc;i rms in country cc making good i, and that the  prefer-
ence parameter depends only on country of origin, cc, country of use, c, and industry, i,
then we can rewrite (A2.11) in order to sum, rst, the various goods varieties of industry
i, g 2 (cc \ i); which are produced in country cc (which all carry the same  preference
parameter), and then to sum across countries:
TUc;i =
0@X
cc
X
g2(cc\i)
cc;c;iU

g;c;i
1A1= : (3.A2.12)
The assumption that all rms within an industry/country are identical in size allows
us to rewrite (3.A2.12) in terms of the total purchases of goods class i by country cc from
country c; QUi;c;cc and the total number of rms in that industry in producing country
i:
TUcc;i =
 X
c
ncii;c;cc (QUi;c;cc=nc;i)

!1=
; (3.A2.13)
where g is a CES share parameter, and  is an elasticity-related parameter, related to
the elasticity of substitution  by the formula:
 = (   1)=: (3.A2.14)
Total expenditure in country cc on goods in industry i (by nal consumers and
intermediate users) is calculated by summing nal user price times volume for all goods,
g; in industry i.
V Ucc;i =
X
c
QUi;c;ccPUUi;c;cc: (3.A2.15)
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This is then used to calculate the price of PU of the aggregate bundle TU :
PUcc;i = V Ucc;i=TUcc;i: (3.A2.16)
Consumption (top level of the nested utility function)
Consumersincome is divided between the various industries, i, in order to maximise
a Cobb-Douglas utility function
UTc =
Y
i
CN
ci;c
i;c ; (3.A2.17)
where UT is utility and CN is consumption of produce of industry i in country c by
nal consumers (in other words, after deducting intermediates use). The c coe¢ cients
are expenditure shares, and sum to 1.
Consumersexpenditure on each industry, i, CNic can be calculated relatively sim-
ply from the Cobb-Douglas property that ic is the share of expenditure on i in total
consumersexpenditure in country c, CEc. Hence:
CNi;c = ci;cCEc=PUc;i: (3.A2.18)
The derivation of total consumersexpenditure is explained below.
Competition and pricing
In a Dixit-Stiglitz model, rms are imperfect competitors. In basic versions of the
model, each rm produces one good, and the goods are symmetrically competitive, with
a constant elasticity of substitution between all goods in an industry consumed in one
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country.
The own-price elasticity of demand facing a rm is derived as follows:
1) If the own price elasticity for the aggregate produce of an industry i is i, and
if competitors do not change their prices in response to rm, g, changing its price
(Bertrand-Nash equilibrium), then the own-price elasticity facing company g would be
 + Sg(i   ); where i is the top-level elasticity of substitution between goods g, and
Sg is the value share of rm g in demand for industry i. If Sg is small (ie n is large) the
own price elasticity would be approximately equal to .
2) Within export markets, it is assumed that a rm has a very small market share
and so its own-price elasticity is .
3) By contrast, in the home market country c, the rms market share Sgc is assumed
to be signicant. It is calculated as Sgc = (1=nc;i)(1   SMc;i), where SMc;i is the
share of imports in consumption of i in country c. Since the top level of the consumption
function (where di¤erent industriesproducts are aggregated) is a Cobb-Douglas function
in our model, the own price elasticity for the aggregate product of industry i, i = 1.
Consequently, the rms own price elasticity in the home market:
hc;i =  + (1=nc;i)(1  SMc;i)(1  ); (3.A2.19)
where, if HU denotes consumption from domestic suppliers and PTi;c;cc is the price at
which it sells (including taxes), then
SMc;i = 1 HUc;iPTi;c;c=V Uc;i: (3.A2.20)
4) The overall own price elasticity for a rms sales is taken as a weighted average (by
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sales) of its own-price elasticity in the home and export markets.
oc;i = hc;i(HUc;i=Yc;i) + (Yc;i  HUc;i=Yc;i): (3.A2.21)
5) In the model variant where the number of rms is xed, we x the value of oc;i.
Monopolistic competition markups: it is assumed that the rm marks up its
production costs by a proportion MMc;i, where
MMc;i = 1=(1  (1=oc;i))  1: (3.A2.22)
The price of good g including monopoly markups is therefore:
PMc;i = PYc;i(1 +MMc;i): (3.A2.23)
It is assumed that no monopoly margin is charged on import tari¤s (the justication
being that importers can buy the good in another country if the manufacturer starts
price discrimination between markets).
Transport costs
Transport costs are assumed to be proportional to value. Consequently, the price
including transport of goods class i from country c sold in country cc is
PTRi;c;cc = PMc;i(1 + Tmargini;c;cc) (3.A2.24)
where Tmargin is the proportional transport cost.
Transport costs are treated in the model as being a form of depreciation in the value
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of the goods transported (otherwise known as iceberg costs). Hence, if Xi;c;cc is the
quantity of i leaving country c for country cc, the amount which arrives in country cc is:
Mi;c;cc = Xi;c;cc=(1 + Tmargini;c;cc): (3.A2.25)
This form of treatment means that there is no need for an explicit transport in-
dustry, nor for dealing with transport specically in the trade accounts. The costs of
transport margin exportsin the GTAP database have been reallocated correspondingly,
to maintain balance in the accounts.
Tari¤s
The model allows for tari¤s applied to prices including transport. Tari¤s on imports
of i from c into cc are expressed as a percentage rate. Consequently, the price including
transport costs and tari¤s is
PTi;c;cc = PTRi;c;cc(1 + tariffi;c;cc=100): (3.A2.26)
Finally, the price of produce of industry i from country c consumed in country cc,
PUUi;c;cc, also includes a proportional tax on use of i in cc, which applies to both
domestically-produced and imported varieties. Hence, the price facing consumers is
PUUi;c;cc = PTi;c;cc(1 + USETAXcc;i): (3.A2.27)
Exports
We dene consumption (nal and intermediate) in country cc of good i produced in
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country c as
QUi;c;cc = fXi;c;cc=(1 + Tmargini;c;cc) if cc 6= c or HUi;c if cc = cg; (3.A2.28)
where Xi;c;cc is the corresponding volume of exports, and Tmargin is the proportion
which melts(to use the iceberg analogy) en route between the countries.
The equation for aggregating QU within each industry, equation (3.A2.13), has al-
ready been explained.
Sales shares
We then di¤erentiate (3.A2.13) setting price equal to marginal utility, to calculate
QUi;c;cc as a function of total use of products of industry i in country cc, TUcc;i and the
relative price of input of i from country cc, PUUi;c;cc compared to that of aggregate use
of i in country cc, PUcc;i. Hence, taking
TUcc;i =
 X
c
ncii;c;cc (QUi;c;cc=nc;i)

!1=
; (3.A2.13)
we di¤erentiate with respect to QU , and set the resulting marginal product equal to
PU=PUU , giving
dTUcc;i=dQUi;c;cc = n
1 
ci i;c;ccQU
 1
i;c;cc
 X
c
ncii;c;cc (QUi;c;cc=nc;i)

!(1 )=
;
= n1 ci i;c;cc(TUcc;i=QUi;c;cc)
1  = PUcc;i=PUUi;c;cc:
This is easily rearranged:
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QUi;c;cc = TUcc;inc;i(i;c;ccPUUi;c;cc=PUcc;i)
1=(1 ): (3.A2.29)
Aggregate consumer price
The total value of expenditure on good i in country c is given by
V Ucc;i =
X
c
QUi;c;ccPUUi;c;cc: (3.A2.30)
The aggregate consumer price of i in cc,
PUcc;i = V Ucc;i=TUcc;i: (3.A2.31)
Factor markets
Both types of labour are immobile between countries, but mobile between industries.
The wage is assumed to clear each labour market, so that total skilled and unskilled
labour use by all industries equals the skilled and unskilled labour endowment of country
c
LU c =
X
i
LUc;i;
LSc =
X
i
LSc;i: (3.A2.32)
We assume capital is fully mobile between industries. There are two variants - one
where total capital within a country is xed (net capital imported from abroad, KMc =
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0) and one where it is allowed to vary. Hence
Kc +KMc =
X
i
Kic;i: (3.A2.33)
Where KMc is allowed to be non-zero (so that there are international transfers of
capital) the global total of KM is set to zero.
X
c
KMc = 0: (3.A2.34)
The rate of return on capital in each industry is equated to the national rate of
return, RBc:
Rc;i = RBc: (3.A2.35)
Where capital is allowed to move internationally, we also set national rates of return
equal to the return in the Other OECDregion:
RBc = RBODX : (3.A2.36)
Land is only used in two sectors: agriculture and other primary. Its rent varies
according to sector. It is sectorally immobile, so
LDc;i = LDc;i: (3.A2.37)
Variety of goods
The model assumes all goods within an industry are produced by separate rms.
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Each rm within a country is of identical size, though the average company size may
vary between countries.
For sensitivity analysis, the xed rm numbers version of the model assumes the
total number of rms in each country is xed
nc;i = nc;i: (3.A2.38)
National accounts
Home use of goods from industry i in country c, HUc;i, is dened as total production
in country c less exports.
HUc;i = Yc;i  
X
cc
Xi;c;cc: (3.A2.39)
Imports of i from country cc to country c are equal to exports from cc to c deated
to take account of transport costs.
Where c = cc (ie the variable IDENc;cc equals 1), total use of good i in country c
produced in country cc equals home use. Otherwise (when IDENc;cc equals 0), total use
equals imports from cc to c.
As well as tari¤s, there are two types of taxes:
Use tax is assumed to be an ad valorem tax on all use of goods class i in country c.
Use tax revenue is given by
TUYc =
 X
i
HUc;iPTi;cc +
 X
cc
PTi;cc;cEXi;cc;c=(1 + tmargini;cc;c)
!!
(1 + u setaxc;i):
(3.A2.40)
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Output tax, OUTTAX is a tax per unit value of output of an industry, as explained
in (3.A2.10).
Total consumer expenditure in country c; CEc, is taken as equalling value added
from all industries in C +monopoly prots from all industries in country C +total tari¤
revenue in country C +output tax revenue +use tax revenue -total subsidies - the trade
balance of country C (assumed to be constant and exogenous) - interest on net capital
imports paid at the world rate. Hence,
CEc =
X
i
V Ac;iPVc;i +
X
i
Yc;iPYc;iMMc;i
+
X
cc
X
i
(EXi;cc;cPMcc;iTRi;cc;c)=100)
+
X
i
OTc;i
 
V Ac;iPWc;i +
X
ii
IIc;ii;iPUc;ii
!
+TUYc   TSUBYc  BOTc  KMcRBc: (3.A2.41)
The Balance of Trade, BOTc, (including long-term net capital payments) is as-
sumed to be xed.
BOTc =
X
i
X
cc
EXi;c;ccPMc;i  
X
cc
EXi;cc;cPMcc;i  KMcRBc: (3.A2.42)
The reason this includes long-term net capital payments is to cover the version of the
model where capital is internationally mobile: in this case, we would expect interest to
be paid at rate RBc on net capital imported from abroad, KMc; and one would expect
this to involve country c either exporting more or importing less.
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Key assumed parameter values
Demand side:
The top level utility function is Cobb-Douglas in functional form (so the elasticity
of substitution between consumption of the produce of each industry, i, is unity). Share
parameters for each product class are calibrated from value shares in total expenditure.
The lower level utility function has an elasticity of substitution between goods g in
industry i of : This is assumed to equal 4 in all industries.
Supply side: production technology is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, so elasticities
of substitution between inputs are unity, and share parameters can be directly calibrated
from shares in total costs (once monopoly prot has been subtracted from costs).
In the absence of other data, rm sizes have been set equal within each industry
across countries, such that Iron and Steel and Heavy Manufacture are seen as the least
competitive industries (1 and 3 rms respectively in our smallest region, Hungary),
followed by Other Primary, Light Manufacturing, Textiles and Food Processing (4-6
rms per industry in Hungary). Services and (especially) agriculture have much smaller
rm sizes, and so are far more competitive. Larger markets (like the EU) have more
rms, and so are more competitive. The main reason for these assumptions is to simulate
the pro-competitive e¤ects of trade liberalisation in reducing monopolistic mark-ups in
smaller, more sheltered economies.
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Chapter 4
Trade and Strategic Regulatory
Bias
4.1 Introduction
This paper examines the implications of quality regulations (e.g. on safety, reliability or
public health and environmental grounds) in an open economy. The existence of trade
can result in strategic distortions to regulatory policy.1 Much of the existing literature
makes a presumption not just that there will be a tendency in an open economy to
excessive regulation, but that this will be of a protectionist, trade-reducing kind. By
contrast, I nd that regulations are generally trade-increasing, and that the need to
prevent rms from leaving the market usually reduces the scope for over-regulation.
It is worth bearing in mind that most previous studies of regulatory protection as-
sume a prot-shifting motive to benet local producers. This suggests an oligopolistic
1See Brander and Spencer (1982) or Brander (1995).
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trade structure2 - yet at the same time, there is little discussion of the legitimate grounds
for quality regulation which occur when an industry is monopolistic. I show that, on
reasonable assumptions, monopolistic producers will tend to produce goods at subopti-
mal quality. It is perhaps worth noting that this quality shortfall may take many forms,
such as inadequate health, safety and environmental testing, or lack of labelling. Much
of this can be corrected by regulation. However, the regulation benets consumers at
the expense of producers. Where the producers are foreign, there can potentially be a
bias to over-regulation, and this strategic bias can potentially continue in the case where
countries are symmetrical and product quality can di¤er between markets. However,
there is an upper limit to such regulation, since rms can exit the market if prots be-
come negative. The higher regulatory standards actually increase trade volumes, at the
expense of prots.
Mutual recognition agreements, under which a pair or group of countries agree to ac-
cept goods from other agreement signatories, so long as they meet the rules and standards
of their country of origin, are also ambiguous. This is in contrast to previous studies
which have claimed mutual recognition is unambiguously welfare improving. The e¤ects
depend in particular upon whether trade is balanced or in one direction: in the latter
case, mutual recognition will produce under-regulation and reduce trade. When trade is
balanced, the mutual recognition can produce either under- or over-regulation, though
numerical simulations suggest the latter is more likely. In this case, there will often be
some welfare gain compared to noncooperative standard setting, though again it will in-
volve a reduction in trade. The precise outcome depends upon the nature of the assumed
game between the regulators and rms, and upon parameters such as country size and
2Or, alternatively, country-specic factors.
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demand elasticity.
These ndings add some qualication to the common prescription of mutual recogni-
tion alone as a response to presumed regulatory bias. In many areas of current dispute,
such as genetically modied foodstu¤s, where the commodity involved is primarily pro-
duced in one country rather than both, removal of protectionistnational or regional
regulations may be contrary to the interests of consumers, and, contrary to widespread
assumptions, may result in falling consumer demand and reduced trade.
Section 4.2 reviews the background and existing literature on quality regulations and
trade. While policymakers and economists accept regulations as potentially legitimate,
the literature stresses they will often be distorted for protectionist reasons: a conclusion
which this paper challenges when an industry is monopolistic.
In the subsequent sections I concentrate on the underprovision of quality by a classical
cross-hauling duopoly. Next, I examine pure vertical standards: the approach is to
develop a model for a simple monopoly in Section 4.3 and then, in Section 4.4, to extend
it to a cross-hauling duopoly with one identical rm in each of two symmetrical countries,
where consumer preferences are identical and the good concerned is a substitute for
other consumer goods. In these circumstances, a vertical minimum quality standard is
potentially welfare-improving, but there will be a strategic bias to overregulation in the
absence of either cooperation or a mutual recognition regime.
Section 4.5 considers pure, horizontal quality standards, imposing a resource cost
on foreign producers only. The previous literature suggests these may be imposed for
protectionist prot-shifting, though only when tari¤s are ruled out. This study sug-
gests that, in a cross-hauling duopoly with price-elastic demand, such barriers will be
unattractive. When there is also vertical regulation, the prot-shifting motive is further
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reduced. Where countries di¤er in quality of production, the higher-quality country may
sometimes choose to raise minimum standards, but again the circumstances and scope
for this are less than the previous literature has suggested.
In section 4.6, I consider the e¤ects of constraining producers to supply at the same
quality to both markets - in particular concentrating on the case where only one country
is a producer. A mutual recognition regime under imperfect competition will result in
underregulation (and reduced trade). Where there is no such recognition, the importing
country will set the higher standards, but there will be a bilateral game between the two
regulators in standard setting. Compared to non-cooperation, mutual recognition will
unambiguously worsen welfare in the importing country.
Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Background and existing literature
As formal trade barriers have been reduced worldwide, there has been increasing recogni-
tion of the importance of Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs) - barriers resulting from a
whole raft of national or regional regulations and standards on labelling, product safety,
labour standards, environmental quality and so on.3 The EU Single Market initiative
has largely been aimed at removing such barriers,4 and subsequent mutual recognition
agreements have been agreed between the EU and several other countries, as well as
within the Asia Pacic Economic Community (see Maskus and Wilson (1), 2001). A
3In the case of EU members, national regulations and standards are gradually being
outnumbered by EU ones. See DTI (2005).
4One EU report in 1996 estimated that 76% of trade between member states was
subject to standards, and sectors a¤ected by regulatory trade barriers accounted for
21% of trade and 29% of gross value added (reported in OECD, 1999).
111
similar awareness underlies the articles on TBTs and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan-
dards (SPS) in the GATT Uruguay Round, and the GATS. For example, the WTO
Agreement Annex on Technical Barriers to Trade Article 2 states that:
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted
or applied with a view to or with the e¤ect of creating unnecessary obstacles
to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be
more trade-restrictive than necessary to full a legitimate objective....
Nevertheless, there has been considerable concern that existing agreements do not go
far enough in terms of facilitating trade, particularly from the viewpoint of developing
countries.
TBTs are much more complicated to analyse than tari¤s or quotas. Deciding to
what extent barriers are in practice legitimate or constitute an obstacle to trade5 is not
simple. First the issue of denition: some authors have used very wide denitions of
what constitutes protectionism,6 exceeding those in the WTO Agreements.
Turning to specic cases, a few conclusions can be drawn from the literature. Even
regulations which apply equally to home- and to foreign-produced goods may discrimi-
nate against rms which trade, if the regulations di¤er across countries. The literature
often discusses pure cost-increasing protectionist regulation (e.g. Wallner, 1998 ): how-
ever, it seems unlikely substantial use would be made of a policy which imposes high
resource costs on consumers unless tari¤s, which impose a much smaller deadweight loss,
were ruled out or rendered infeasible or hard to alter due to their greater visibility.
5Or regulatory protection(see e.g. Baldwin, 2001), the terminology henceforth used
in this paper.
6Fischer and Serra (2000) dene a standard in a cross-hauling duopoly model as non-
protectionist when it corresponds to the standard the local social planner would use if
both rms were domestic.
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Regulatory di¤erences between countries can in principle be broadly dened as either
horizontal or vertical. The former impose di¤erent technologies or incompatible means
of achieving a given set of results, such as plug sizes. By contrast, vertical standards are
where a regulator clearly insists that goods achieve at least a certain minimum standard
of safety or performance. In practice many regulations may have both horizontal and
vertical aspects, such as insisting that cars achieve less than certain emissions levels, and
specifying use of catalytic converters.
The most widely-recognised motive for horizontal regulation is network externalities
(see, e.g. Gandal, 2001).7 The scope for distorting such a system for protectionist
purposes is also clear: if technologies are not easily compatible, the government can
favour home producers.
In the case of vertical quality, the literature to date recognises three main legitimate
reasons for minimum quality controls. First, unreliable or dangerous goods may impose
externalities.8 Secondly, purchasers of goods may not easily be able to distinguish the
quality. In this case (see e.g. Akerlof, 1970) adverse selection may mean that bad
products drive out the good, unless there is either e¤ective central labelling or some
minimum quality standard. The third motivation is where tastes are diverse and supply
is oligopolistic. In this model (see Lutz, 1996(1))9 mutual recognition benets both
countries, particularly the lower-quality producer.
However, the above papers assume a xed number of consumers buying at most one
7This is the situation where there is a substantial potential gain if all consumers use
a compatible technology. There may be good reason to impose one technology centrally,
rather than letting di¤erent technologies ght a costly battle for supremacy.
8Hypothetical alternative policies (e.g. compulsory insurance) are perhaps a side issue
- in practice the state usually does insist on goods meeting certain standards. The
most extreme case is disease control, which is the main justication for Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS).
9See also papers by Crampes and Hollander (1995) and Das and Donnenfeld (1989)
for this basic model setup, which is derived from Shaked and Sutton (1982).
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good each. This means they tend to ignore a key feature of the classical monopoly/oligopoly
model: that producers can raise prots by restricting output. Where quality di¤erences
substitute with diminishing returns for quantity of consumption, there may be scope for
producers to increase prots at consumersexpense by reducing crude quantity as well
as quality. This provides another legitimate reason for minimum quality standards: to
correct the underprovision of quality by monopolistic rms.
A lack of competition may reduce quality - on a broad denition - in a number of ways.
These could include lack of testing and labelling or use of technological incompatibilities
to tie in users to one rms products. For example, all of these criticisms are seen in
the lobbying against genetic modication of foodstu¤s. The response of governments
to these will, however, depend upon the geographical structure of the industry: in the
case of GM technology, US rms dominate. The analysis of this paper suggests it should
be no surprise that European legislators have taken a stricter line than those in North
America, leading to a major trade dispute, notably over the separate labelling of GM
foodstu¤s - however, I would suggest it is likely, if higher labelling standards prevail, that
trade will be higher than if they do not, and that this would benet consumer welfare.10
More common, however, may well be industries where trade is in both directions,
such as aircraft, motor vehicles, food products, clothing, petroleum products, pharma-
ceuticals or mobile telephones. In all of these industries, national standards are seen as
extremely important, and yet the symmetries between countries are much greater than
with GM crops. I argue that under these circumstances there may be a bias towards
over-regulation. For example, there have long been complaints in the USA about sup-
10Nielsen and Anderson (2001) look at one scenario where some of the EU consumer demand is sensitive,
but they do not link this to utility, which may explain their rather negative assessment of EU policy.
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posed overregulation of pharmaceuticals by the Food and Drugs Administration,11 while
similar complaints can be heard from European motor vehicle manufacturers.12 How-
ever, in this paper, I argue that these regulations may actually increase trade volumes
(at least when adjusted for quality), though at a cost to manufacturers.13 Again, the
over-regulation bias is generally constrained by the need for prots to be non-negative,
although, interestingly, the best-known cross-hauling duopoly case in a heavily regulated
industry, the Boeing-Airbus dispute, involves subsidised rms.
The asymmetric interests cases (such as GM technology) tend to be those which
crop up most in WTO disputes, while where interests are symmetric there may be fewer
disagreements. While one may be tempted to talk of cases such as the GM technology
as representing regulatory protectionism, this is also too simple, since it ignores the
potential bias in the exporting country towards under-regulation. It is by no means
clear that mutual recognition would be welfare-improving in either case - contrary to the
drift of much of todays trade literature.
4.3 A model of vertical quality regulation
I examine quality regulations as a response to underprovision of quality by a monopolistic
industry. Strictly speaking, regulationsare applied by governments, while standards
are voluntarily agreed by industries (Sykes, 1995).14 I concentrate primarily on the
11The argument was made by Friedman (1980), but is more recently repeated, for example, by the
right-wing Cato Institute: https://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg15n4e.html
12e.g. the European Automobile Manufacturers Association, as shown on
http://www.acea.be/ACEA/20040218PressRelease.pdf
13 In the case of pharmaceuticals, it may be more accurate to say that higher imposed testing standards
would reduce the risk of consumer scares.
14In general, a voluntary industry standard is more likely to be operated to maximise
prots of domestic rms than a government regulation. However, under the former,
importers may be able to enter the market without complying.
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former.
The method is to set up a series of theoretical models of a monopoly and a cross-
hauling duopoly. The optimal degree of regulation is established, as are the conditions
under which actual regulation di¤ers from this, when there is total non-cooperation over
regulation setting, or when there is mutual recognition.15
Consideration is also given to whether these regulations are in fact protectionist: for
this I prefer a relatively narrow denition of protection.
DEFINITION 4.1: A regulation is non-protectionist if it (i) does not reduce traded
volumes; and (ii) does not favour local prots at the expense of foreign producers.
This denition leaves a category of trade-related strategic distortions, notably the
case where regulation causes local consumers to benet from increased sales (at lower
cost and reduced prot) by both domestic and foreign producers. In this case, there are
much stronger parallels with the issue of international tax competition, rather than with
tari¤ or quota policies.
There is actually a fair amount of evidence to suggest that standards and regulations
are generally not protectionist - notably Swann et als (1996) British study, nding
that increasing numbers of quantitative standards tend to be correlated with increasing
volumes of both imports and exports.16
In this paper I am interested in regulations which improve the minimum vertical
quality experienced by consumers. In the absence of regulation, monopoly generally
15I label these cases noncooperationand mutual recognition, though mutual recogni-
tion should be seen as a regime of limited noncooperation between regulators (the limit
being that they can only regulate the home rms quality).
16Moenius (1999) had broadly similar ndings. Also note Greenaway and Milners
(1986) theoretical arguments that standards are trade-promoting, though based on rather
di¤erent grounds to this paper.
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reduces the quality of goods on o¤er, but in the presence of trade there may be strategic
distortions if national regulators do not collaborate.
I start with the simplest case of a monopolist. It is assumed that consumers are
identical. I consider initially a single country using a partial equilibrium approach,
concentrating on just one good. Firms produce output with two features, quality, Q,
and quantity, Y . I assume initially that the total cost of production, C, is a linear
function of Q and Y , with a and b denoting the linear scalars,
C = aY + bQ: (4.1)
Without loss of generality we can set a = 1, so that
C = Y + bQ: (4.1a)
I assume homothetic demand for quality and output, so that we can convert quality and
output to a measure of quality-adjusted output, X. For simplicity I assume X is a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate of Y and Q;
X = Y Q1 ; (4.2)
where  is a scalar which lies between zero and unity, and can be seen as reecting the
relative weight consumers place on quality as against crude quantity.
We can also convert the price per unit of output, P; into a price per unit of quality-
adjusted output, PX .
Consumer utility depends upon consumption both of quality-adjusted output, X, and
117
of a residual aggregate of other goods, G = M  PXX (where M is an exogenously given
endowment) in a quasilinear fashion  thus eliminating income e¤ects. For simplicity,
the utility from consuming the good in question is assumed to have an elasticity  with
respect to consumption  implying a constant elasticity of demand,   =  1=(1   ):
Hence
U = M   PXX + X; (4.3)
where  is a scalar, which we would expect to be related partly to country size. I assume
0 <  < 1: Again, without loss of generality, we ignoreM , and concentrate on a measure
of consumer surplus, U = X   PXX: Setting price equal to marginal utility, we can
write
U = (1  )X: (4.3a)
Since this gives dU=dX = (1 )X 1 > 0; consumer surplus is monotonically increas-
ing with respect to X; but the second di¤erential shows marginal utility is decreasing.
4.3.1 Monopoly equilibrium under quality regulation.
I begin with a quality regulated monopolist, whose prot mark-up is a decreasing function
of demand elasticity, . The rm will set nite prices as long as  exceeds unity, which
will be the case as long as 0 <  < 1.
Behaviour of an unregulated monopoly
As a benchmark case, I start by considering the behaviour of an unregulated monopoly,
denoted by the subscript U . For a given level of X = XU , we can obtain the cost-
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minimising value of Q (= QU ). This satises
QU = ((1=b)(1  )=)XU ; (4.4)
and hence yields a constant marginal cost of raising X,
MCU = (1=)((1=b)(1  )=) 1: (4.5)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equations (4.4)-(4.5):
C = Y + bQ: (4.1a)
From (4.2)
X = Y Q1 ; (4.2)
Y = X1=Q( 1)= ;
so
CU = X
1=
U Q
( 1)=
U + bQU ;
dCU=dQU = 0 ==> ((1  )=)X1=U Q 1=U = b;
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QU = ((1=b)(1  )=)XU ; (4.4)
CU = X
1=
U ((1=b)(1  )=) 1X( 1)=U + b((1=b)(1  )=)XU ;
= XU (1=b)
 1((1  )=) 1(1 + b(1=b)(1  )=);
= XU (1=)((1=b)(1  )=) 1;
which can readily be di¤erentiated with respect of XU to yield marginal cost as in
equation (4.5).
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
The unregulated monopolys total revenue is
RU=X

U :
Hence marginal revenue is
MRU = 
2X 1U :
Since a monopolist will equate this with marginal cost, which we have already found in
equation (4.5), we can nd unregulated output
XU = 

1=(1 )((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ); (4.6)
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where 
 = 2: Hence, we can show that
QU = 

1=(1 )((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ): (4.6a)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations (4.6) and (4.6a)
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost,
2X 1U = (1=)((1=b)(1  )=) 1
XU = (1=
2)1=( 1)((1=b)(1  )=)( 1)=( 1);
= 
1=(1 )((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ): (4.6)
But
QU = ((1=b)(1  )=)XU ; (4.4)
= ((1=b)(1  )=)
1=(1 )((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 );
QU = 

1=(1 )((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ): (4.6a)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
We also note that ((1=b)(1 )=) = (XU=QU ) 1= : Let us dene the ratio (XU=QU ) =
U : From (4.4) we can see that
(XU=QU ) = U = ((1=b)(1  )=) : (4.6b)
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Hence we can rewrite equation (4.5) as
MCU = (1=)
(1 )=
U : (4.5a)
The regulated monopoly
Now introduce a regulation xing Q  QR (where the subscript R denotes a regulatory
minimum quality). In practice, if QR > QU then the rm will choose Q = QR. It is also
assumed that the regulator only sets a minimum quality standard: there is no regulation
of volume supplied or price (this may be a more realistic assumption for the oligopoly
case considered later).
By contrast with the unregulated case, marginal cost is now a function of Q and X,
MCR = (1=)(R)
(1 )= ; (4.7)
where  denotes the output/quality ratio X=Q.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.7):
CR = X
1=
R Q
( 1)=
R + bQR ;
dCR=dXR = (1=)X
(1 )=
R Q
( 1)=
R :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Di¤erentiating dCR=dXR with respect to QR, we nd that
d(dCR=dXR)=dQR = (1=)((   1)=)X(1 )=R Q 1=R ; (4.7a)
which will be negative for the case where 0 <  < 1;and XR; QR > 0: Hence raising
the regulatory quality lowers marginal costs. Further, by comparing (4.7) with (4.5a),
we can see that if R = U ; then MCR = MCU . Consequently, if the regulator sets
the minimum standard equal to QU , the quality the unregulated monopolist would have
chosen, then the monopolist will choose XR = XU , which would produce the same
marginal cost as if he were unregulated.
Since dMCR=dQR is negative, as QR is increased by regulation, the marginal cost of
quality-adjusted output X will fall. This leads to our rst result.
LEMMA 4.1: If a monopolist is constrained to produce to a higher standard than
he would otherwise choose, the marginal cost of increasing quality-adjusted output is less
than when the choice of quality is unconstrained.
This can be shown in Figure 4.1, which summarises the rms choice of crude output
Y . Given free choice, the rm will choose (QU ; Y U ) on the ray QU=Y U= k. However,
regulation prevents the rm setting Q < QR: It follows that, for quantities of quality-
adjusted output up to XF ; the rm is forced to incur higher cost, C; than it would freely
choose for a given level of quality-adjusted output X. Against this, as output increases
the total cost line approaches the ray QU=Y U= k. This suggests that imposing a quality
standard of QR> QU means the marginal cost of increasing X is less than it would be
if the rm were to freely choose Q and Y , up to the point where X = XF . The reason
total cost is higher is because the minimum standard e¤ectively imposes a xed cost on
123
the rm.17
17There are strong parallels here with regulatory policies which change the input mix
of rms as a means of inducing them to change output levels - for example, insisting a
rm instals more capital than it would freely choose. (Thanks to Rodney Falvey for this
point).
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Figure 4.1: Imposition of a minimum quality standard QR by a regulator.
Imposition of a minimum quality standard QR by a regulator.
QU and YU are the unregulated quality and quantity. YF corresponds to the level of
demand at which the regulated standard QR is the same as what the monopolist would
freely choose.
Quality Q
Crude
Quantity
Y
C=CU
X=XU  Q.A. Output chosen by
Unregulated monopolist
QR
YF
X=XF
C=CF
Qu/Yu is
constant k
YU
QU
Assuming a constant demand elasticity, the monopolist will set a xed proportional
markup over marginal cost. Hence the introduction of QR will lead to lower prices (at
least when quality-adjusted), and higher sales, at least as long as the standard is not set
so high that the monopolist chooses to exit the market. This leads to our next result:
LEMMA 4.2: A quality-constrained monopolist will sell more quality-adjusted
output at a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated monopolist, and this output
will rise monotonically with the quality standard as long as the rm continues to produce.
To establish more formally the relationship between the supply of quality-adjusted
125
output chosen by the monopolist, XR, and the minimum quality specied by the regula-
tor, QR; we note that a prot-maximising rm will set marginal cost equal to marginal
revenue and solve, giving us the relationship
XR= 

=(1 )QR
(1 )=(1 ) : (4.8)
This conrms that for positive  and ; 0 < < 1 and 0 < < 1 , XR is increasing
monotonically with respect to QR.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.8):
Marginal revenue is given by MR = 2X 1:
Setting marginal revenue equal to marginal cost
2X 1R =MCR= (1=)(XR=QR)
(1 )= ;
2(XR)
( 1)= = (1=)(QR)( 1)= ;
XR
(1 )= = 2QR(1 )= :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Figure 4.2: Choice of quality-adjusted output under a regulatory minimum quality
standard.
Choice of quality-adjusted output under a regulatory minimum quality
standard.
XU is the choice of an unconstrained monopolist. XR is that which a quality-
regulated monopolist chooses. At XF the constrained and unconstrained
outputs are the same. X* is the social optimum if the regulator could set both
quality and output.
Marginal Cost MC,
Marginal Utility
MU
Utility U
Quality-
adjusted
Output X
XU X*
MR
MU
MCU
MCR
XR XF
The e¤ect on output of imposing a minimum quality standard is illustrated in Figure
4.2. For X < XF ; the new marginal cost curve, MCR(X), lies below the old one,
MCU (X). Consequently the monopolist will now increase quality-adjusted output to
equal XR rather than XU as before.
Optimal regulation according to social welfare
We now want to model the regulators choice. In fact, given the above relationship
between output and the regulatory standard, modelling welfare choices is relatively
straightforward in the case of the Cobb-Douglas/linear functional form. This follows
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from the fact that consumer surplus, sales revenue and variable costs of production are
all directly proportionate to one another. Specically, we can relate consumer surplus,
sales revenue, variable cost and quality using a series of constants. If RR is sales revenue
of a regulated monopoly, then rst we note that RR is a function of QR of the form
RR = k1Q

R; (4.9)
where
k1 = 

=(1 ); (4.9a)
and  = (1   )=(1   ). Note that, for 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1;  must also
lie between zero and one. This implies that RR; UR and V CR are all monotonically
increasing with respect to QR, although at a declining marginal rate.
consumer surplus UR = k2RR; (4.10a)
variable cost V CR = k3RR; (4.10b)
where k2 and k3 are constants, whose values depend upon  and  :
k2 = (1  )=; (4.11a)
k3 = : (4.11b)
These equations imply that RR; UR and V CR are all monotonically increasing with
respect to QR, although at a declining marginal rate.
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LEMMA 4.3: Consumer surplus rises monotonically with the minimum quality,
although at the marginal rise in consumer surplus is declining.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equations:
Equations (4.9) and (4.9a)
RR= PxRXR=X

R;
But
XR= 

=(1 )QR
(1 )=(1 ) : (4.8)
Consequently
RR = 

=(1 )QR
(1 )=(1 ) ;
= 
=(1 )QR
 : (4.9)
Derivation of Equations (4.10a) and (4.11a).
Consumer surplus is a function of quality-adjusted sales
UR = X

R   PxRXR;
= (1  )XR;
= ((1  )=)RR: (4.10a)
Derivation of Equations (4.10b) and (4.11b)
Starting with cost
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CR = X
1=
R Q
( 1)=
R + bQR;
we can write
CR = V CR + bQR;
where variable cost
V CR = X
1=
R Q
( 1)=
R :
Hence, substituting from (4.8)
V CR = (

=(1 )(QR)
(1 )=(1 ))
1=
Q
( 1)=
R ;
= 
1=(1 )QR
(1 )=(1 )Q(1 )( 1)=((1 ))R ;
= 
1=(1 )QR
(1 )=(1 ):
Hence
V CR=RR = 

1=(1 )=(
=(1 ));
= 
=;
= :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
The rms prots, R; will rst rise and then decline as quality standards rise. This
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result follows from the observation that
R = RR   V CR   bQR;
= (1  k3)k1QR   bQR: (4.12)
Di¤erentiating this with respect to QR, we can show that prots peak when
Q1 R = (1  k3)k1=b; (4.12a)
which, in fact, gives the value we have already established for QU .
To illustrate these relationships further, consider the case where  = 10; b = 1;
 = 1=2 and  = 1=2: In this case,  = 1=3; 
 = 10=8; k1 = 5:387; k2 = 1; k3 = 1=4:
Consequently, QU = 1:5625.
The relationships between the key variables in this case are seen in Figure 4.3, below.
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Figure 4.3
Effect of varying quality standards in a monopoly,
where gamma=10, b=1, eta=0.5, beta=0.5
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[Rev=rms revenue; Vcost = variable cost; Fcost = xed cost; X = rms sales; WR
= overall welfare.]
The gure shows how revenue and variable cost both increase (but at a declining
rate) as quality is raised. However, due to rising xed costs, which are a linear function
of QR, prot starts to decline once QU (= 1:5625) is passed.18 The sum of consumer
surplus and prot - which equals social welfare if the rm is domestic - is maximised at
a quality of around 5:6, while the rm nally exits the market at a quality standard of
about 8.
18The graph assumes the regulator sets the quality standard. In practice, if the regulator only sets a
minimum quality standard, then the rm will not implement any standard less than QU .
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Regulation: the general case
To derive the behaviour of the regulator in a more general case, rst assume the monop-
olist is domestic. In this case, the regulator seeks to maximise national welfare
WR = UR + R;
= (k2 + 1  k3)k1QR   bQR: (4.13)
Di¤erentiating this with respect to QR, setting the di¤erential equal to zero and rear-
ranging, we can nd the welfare-maximising standard:
dWR=dQR = 0 ==> Q
1 
R = (k2 + 1  k3)k1=b: (4.13a)
By contrast, where the monopolist is foreign, the regulator will not care about the
rms prots, and will seek simply to maximise consumer surplus. Since this is increasing
monotonically with respect to the quality standard (in this case denote QRF ), the only
constraint is that eventually, as standards are raised, the rms prots will reach zero
and it will leave the market. We can deduce:
PROPOSITION 4.1: If the monopolist is foreign, a regulator maximising domestic
welfare will set the highest quality standard at which the rm does not exit the market.
Normally we would assume this to be the rms reservation level of QRF correspond-
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ing to RF = 0: In this case, the optimal standard when the monopolist is foreign is
(1  k3)k1QRF = bQRF ;
Q1 RF = (1  k3)k1=b: (4.14)
We next need to compare these various quality standards. Since 0 <  < 1; we can
rank the various standards quite simply. First of all, QRF is clearly greater than QU ,
since, comparing (4.14) with (4.12a), we see that
Q1 RF =Q
1 
U = 1=
= (1  )=((1  )) > 1:
Next, comparing (4.13a) with (4.12a), we can show that QR > QU , since
Q1 R =Q
1 
U = (k2 + 1  k3)=(1  k3) > 1:
Finally, we need to compare (4.14) with (4.13a).
Q1 RF  Q1 R = (1  k3)k1=b  (k2 + 1  k3)k1=b:
Since k1 and b are both positive, we can say this will exceed zero if
(1  k3) > (k2 + 1  k3);
(1  )(1  k3) > k2: (4.15)
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This condition can be shown to hold at all times under the functional form and
parameter restriction assumptions which we are making.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Proof.
Note that (4.15) is equivalent to writing
((1  )=(1  ))(1  ) > ((1  ))=(1  ))(1  )=;
(1  ) > ((1  )=(1  ))(1  );
(1  ) > (1  );
 < 1:
But we have already assumed 0 <  < 1:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
The above comparisons can be summed up:
PROPOSITION 4.2: Given our Cobb-Douglas/linear functional form assump-
tions, the optimum regulatory standard for a foreign monopolist is higher than that for
a domestic monopolist, and both are higher than the rm itself would choose.
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4.3.2 Mutual recognitionwith a monopolist19
If there are two countries, but a single, monopolistic producer, which can costlessly
supply di¤erent national markets at di¤erent quality standards, it follows that, in the
absence of a mutual recognition (or harmonisation) agreement, the importing countrys
regulator would always set a higher standard for a foreign rm than the rm would
freely choose. By contrast, under mutual recognition, the producing countrys regulator
sets a common minimum standard for both countries. In doing so, it will take account
of its own consumers surplus, but not that of foreign consumers, while it will take
account of the prots its own rm would set in both markets. Consequently, we would
expect it to reduce the quality standard in its own country, compared with the situation
under noncooperation, which leads to an even larger reduction in the (formerly excessive)
standards imposed in the importing country.
Since we have already shown that reduced standards cause a fall in demand, the result
of this would be a fall in volumes of trade (at least when measured in quality-adjusted
units).
PROPOSITION 4.3: The introduction of mutual recognition in the presence of
a monopoly, where the rm can costlessly set separate standards for di¤erent markets,
will result in a reduction in quality and quality-adjusted trade volumes compared to the
noncooperative regulation case.
19Mutual recognitionis, of course, a slightly incongruous term when only
one country is producing the good. Nevertheless, looking at this case does
have potential implications in the more general case where trade is largely
in one direction, so it is worth considering for that reason.
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In the case where the two countries are identical in size and consumer preferences, we
can quite easily model the quality standard chosen by the exporting countrys regulator
under mutual recognition. The exporters regulator will seek to maximise
WX = UX   2X = (k2 + 2  2k3)k1QX   2bQX : (4.16a)
The rst order condition for maximising WX with respect to QX is
dWX=dQX = 0 ==> Q
1 
X = ((k2=2) + 1  k3)k1=b: (4.16b)
Comparing (4.16b) with (4.13a) and (4.12a), we can see that Q1 X lies midway be-
tween Q1 U and Q
1 
R :
To make global welfare comparisons in this case, rst we note that global welfare
WG = UG   2G = (2k2 + 2  2k3)k1QG   2bQG: (4.17)
Maximising this would give a standard in both countries equal to QR. It follows that
mutual recognition of a monopolist leads to a quality standard in both countries below
the global optimum. By contrast, under noncooperative setting, the quality standard
in the exporting country will be set at the global optimum, while that in the importing
country will be higher than the global optimum. Since lower quality standards benet
the producer at the expense of consumers, we can summarise the situation as:
PROPOSITION 4.4: On our model formulation, the introduction of mutual recog-
nition in the presence of a monopoly, where the rm can costlessly set separate standards
for di¤erent markets, will result in a reduction in consumer utility in both the import-
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ing and the exporting country, but with a gain to the monopolists prots. Overall, the
exporting country gains and the importing country loses.
The overall sign of the net e¤ect on global welfare of a move to mutual recognition
is not straightforward to determine.
4.3.3 Extension to alternative cost structures
The above analysis has relied upon a very simple, linear cost structure, as shown in
equation (4.1). It is worth noting that the broad results carry through to more general
cost structures C = C(Y;Q), so long as, rst, we can still write Y = Y (X;Q), which
implies that we can also treat C as a function of X and Q, C = eC(X;Q) and, secondly,
raising quality lowers the marginal cost of producing quality-adjusted output, i.e.
d(d eC(X;Q)=dX)=dQ < 0: (4.18)
For example, where X is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate, but raising quality has e¤ects
on both xed and variable costs, i.e.
C = Y + bQ+ dQY; (4.19)
where a, b and d are non-negative, it is relatively straightforward to show that the
conditions in equation (4.18) hold so long as
(   1) + d(2   1)Q < 0: (4.20)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Derivation of Equation (4.20):
Y = X1=Q( 1)= :
Hence
C = X1=Q( 1)= + bQ+ dX1=Q(2 1)= ;
dC=dX = (1=)X(1 )=Q( 1)= + (d=)X(1 )=Q(2 1)= ;
d(dC=dX)=dQ = ((   1)=2)X(1 )=Q 1= + (d(2   1)=2)X(1 )=Q( 1)= ;
= (1=2)X(1 )=Q 1=((   1) + d(2   1)Q:
When this equals zero, 1   = d(2   1)Q:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Clearly, for 0 <  < 1 and d = 0 (the case in the previous section) this holds.
Also when  < 1=2 it will hold. For  > 1=2 and d > 0; (4.20) will be satised if the
unregulated monopolists output,
QU < (1=d)((1  )=(2   1)): (4.21)
It is possible to show that an unregulated monopolist will always choose less than
this level of quality - hence quality regulation, at least at the margin, will cause the
monopolist to increase output. It may be noted, however, that while the regulator will
only increase Q; this will not exceed the point where (4.20) is satised: whether this will
a¤ect the interaction with trade depends on parameter values.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Proof
A monopolist will minimise costs for a given level of output (unless constrained).
Hence dC=dQ = 0:
But
dC=dQ = ((   1)=)X1=Q 1= + b+ d((2   1)=)X1=Q( 1)= ;
= => (1=)X1=Q 1=((   1) + d(2   1)Q) =  b:
But the LH term is X(d(dC=dX)=dQ):
Hence for  > 0; X > 0 and b > 0, d(dC=dX)=dQ < 0:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
It follows that raising Q would, at the margin, lower marginal costs, and so lead
a monopolist to increase output. However, it is conceivable that there will be functional
forms on which QRF 6 QR, in which case noncooperative standard setting will not result
in overregulation.
Despite this qualication, for the rest of this paper, I will retain the simpler formu-
lation, for expositional reasons.
4.4 Quality regulation in a cross-hauling, Cournot duopoly
4.4.1 Third country and reciprocal market models
Brander (1995) gives a good survey of the literature on strategic trade policy where
products are identical or near-identical. Most papers to date have concentrated on the
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use of export and R&D subsidies, and have can be divided into those using a third
market model (e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1985) or those with reciprocal markets (fol-
lowing Brander, 1981). None of the papers listed specically covers the issue of quality
regulation, which has generally only been tackled using the alternative, Hotelling-based
heterogeneous consumers/di¤erentiated products approach (Das and Donnenfeld, 1989,
Lutz, 1996(1) and (2)).
In this chapter, I am assuming that consumers are homogeneous, and that products
can be compared easily in terms of quality-adjusted output. I also follow the framework
of Brander and Spencer in that the regulator within a country is seen as a rst-mover,
setting a standard to which the rms then respond, and that the rms compete on
the basis of Cournot conjectures. Strategic games with standards are generally rather
di¤erent to those involving export subsidies, in that it is di¢ cult for exporting countries
governments to intervene in foreign markets using regulatory standards, unless a mutual
recognition agreement is in force, in which case the third country would be forced to
accept standards laid down by exporting countries.20 Compared to the single monopoly
exporter model which I have so far investigated, regulatorsmotives would would be
potentially more complicated , since there are more complicated strategic motives where
two exporting country regulators are both backing their domestic exporting rms (since
market share, or prot-shift considerations come into play where more than one exporting
country is involved).
In this chapter I prefer to follow the reciprocal markets approach to analysing strate-
gic regulatory bias in the case where there is more than one exporter, as this brings
20 In the absence of mutual recognition (which is, of course, a rather odd concept in the case where
a country imports a good which it does not produce), the importing country regulator would simply
set the highest standard at which the foreign producers do not exit the market, as established in the
previous section.
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out more clearly the potential conicts between the impact of regulatory standards on
domestic consumers, on foreign consumers, on supply costs and on market share/prot
shift considerations. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in mind that a global mutual
recognition agreement for many products may involve elements of both reciprocal selling
by exporting countries into each others market and of third party strategic competition,
and this would be a potential eld for future research.
4.4.2 The model
I now assume that, instead of a monopolist, the industry contains two identical rms:
f = 1 and 2, set in countries c = 1 and 2 respectively. All consumers in both countries
have identical tastes, and the two rms produce goods which are perfect substitutes,
with identical production functions.
As before, consumersutility in country 1 depends on total consumption, which I
now denote Z1, where Z1 = X1;1 +X2;1, the aggregate of the quality-adjusted sales Xf;c
of the two rms to country 1.
Consumer surplus in country 1 is given by
U1 = Z

1   P1Z1; (4.22)
where P1 is the price of the quality-adjusted output in country 1, which is the same for
both suppliers given their outputs are perfect substitutes. As before, we can equate
marginal utility with price and insert this in (4.22) to derive
U1 = (1  )Z1 : (4.22a)
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As before, X1;1 and X2;1 are Cobb-Douglas aggregates of quality, Qf;c and crude
quantity, Yf;c. Cost, Cf;c; is a linear function of Y f;c and Qf;c.21
We are crucially assuming that rm f chooses its quality to supply to each market
separately, and that quality chosen to supply to country 1 has no e¤ect on the costs of
quality in country 2.
Since the cost side of the model is unchanged from that of the monopoly above,
we can proceed by analogy. When a rm is unregulated the marginal cost of increasing
quality-adjusted outputXf;c is constant, as given by (4.5) above. Likewise, when country
1 sets a higher quality standard than the unregulated duopoly would choose, marginal
costs fall as (Qf;1R=Xf;1) rises, as indicated by equation (4.7).
The demand side is somewhat more complicated. Assuming consumers maximise
utility, consumption is to the point where marginal utility of Xf;c equals quality-adjusted
price.
Since we are initially looking at the market in just country 1, which is assumed to
be totally segregated from any other country, we can ignore subscripts for the country,
and simply denote the two rms 1 and 2. Firm 1 is assumed to be domestic, while
rm 2 is foreign. For maximum prot, each rm f = f1; 2g will choose its level of
output for market 1 to equate marginal cost and perceived marginal revenue. The latter
is dependent upon rm fs conjecture about the behaviour of its rival g: I follow the
21 Strictly speaking, if the values of scale parameters a and b in equation (4.1) were
invariant with the number of rms, the smaller rms in a duopoly case would be pro-
ducing a lower quality than the monopolist in the rst case. However, a slightly modied
formulation (eg where costs are a function of output and quality per plant, and the num-
ber of plants) would return the model to the classical features where a monopoly results
in lower quality and quantity. Since in this paper I am only interested in cases where
the number of rms is xed, I have retained the linear formulation in (4.1) for simplicity,
but it is worth bearing in mind that a and b are not invariant with the number of rms.
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Cournot-Nash assumption that f chooses its quality-adjusted output, Xf , as a response
to g0s chosen level of quality-adjusted output Xg.22 Concentrating on rm 1, total
revenue will be related to the rms conjecture of its rivals output:
dU=dZ = 0 ==> PX = Z
 1;
Rc1 = Z
 1X1; (4.23)
Rc1 = X1(X1 +X
c
2)
 1; (4.23a)
where Xc2 is rm 1s Cournot conjecture about rm 2s output.
If we denote the rmsrespective marginal costs of increasing quality-adjusted sales
MC1 and MC2; then assuming a prot-maximising rm sets perceived marginal rev-
enue equal to its perceived marginal cost, based upon its conjecture of the other rms
behaviour we can derive:
@Rc1=@X1 = (X1 +X
c
2)
 1 + (   1)X1(X1 +Xc2) 2 =MC1:
(X1 +X
c
2)
 1 + (   1)X1(X1 +Xc2) 2 =MC1=: (4.24a)
Likewise for rm 2
(Xc1 +X2)
 1 + (   1)X2(Xc1 +X2) 2 =MC2=: (4.24b)
22The alternative Bertrand-Nash duopoly will, if goods are identical, produce the un-
interesting result that prices are bid down to marginal cost.
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Equations (4.24a-b) dene the best response functions of the two rms. These are
nonlinear, though they can be solved for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Examples of
these functions are shown graphically in Appendix 4.2.
The equilibrium conditions are given by
Z = X1 +X2 = [(MC1 +MC2)=((1 + ))]
1= 1; (4.25)
and
 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1); (4.26)
where  is dened as the ratio X2=X1, which implies that X1 = Z=(1 + ) and X2 =
Z=(1 + ):
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.25)
Adding the two equations, and setting Xc1 = X1 and X
c
2 = X2,
(MC1 +MC2)= = 2(X1 +X2)
 1 + (   1)(X1 +X2)(X1 +X2) 2;
= (X1 +X2)
 1(1 + ):
Z = [(MC1 +MC2)=((1 + ))]
1= 1: (4.25)
Derivation of Equation (4.26)
If we denote X2=X1 = , then X1 = Z=(1 + ) and X2 = Z=(1 + ). Hence from
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(4.24a),
Z 1(1 + (   1)=(1 + )) = MC1=;
Z 1 = MC1=(1 + (   1)=(1 + ));
and from (4.24b),
Z 1(1 + (   1)=(1 + )) = MC2=;
Z 1 = MC2=(1 + (   1)=(1 + )):
Assuming MC1; MC2;  and  are non-zero, we can cross-multiply from the two
equations
MC2(1 + (   1)=(1 + )) =MC1(1 + (   1)=(1 + ));
(MC2  MC1) = ((   1)=(1 + ))(MC1  MC2);
(1 + )(MC2  MC1) = (   1)(MC1  MC2);
MC2  MC1 + (MC2  MC1) = MC1   MC1 + (1  )MC2;
MC2  MC1 = (MC1  MC2);
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 = (MC2  MC1)=(MC1  MC2);
= (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1): (4.26)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Equation (4.26) yields non-negative values for X1 and X2 as long as the numerator
and denominator carry the same sign. Since we are assuming 0 <  < 1, the relevant
cases are where numerator and denominator are both negative, which will be the case if
1= > MC2=MC1 > : (4.26a)
This implies that either MC2 and MC1 are close in value or that  is small.
Also note that if M =MC2=MC1, then (4.26) can be written
 = (1  M)(M   ) 1;
d=dM =  (M   ) 1   (1  M)(M   ) 2:
When M = 1,
d=dM =  (1 + )=(1  ); (4.27)
which is negative for 0 <  < 1, conrming that raising MC2 will reduce rm 2s market
share, at least at the margin.
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4.4.3 Regulation of a cross-hauling duopoly
Starting with the simplest case, I consider a model where the two rms are both selling
into country 1s market. The regulator in 1 sets the minimum standard. Firm 1 is
domestic while 2 is foreign. I assume that both rms have identical cost functions, which
do not depend upon product standards in the foreign market. In this case, marginal
cost will be denoted by MC. Where there is no regulation, rms will choose a constant
ratio of Xf=Qf and marginal cost will be a constant MCU , as in the analysis of a single
monopolist.
First of all, the quality standard chosen by an unregulated duopoly will be
QU = 	
1=1 2(2 )=( 1)((1=b)(1  )=)1=1 ; (4.28)
where 	 = (1 + ), which is positive.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.28)
The relationship between QU and XU for each rm as expressed in (4.4) and (4.5)
will continue to stand:
QU = ((1=b)(1  )=)XU : (4.4)
Total cost for rm 1 is
C1U = X
1=
U Q
( 1)=
U + bQU ; (4.5)
MC1U = (1=)((1=b)(1  )=) 1 =MCU :
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This implies
ZU = [(1 + )=2MCU ]
1=1 
= ((1 + )=2)1=1 ((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 );
XU = ((1 + )=2)
1=1 ((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 )=2; where the rms are identical;
QU = ((1=b)(1  )=)((1 + )=2)1=1 ((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 )=2;
= ((1 + )=2)1=1 ((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 )=2;
= 	1=1 2(2 )=( 1)((1=b)(1  )=)1=1 ; (4.28)
where 	 = (1 + ), which is positive.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
4.4.4 The regulatory game
I assume that the regulator aims to maximise the sum of the the domestic rms prots
and domestic consumer surplus. Hence, as before, it seeks to maximise
WRC = 1RC + URC ; (4.13b)
where I am using the subscripts RC to represent a regulated Cournot game. The regula-
tor is assumed to be indi¤erent to the prots made by the foreign rm, or to foreigners
consumer surplus.
The setup of the game between the regulator and the two rms is also signicant.
In this paper, I shall assume that the regulator can accurately predict the outcome of
the Cournot subgame between the two rms, and can potentially act as a rst mover,
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committing the rms in advance to a particular quality of output.
Firm 1s total revenue is given by
R1RC = Z
 1
RC X1RC : (4.23)
If we are looking at the regulators choice of standards, then it is the regulators conjec-
tures of Z and X1 which matter. I will assume that the regulator can accurately predict
the outcome of the subgame between the two rms.
Firm 1s costs are derived in similar fashion to the case of a domestic monopolist.
Consequently, total cost will be
C1RC = X
1=
1RCQ
( 1)=
RC + bQRC : (4.29)
Crucially, if rm 1 takes the quality standard QRC as something set exogenously by
the regulator, then its marginal cost will be given by
MC1RC = (1=)(X1RC=QRC)
(1 )= ; (4.30)
as in (4.7). Firm 2s marginal cost will be similarly determined, as the two rms are
identical.
Combined sales by the two rms in this symmetrical game will be given by
ZRC = 	
=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC=: (4.31)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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Derivation of Equation (4.31)
The regulator can accurately predict the outcome of the Cournot subgame between
the two rms, and so will assume (from 4.23)
ZRC = [(1 + )=2MCRC ]
1=1 ;
MCRC = [(1 + )=2]Z
 1
RC :
But we also know from (4.30)
MCRC = (1=)(X1RC=QRC)
(1 )= = (1=)2
( 1)=
(Z1RC=QRC)
(1 )= :
Consequently
[(1 + )=2]Z 1RC = (1=)2
( 1)=(Z1RC=QRC)
(1 )= ;
Z
( 1)=
RC = [2=(1 + )]2
( 1)=QRC ( 1)= ;
ZRC = [(1 + )=2]
=(1 )2( 1)=( 1)QRC ( 1)=( 1);
= 	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC (1 )=(1 );
= 	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC=: (4.31)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Di¤erentiating (4.28) with respect to QRC , we nd that
dZRC=dQRC = (=)	
=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC ( )=;
which is positive, given that 0 <  < 1 and 0 <  < 1: Consequently, we can derive
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LEMMA 4.4: If a Cournot duopoly of identical rms is regulated to produce to a
higher standard than they would otherwise choose, the marginal cost of increasing quality-
adjusted output is less than when the choice of quality is unconstrained.
It is worth noting that, when the regulator sets QRC = QU ; then ZRC = ZU (as one
would expect from the envelope theorem).
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Proof:
ZRC = 	
=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QU (1 )=(1 ) from (4.31),
= 	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )	(1 )=(1 )(1 )2(2 )(1 )=( 1)(1 )
((1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ); from (4.28)
= 	1=(1 )21=( 1)(1=b)(1  )=)(1 )=(1 ) = ZU :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Consequently, we can write
ZRC = ZU (QRC=QU )
=: (4.31a)
Since 1 >  > 0 and 1 >  > 0; we can deduce the proposition from (4.31a)
PROPOSITION 4.5: A regulated duopoly as in lemma 4.4 will sell more quality-
adjusted output at a lower quality-adjusted price than an unregulated duopoly, and this
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output rises monotonically with the quality standard as long as the rms continue to
supply the market.
Also note that, when QRC = QU ,
MCRC = [(1 + )=2]Z
 1
U =MCU : (4.32)
Note the similarity between (4.31a) and (4.8). The elasticity of output with respect
to the regulatory standard is the same for a Cournot duopoly as for a monopolist, so
that for any given regulatory standard, Cournot output di¤ers from monopoly output
by a xed proportion.
The analysis in the case of noncooperative standard setting follows the approach we
used in the monopoly case. In other words, I start by deriving the relationship between
rm 1s sales revenue, R1RC , and the regulatory quality standard, QRC . This is of the
form
R1RC = K1Q

RC ; (4.33)
where
K1 = (=2)	
=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 ): (4.34)
Next, I establish that, for the Cobb-Douglas/linear cost structure, variable costs and
consumer utility are directly proportional to rm 1s sales revenue, R1RC . In other words,
we can write
U1RC = K2R1RC ; and (4.35a)
V C1RC = K3R1RC ; (4.35b)
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where
K2 = (2(1  )=); and (4.36a)
K3 = ((1 + )=2): (4.36b)
Note that K3 is less than 1, so variable costs will always be less than the rms revenue.
K2 is positive.
Next, I show that rm 1s total prots are given by
1RC = R1RC   C1RC = R1RC   V C1RC   bQRC;
= (1 K3)K1QRC   bQRC; (4.37)
where V C1RC represents variable costs, as before.
From (4.33), (4.35a) and (4.36a) we can derive
LEMMA 4.5: Consumer surplus with a quality regulated Cournot duopoly rises
monotonically with the minimum quality standard.
This follows since sales rise monotonically with the minimum quality standard, and
utility rises monotonically with sales.
Since 0 <  < 1; it follows that both consumer surplus and the gap between revenue
and variable cost increase as the quality standard is increased, but at a declining rate. By
contrast, xed cost increases linearly with the quality standard. To illustrate what this
means, consider the case where  = 10; b = 1;  = 1=2 and  = 1=2: In this particular
case, 	 = (1 + ) = 3:75; K1 = 3:884; K2 = 2; K3 = 3=8: The relationship between
key variables in this case is shown in Figure 4.4, below.
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Figure 4.4:
Cournot Duopoly: effect of varying quality
standard. Gamma=10, b=1, beta=1/2,
eta=1/2.
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The quality at which prot equals zero, Q#, is found by setting
(1 K3)K1Q# = bQ#; from 4.37
Q1 # = (1 K3)K1=b: (4.38)
In our illustrative case,
Q# = [(5=8) 3:884]3=2 = 3:782:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equations (4.33) and (4.34)
155
R1RC = Z
 1
1RCX1RC = Z

1RC=2; assuming identical rms,
= (=2)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC (1 )=(1 );
= (=2)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC: (4.33)
R1RC = (=2)Z

U (QRC=QU )
(1 )=(1 );
Derivation of Equations (4.35a) and (4.36a)
URC = Z

RC   ZRCPXRC = ZRC   ZRC ;
= (1  )ZRC :
But Z1RC=2 = R1RC ; so
URC = ((1  )R1RC=(=2));
= (2(1  )=)R1RC : (4.35a)
Derivation of Equations (4.35b) and (4.36b)
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V C1RC = X
1=
1RCQ
( 1)=
RC ;
= 2 1=Z1=RCQ
( 1)=
RC ;
= 2 1=	1=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )Q(1 )=(1 )RC ; (from 4.28)
V C1RC=R1RC = [2
 1=	1=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )]=[(=2)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )];
V C1RC = (2
 1==(=2))((1 + ))2(1 2)=R1RC ;
= (2)((1 + ))2 2R1RC ;
= ((1 + )=2)R1RC : (4.35b)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
4.4.5 Regulatory standards and market exit
In this section, consider the e¤ects of the assumption of a non-negative prot constraint.
As in the pure monopoly case, regulatory policy can potentially raise consumer welfare
by making rms supply more quality-adjusted output than they would freely choose to
do. However, it is worth bearing in mind that this is usually subject to the constraint
that the regulator will not force standards so high that the rms will exit the market.
Before examining the e¤ects of this constraint, however, I rst analyse the standards
regulators would set if rmsexit were not a problem.
No nonnegative prot constraint In a noncooperative game, WRC , the regulators
objective, will be given by
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WRC = URC + 1RC ;
= [K2 + 1 K3]R1RC   bQRC ;
= [K2 + 1 K3]K1QRC   bQRC (4.39)
We can derive the quality standard which a regulator will choose in the absence of
harmonisation or mutual recognition by di¤erentiating with respect to QRC and setting
dWRC=dQRC = 0. This will be satised by the condition
[K2 + 1 K3]K1Q 1RC = b;
Q1 RC = [K2 + 1 K3]K1=b: (4.40)
Now compare this with the situation where there is a harmonised standard set by
a single, global regulator. Global welfare includes utility from two (identical) countries
and prot from two identical rms, each selling in both markets. Consequently
WG = 2U1G + 41;1G;
= [2K2 + 4  4K3]K1QG   4bQG: (4.41)
Again, di¤erentiating (4.41) to obtain the global welfare-maximising quality standard,
we nd
WG=dQG = 0 ==> [2K2 + 4  4K3]K1Q 1G = 4b;
Q1 G = [(K2=2) + 1 K3]K1=b: (4.42)
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Note that (in this case before we take account of the nonnegative prot constraint)
Q1 RC > Q
1 
G ; the global optimum standard. This is fairly easily shown by comparing
(4.40) with (4.42):
(Q1 RC  Q1 G )=Q1 G = [(K2 + 1 K3)  ((K2=2) + 1 K3)]=[(K2=2) + 1 K3];
= (K2=2)=[(K2=2) + 1 K3];
which is positive given K2 > 0 and 1  K3 > 0.Since 0 <  < 1; this also implies that
QRC > Q

G; so noncooperative regulators will always set higher than the global optimum
standard (unless the nonnegative prot constraint intervenes).
Lemma 4.6: If rms will stay open regardless of whether they make a prot, then
the quality standard set by noncooperative regulators will exceed that set under global
harmonisation.
With the nonnegative constraint In our illustrative case where  = 10; b = 1;
 = 1=2 and  = 1=2; a noncooperative regulator would wish to set QRC = f[K2 + 1  
K3]K1=bg1=1  = 6:26; while a single global regulator would prefer QG = f[(K2=2) +
1 K3]K1=bg1=1  = 3:06: Since the global optimum standard in this case is 3:782; it
turns out that, if subsidies are ruled out, the actions of a noncooperative regulator in
raising standards above the global optimum would be limited by the standard at which
the rms would exit.
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More generally, Q# will exceed QG if and only if
(1 K3)K1=b > [(K2=2) + 1 K3]K1=b;
K2 < 2(1 K3)(1  ): (4.43)
The condition in (4.43) always holds for ranges of  and  between 0 and 1.
..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Proof
(4.43) will only be satised if
((1  )=(1  ))(2(1  )=) < 2(1  ((1 + )=2))(1  ((1  )=(1  )));
Right hand side = (2  (1 + ))((1  )=(1  ));
Left hand side = 2(1  )(1  )=(1  ):
Hence, since (1   ) is positive, we can divide both sides of the equation by (1   ) to
write
2(1  )=(1  ) < (2  (1 + ))=(1  );
and since (1  ) is positive, we can write
2(1  ) < 2  (1 + );
(1 + ) > 2;
 > 1;
which violates our assumption that 0 <  < 1:
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Comparing the conditions in (4.38) and (4.40), we can say that QRC will exceed Q#
if and only if
(1 K3)K1=b < [K2 + 1 K3]K1=b:
This is equivalent to the condition that
 < 2=(3  ); (4.44)
which means that Q# will exceed QRC only where  is su¢ ciently high relative to :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of (4.44)
(1  ((1 + )=2))((1  )=(1  )) < (2(1  )=)(1  )=(1  );
1  (1 + )=2 < 2(1  );
2  (1 + ) < 4(1  );
2      < 4  4;
3    < 2;
 < 2=(3  ):
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
A numerical simulation (calculated assuming  = 10 and b = 1, neither of which
should a¤ect the comparison), indicates the nonnegative prot constraint binds on qual-
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ity standards under noncooperation for the following combinations of  and  :
Eta 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Beta 0.1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.5 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.6 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.7 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0.8 Y Y Y Y Y
0.9 Y Y
Table 4.2: Ranges over which the nonnegative prot constraint potentially constrains
quality standards under noncooperation.
PROPOSITION 4.6: Given the functional form assumptions in this section, and
assuming no subsidies are made to rms, then unless  is su¢ ciently high relative to ;
the quality standard set in a noncooperative game will either be constrained to the highest
standard at which rms do not make a loss, or the rms will have to be subsidised.
Denoting the constrained regulatory outcomes with a hat, we can say that bQRC =
bQG = Q#.
The analysis in this section potentially casts a new light on the best-known cross-
hauling duopoly, the Boeing-Airbus case. Both rms are recipients of overt and covert
subsidies, which are commonly interpreted as being a war for market-share (and hence
prot-shifting, following the analysis of Brander and Krugman, 1983). However, it is
worth noting that aviation is an industry where safety and environmental concerns are
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crucially important, and where regulation is therefore likely to be an important item
in driving costs. While subsidies may well be excessive from a social viewpoint, they
may well be linked, to a large degree, with excessively high regulatory quality standards,
which occur not for prot shifting but to benet consumers in a cross-hauling duopoly
at the expense of the foreign rm.
4.4.6 Mutual recognition and harmonisation
I now examine a mutual recognition agreement, under which each country will set its
own quality standard for production, but will accept any goods produced abroad which
are acceptable to the producing countrys regulator. This is a somewhat more complex
case, since we need to consider the interaction between the two regulatorspolicies. I will
assume there is a Cournot subgame between the two rms in each countrys market, and
that there is an overall regulatory game between the two regulators. This means that,
with mutual recognition, the regulator in country 1 assumes rm 1 will sell goods at
quality Q1M in both markets, but at the same time, it assumes the regulator in country
2 will not change the standards it is setting for rm 2. I will also assume that the legal
arrangement is such that each rm has to sell goods at the quality specied by its home
country regulator.23
Under mutual recognition, country 1s regulator will seek to maximise
WM=1;1M + 1;2M + U1M ; (4.45)
where 1;2M ; for example, denotes the prots made by rm 1 in country 2. U1M denotes
23 If this rule were not the case, then an alternative possible outcome would be kinked reaction functions,
as rm 2 could match cuts in QR1 for its sales to country 1, but would not match increases in QR1.
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consumer surplus in country 1.
Looking in particular at the decision process for regulator 1 (regulator 2 faces an
identical problem), I assume regulator 1 sets Q1 as a response to Qc2; its Cournot con-
jecture of the standard regulator 2 will set. Comparing noncooperative quality setting
under mutual recognition with full global optimum, there are two omitted e¤ects - the
omission of the benets of raising Q1 for consumers in country 2 and the omission of
losses to rm 2: These latter reect a prot shift e¤ect, which follows from equation
(4.26):
 = X2=X1 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1); (4.26)
which applies in both markets. If regulator 1 obliges rm 1 to raise its standards above
what it would freely desire, this lowers MC1 (but imposes a higher xed cost on rm
1). This raises rm 1s share of both markets and lowers rm 2s share, hence shifting
prots towards rm 1.24
The e¤ects of omitting foreignersutility and omitting the e¤ect on the foreign rms
prots carry opposite signs, so it is not easy to say a priori whether the equilibrium
outcome under mutual recognition will be for higher- or lower-than-optimal standards.
Prots do, of course, fall to zero as product standards are raised - however, prot shift
applies to the markup over marginal (variable) cost, which remains positive, though
falling. Marginal consumer utility also falls as quality standards are raised (though it
remains positive).
24 It is worth recalling in this context that, in our assumed game setup, rm 1 makes Cournot as-
sumptions about rm 2s behaviour. By contrast, the regulators predict accurately the outcome of the
subgame between the two rms: this means regulator 1 will be more optimistic about the marginal e¤ect
of raising standards on rm 1s prots than will rm 1 itself.
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4.4.7 Mutual recognition
The two country regulators are assumed to play a standard-setting game, taking into
account the anticipated result of changes in their national standard upon the outcome of
the subgames between the rms in both national markets. Mutual recognition changes
this game, in that each national regulator is now assumed to be able to set the standard
for its own rm in both markets, but cannot directly inuence the standard the foreign
rm sets. I assume that each regulator will act on the conjecture that the other regu-
lators strategy (and hence, the foreign rms standard) is exogenous: an equilibrium is
where actual standards equal conjectured ones for both countries. An equilibrium can
also be seen (as in the case of the subgame between the two rms analysed above) as the
point of intersection of the two regulatorsreaction functions. For some functional forms,
these will intersect just once, at a symmetric equilibrium where Q1 = Q2. Where the
reaction functions are monotonically-sloping, there will be only one point of intersection.
Let us start by considering the equations governing the reaction functions of the two
regulators. I will concentrate on regulator 1, since regulator 2 is essentially a mirror-
image of it. Regulator 1 will assume regulator 2 will maintain a constant standard, so
Qc2 = Q
c
2. Regulator 1 will then choose a new standard Q1M in order to maximise his
conjecture of welfare in country 1. We can rewrite (4.45) in more detail, taking advantage
of the assumed symmetry of the two countries, so rm 1 earns the same prots in both
markets.
WM= U1M + 21;1M ;
WM = U1M + 2R
0
1M   2V C 01M   2bQ1M ; (4.45a)
165
where the prime denotes rm 1s revenue or costs in any one market, and subscript M
denotes the mutual recognition case. Di¤erentiating this implies the rst order condition
dWM=dQ1M = dU1M=dQ1M + 2dR
0
1M=dQ1M   2dV C 01M=dQ1M   2b = 0: (4.45b)
The solution to (4.45b) will potentially depend upon Q
c
2.
To examine the solution(s) for (4.45b), we need to consider each element in more
detail. Consumer surplus is U1M = (1 )Z1M , as before. I also denote rm 1s market
share by S1M , where S1M = 1=(1+ ) and allow regulator 1 to alter its quality standard
(while assuming regulator 2 continues to impose Q
c
2). R
0
1M is sales revenue in any one
market by the rm 1 and V C 01M is the associated variable cost, such that
R01M = S1MZ

1M ; (4.46a)
V C 01M = S
1=
1M Z
1=
M Q
( 1)=
1M : (4.46b)
S1M and ZM are functions of both Q1M and Q2M .
We can di¤erentiate (4.46a) and (4.46b) by parts, to give us expressions for the mar-
ginal e¤ects on revenue and variable cost of increasing Q1M , while keeping Q2 constant.
166
These are
dR01M=dQ1M = 
2Z 11M [S1M (dZ1M=dQ1M ) (4.47a)
+(Z1M=)(dS1M=dQ1M )];
dV C 01M=dQ1M = (1=)S
1=
1M Z
(1 )=
M Q
( 1)=
1M
[(dZ1M=dQ1M ) + Z1MS
 1
1M (dS1M=dQ1M ) (4.47b)
+(   1)Z1M=Q1M ]:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of (4.47a-b)
Di¤erentiating (4.46a) and (4.46b) with respect to Q1M , given Qc2 = Q
c
2, we can write
R01M = S1MZ

1M ; so (4.46a)
dR01M=dQ1M = 
2Z 11M [S1M (dZ1M=dQ1M ) (4.47a)
+(Z1M=)(dS1M=dQ1M )]:
V C 01M = S
1=
1M Z
1=
M Q
( 1)=
1M ; (4.46b)
dV C 01M=dQ1M = (1=)S
1=
1M Z
(1 )=
M Q
( 1)=
1M
[(dZ1M=dQ1M ) + Z1MS
 1
1M (dS1M=dQ1M ) (4.47b)
+(   1)Z1M=Q1M ];
167
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Next, consider the e¤ects on total consumer surplus in country 1, U1M , of altering
Q1M . Consumer surplus U1M = (1  )Z1M , so
dU1M=dQ1M = (1  )Z 11M (dZ1M=dQ1M ); (4.48)
As a consequence, we can rewrite (4.45b) as
dWM=dQ1M = dU1M=dQ1M + 2dR
0
1M=dQ1M   2dV C 01M=dQ1M   2b = 0: (4.45b)
(1  )Z 11M (dZ1M=dQ1M ) + 22Z 11M [S1M (dZ1M=dQ1M )
+(Z1M=)(dS1M=dQ1M )]  2(1=)S1=1M Z(1 )=M Q( 1)=1M
[(dZ1M=dQ1M ) + Z1MS
 1
1M (dS1M=dQ1M ) + (   1)Z1M=Q1M ]
= 2b:
This leaves us with
[(1  )Z 11M + 22Z 11M S1M (4.45c)
 2(1=)S1=1M (ZM=Q1M )(1 )= ](dZ1M=dQ1M )
+[(Z1M=) + 2(1=)S
(1 )=
1M Z
1=
M Q
( 1)=
1M ](dS1M=dQ1M )
 2((   1)=)S1=1M (ZM=Q1M )1=
= 2b:
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There remains to be sorted out the issue of how the outputs of the two rms change
when Q1M and Q
c
2 alter.
First, consider how rm 1s market share (S1M , which is the same in both markets)
will alter with respect to its quality (keeping Q
c
2 constant). If the ratio of marginal costs,
MC2=MC1, is denoted M ,25 then we can derive that
S1M = (M   )=((1 +M)(1  )); (4.49)
and
dS1=dM = S
2
1M (1  2)=(M   )2: (4.50)
Noting that  < 1; dS1=dM is positive as long as M is greater than , and decreases as
M rises.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation (4.49) and (4.50)
To nd dS1=dQ1M , I start with the ratio  = (1  S1)=S1. From (4.26)
 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1);
= (1  M)=(M   );
where M =MC2=MC1. Di¤erentiating this with respect to M , we nd
d=dM = [ (M   )  (1  M)]=(M   )2;
= (2   1)=(M   )2:
25Ruling out the case MC1 = 0.
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If
S1 = (1 + )
 1;
= (M   )=((M   ) + (1  M));
= (M   )=((1 +M)(1  )); (4.49)
dS1=d =  (1 + ) 2 =  S21 ;
dS1=dM = S
2
1(1  2)=(M   )2: (4.50)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Also, where
M = (Q1M (1  S1M )=Qc2S1M )(1 )= (4.51)
dM=dQ1M = ((1 )(M )(1 M))=[(1 M)(1 M 1)+((1 )(M ))]Q1M :
(4.52)
Finally, from the chain rule
dS1=dQ1M = (dS1=dM)(dM=dQ1M ) (4.52a)
...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations (4.51) and (4.52)
To relate the marginal cost ratio, M , to Q, note that
MC1M = (1=)(X1M=Q1M )
(1 )= ;
MC2M = (1=)(X2M=Q2M )
(1 )= ;
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M = MC2M=MC1M=(Q1MX2=Q2MX1)
(1 )= ;
M = (Q1M (1  S1M )=Q2MS1M )(1 )= ; (4.51)
= (Q1M=Q2M )
(1 )= ;
= ((Q1M=Q2M )(1  M)=(M   ))(1 )= ;
M(M   )(1 )= = (Q1M=Q2M )(1 )=(1  M)(1 )= ;
M=(1 )(M   ) = (Q1M=Q2M )(1  M);
M1=(1 )   M=(1 ) = (Q1M=Q2M )(1  M)
Totally di¤erentiating this
(1=(1  ))M=(1 )dM   (=(1  ))M (2 1)=(1 )dM = ((1  M)=Q2M )dQ1M
 ((1  M)Q1M=Q22M )dQ2M
 (Q1M=Q2M )dM:
Rearranging this, holding the perceived value of Q2M (denoted Q
c
2) constant (so its
di¤erential is zero)
[(1=(1  ))M=(1 )   (=(1  ))M (2 1)=(1 ) + (Q1M=Qc2)]dM
= ((1  M)=Qc2)dQ1M :
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[(1=(1  ))M=(1 )(1  M 1) + (Q1M=Qc2)]dM
= ((1  M)=Qc2)dQ1M :
But M=(1 ) = (Q1M=Q
c
2)(1  M)=(M   ); so
[(1=(1  )(Q1M=Qc2)((1  M)=(M   ))(1  M 1) + (Q1M=Qc2)]dM
= ((1  M)=Qc2)dQ1M :
[(1=((1  )(M   ))(1  M 1) + =(1  M)]Q1MdM
= dQ1M :
Multiplying through by ((1  )(M   )(1  M)):
[(1  M)(1  M 1) + ((1  )(M   ))]Q1MdM
= ((1  )(M   )(1  M))dQ1M :
This implies that
dM=dQ1M = ((1 )(M )(1 M))=[((1 M)(1 M 1)+((1 )(M )))Q1M ]:
(4.52)
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Effect of the two firms' quality on firm 1's market
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(4.49)-(4.52a) represent a system of simultaneous equations relating S1M , M , Q1M
and Q
c
2. Unfortunately, they do not easily reduce into a simple reduced form. However,
plotting the solution for various parameter values indicates a monotonically upward-
sloping function, curving o¤ as S1M approaches 1: The graph below, for the case  =
 = 0:5, is typical.
Total sales in country 1 (which will be mirrored by sales in country 2) are given by
Z1M = [((S1MZ1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1 S1)Z1M=Qc2)(1 )=)=((1+ ))]1= 1; (4.53)
while the di¤erential of Z1M with respect to Q1M depends upon both the share of rm 1
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and upon the sensitivity of that share to changes in the quality standard imposed upon
it:
dZ1M=dQ1M = ((1  )=	(   1))[S1M (1 2)=Q1M ( 1)= (4.54)
 (1 S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)= ](Z1M=Z( 1)=1M )dS1M=dQ1M
+((1  )=	(1  ))S1M (1 )=Q1M 1=(Z1M=Z( 1)=1M )dQ1M ;
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations (4.53) and (4.54)
I start with equations (4.25) and (4.30):
Z1RC = (X1RC +X2RC) = [(MC1RC +MC2RC)=((1 + ))]
1= 1; (4.25)
MC1RC = (1=)(X1RC=QRC)
(1 )= ; (4.30)
and likewise for MC2RC :
Substituting into this for X1M = S1MZ1M and X2M = (1  S1M )Z1M , we get
Z1M = [((S1MZ1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1 S1)Z1M=Qc2)(1 )=)=((1+ ))]1= 1; (4.53)
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	Z 11M = (S1MZ1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1  S1M )Z1M=Qc2)(1 )= ;
	Z
( 1)=
1M = S1M
(1 )=Q1M ( 1)= + (1 S1M )(1 )=Qc2( 1)= ;
remembering that 	 = (1 + ):Totally di¤erentiating
(   1)	Z( 1)=1M Z 11MdZ1M = ((1  )=)S1M (1 2)=Q1M ( 1)=dS1M
 ((1  )=)(1 S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)=dS1M
+((   1)=)S1M (1 )=Q1M 1=dQ1M ;
(   1)	Z( 1)=1M Z 11MdZ1M = ((1  )=)[S1M (1 2)=Q1M ( 1)=
 (1 S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)= ]dS1M
+((   1)=)S1M (1 )=Q1M 1=dQ1M ;
(   1)	Z( 1)=1M Z 11MdZ1M = (1  )[S1M (1 2)=Q1M ( 1)=
 (1 S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)= ]dS1M
+(   1)S1M (1 )=Q1M 1=dQ1M ;
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dZ1M=dQ1M = ((1  )=	(   1))[S1M (1 2)=Q1M ( 1)= (4.54)
 (1 S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)= ](Z1M=Z( 1)=1M )dS1M=dQ1M
+((1  )=	(1  ))S1M (1 )=Q1M 1=(Z1M=Z( 1)=1M )dQ1M ;
.............................................................................................................................................................................
While, in principle, it is possible to derive reaction curves and equilibrium values
from the above equations, they do not easily reduce to a comprehensible reduced form.
For this reason, I proceed by numerical means, estimating equilibrium values for a wide
range of combinations of parameter values. In addition, given the complexity of some
of the di¤erentials, I concentrate on deriving symmetric equilibria, which are somewhat
easier to derive than asymmetric equilibria. I will consider later the issue of possible
asymmetric equilibria, or other multiple equilibria.
Derivation of symmetric equilibrium values A symmetric, pure strategy equi-
librium is one where Q1 = Qc1 = Q2 = Q
c
2. Because it is symmetric, we can solve it
just looking at country 1s decision as a response to country 2s standard setting. Conse-
quently, I start by examining the locus of symmetric quality regulations, where Q1 = Q
c
2.
A symmetric Nash equilibrium is a point on this locus where neither regulator will wish
to adjust quality (assuming the other regulators standard is constant). To be practica-
ble, such an equilibrium must also lie above the standard the rms would independently
set, and below the level at which they exit the market. Concentrating on regulator 1s
decision: he will assume regulator 2 will maintain the initial standard, Q
c
2. Regulator 1
will then choose a new standard Q1M in order to maximise his conjecture of welfare in
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country 1.
In this equilibrium, both national markets will be split equally between the two rms,
so S1M = (1  S1M ) = 1=2.
Going through the various equations dening the equilibrium, by simple substitution
(4.47a) and (4.47b) become:
dR01M=dQ1M = (
2Z 11M =2)[(dZ1M=dQ1M ) (A)
+2(Z1M=)(dS1M=dQ1M )];
dV C 01M=dQ1M = (1=)2
 1=(Z1M=Q
c
2)
(1 )= [(dZ1M=dQ1M )
+2Z1M (dS1M=dQ1M ) + (   1)Z1M=Qc2]; (B)
(4.48) and (4.45b) are unchanged:
dUM=dQ1M = (1  )Z 11M (dZ1M=dQ1M ); (C)
dWM=dQ1M = dU1M=dQ1M + 2dR
0
1M=dQ1M   2dV C 01M=dQ1M   2b = 0: (D)
From (4.50) and (4.51) we are able to derive a simpler reduced form for the marginal
e¤ect of altering Q1M on S1, when starting from Q1M = Q
c
2:
dS1=dQ1M = ((1 + )(1  )=4Qc2(1 +    2): (E)
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation (E)
dM=dQ1M = ((1 )(M )(1 M))=[((1 M)(1 M 1)+((1 )(M )))Q1M ]:
(4.52)
In the symmetric case, M = 1, so
dM=dQ1M = ((1  )(1  )(1  ))=[((1  )(1  ) + ((1  )(1  )))Qc2];
= ((1  )(1  ))=[((1  ) + (1  ))Qc2];
= ((1  )(1  ))=[(1 +    2)Qc2]:
Also, from (4.50)
dS1=dM = S
2
1(1  2)=(M   )2;
= (1=4)(1  )(1 + )=(1  )2;
= (1 + )=4(1  ):
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So
dS1=dQ1M = (dS1=dM)(dM=dQ1M ) = f(1 + )=4(1  )g
f((1  )(1  ))=[(1 +    2)Qc2]g;
= ((1 + )(1  ))=(4Qc2(1 +    2)): (E)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Total sales along the symmetric locus can be expressed as an increasing function of
quality, where both rmsquality is increased simultaneously. The function for this has
already been examined:
Z1RC = (=)K
0Qc2
=; (F)
where
K 0 = (=)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 ): (G)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations (F) and (G)
These derive from equation (4.31), which derives Z1RC , the combined sales if both
rms sell goods of the same standard.
ZRC = 	
=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 )QRC=: (4.31)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
The marginal e¤ect on total sales of increasing Q1M is half that of increasing both
countriesstandards simultaneously:
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dZ1M=dQ1M = (1=2)dZ1RC=dQRC ; (H)
where
dZ1RC=dQRC = K
0Q( )=RC : (I)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations (H) and (I)
For (H), note that
Z1M = [((S1MZ1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1  S1)Z1M=Qc2)(1 )=)=((1 + ))]1= 1;
	Z 11M = ((S1MZ1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1  S1)Z1M=Qc2)(1 )=);
	Z
( 1)=
1M = (S1M=Q1M )
(1 )=+((1  S1)=Qc2)(1 )= ;
so that, totally di¤erentiating (but keeping Q
c
2 constant)
(	((   1)=)Z( 1)=1M =Z1M )dZ1M = ((1  )=)S(1 2)=1M Q1M ( 1)=dS1M
+((   1)=)S(1 )=1M Q 1=1M dQ1M
 ((1  )=)(1  S1M )(1 2)=Qc2( 1)=dS1M ;
On the symmetric locus
(	((   1)=)Z( 1)=1M =Z1M )dZ1M = ((   1)=)S(1 )=1M Q 1=1M dQ1M ;
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dZ1M=dQ1M = ((   1)=)2( 1)=Qc2 1=Z1M=((	(   1)=)Z( 1)=1M ):
By contrast, when Q1M = Q
c
2 = QRC , and both standards are changed simultane-
ously
	Z
( 1)=
1RC = (1=2QRC)
(1 )=+(1=2QRC)(1 )= ;
= 2(2 1)=QRC ( 1)= ;
	((   1)=)Z( 1)=1RC =Z1RC)dZ1RC = ((   1)=)2(2 1)=QRC 1=dQRC ;
dZ1RC=dQRC = ((   1)=)2(2 1)=QRC 1=Z1RC=(	((   1)=)Z( 1)=1RC )):
Consequently,
(dZ1M=dQ1M )=(dZ1RC=dQRC) = 2
 1; (H)
dZ1M=dQ1M = (1=2)dZ1RC=dQRC :
(I) follows from di¤erentiating (F) with respect to Q.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Equations (A) to (I) dene a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium for quality, bQ, in
the mutual recognition case. While it is possible to derive a reduced form from these
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equations and solve it for the equilibrium value of Q1M = Q
c
2 =
bQ, it is not particularly
informative in this case, which is why I prefer to derive a solution by numerical means.
Nevertheless, it is worth exploring the implications of writing out more fully the rst
order condition for an equilibrium in (4.45c). Imposition of symmetry allows us to write
[(1  )Z 11M + 2Z 11M 1M (4.55)
 2( 1)=(1=)(ZM=Qc2)(1 )= ](dZ1M=dQ1M )
+[(Z1M=) + 2(1=)Z
1=
M (2Q
c
2)
( 1)= ](dS1M=dQ1M )
 2((   1)=)(ZM=2Qc2)1=
= 2b:
This same result can also be found by substituting into (D) from (A)-(C).
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation (4.55)
Start with
[(1  )Z 11M + 22Z 11M S1M (4.45c)
 2(1=)S1=1M (ZM=Q1M )(1 )= ](dZ1M=dQ1M )
+[(Z1M=) + 2(1=)S
(1 )=
1M Z
1=
M Q
( 1)=
1M ](dS1M=dQ1M )
 2((   1)=)S1=1M (ZM=Q1M )1=
= 2b:
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[(1  )Z 11M + 2Z 11M 1M (4.55)
 2( 1=)(1=)(ZM=Qc2)(1 )= ](dZ1M=dQ1M )
+[(Z1M=) + 2(1=)Z
1=
M (2Q
c
2)
( 1)= ](dS1M=dQ1M )
 2((   1)=)(ZM=2Qc2)1=
= 2b:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
(4.55) can also be written in a more intuitive form as:
(dZM=dQ1M )[dUM=dZM + 2dR1M=dZM   2(dV C1M=dZM )]
+2(dS1M=dQ1M )[2R1M   2TV C1]
 2((   1)2=)(TV C1=Q1) + (4=)TV C1(dS1M=dQ1M )
= 2b: (4.55a)
where TV C1M refers to total variable cost for each market incurred by rm 1. Intuitively,
the rst line in (4.55a) represents the marginal e¤ect of rising output on consumer
surplus, rm 1s revenue and rm 1s variable costs, ignoring the change in rm 1s
market share. The second line is a prot shift e¤ect. The third line reects more
complex e¤ects upon the overall cost mix. The right hand side is the extra xed cost to
rm 1 in each market of raising quality.
Compare this now to the rst order conditions for the global optimum standard, QG.
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WG = 2U1G + 4(R1G   V C1G   bQG);
dWG=dQG = 0 ==>
(dZ1G=dQG)[dU1G=dZ1G + 2dR1G=dZ1G   2dV C1G=dZ1G] = 2b: (4.56)
The similarity between the left hand side of (4.56) and the rst line of (4.55a) is readily
apparent. However, note that the rst line of (4.55a) is written in terms of (dZ1M=dQ1M )
(i.e.assuming only rm 1s quality is changed), and is smaller than (dZ1G=dQG) by a
factor of (1=2): Since (dZ1M=dQ) is declining with respect to Q, we would expect (4.55a)
to give a quality standard less than QG, if the e¤ects in the second and third lines were
zero. However, the prot shift and cost mix e¤ects are not zero, and will reduce the
equilibrium value of Q, so that it is not easy to determine whether quality standards
under mutual recognition will exceed, or fall short of the global optimum.
Numerical analysis In order to illustrate the relative e¤ects at work, I start by
examining the e¤ects at various levels of Q
c
2, the standard set by regulator 2, of altering
Q1M , country 1s standard, while holding Q
c
2 constant, in the case where  = 1=2 and
 = 1=2: Marginal e¤ects of changing Q1M are calculated for di¤erent levels of Q
c
2, at
intervals of 0:1. This indicates that raising Q1M always benets consumers, although
beyond a point Q = Q^ the fall in prots outweighs the marginal gain to consumers. The
point at which this occurs is at bQ = 3:14, which exceeds QG (calculated in this case
to equal 3:05). However, but for the prot shift e¤ect (the e¤ect in line 3 of (4.55a)),
the net welfare e¤ect of raising Q1M would become negative at a lower level of around
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Marginal effect on welfare in country 1 of
changing Q1 while Q2 is constant. Beta=1/2 and
eta=1/2.
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Q = 2:4: Recalling the outcomes already calculated, a ranking of the outcomes of the
various regulatory scenarios on these parameter values would therefore be:
QRC = 6:27; unconstrained noncooperative solution;
Q# = 3:78; rms leave the market;
bQ = 3:14; mutual recognition equilibrium;
QG = 3:05; globally optimum regulated equilibrium;
bQ excluding prot shift = 2:4;
QU = 1:76; unregulated equilibrium.
Appendix 4.3 summarises the results of numerical simulations over a wider range of
values of  and : For scaling purposes, the outcomes of the various regulatory games
are expressed in each case as a ratio relative to the quality chosen by an unregulated
duopoly, QU . A summary of the conclusions of the simulations carried out is as follows:
1. Varying the market scale parameter, ; and the relative cost parameter for quality,
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b, has no e¤ect on any of the regulatory outcomes (when they are expressed as proportions
of QU ). Consequently, without loss of generality, we can concentrate on the case where
 = 10 and b = 1.
2. The simulations conrm the conclusions of the theoretical analysis that, in all
cases, QRC > QG > QU .
3. In all cases examined, the zero prot quality, Q# exceeds the global optimum,
QG. This is again consistent with the theoretical ndings above.
4. As Table 4.2 has already shown, Q# will constrain the local regulator in the
noncooperative scenario, except for cases where  is relatively high and  relatively low.
5. In all the cases examined, the unconstrained equilibrium quality under mutual
recognition, bQ, is lower than the unconstrained noncooperative equilibrium, QRC , but
higher than the global optimum, QG. This indicates that the prot shift e¤ect outweighs
any gain to prots from cutting quality sold to foreigners. However, this di¤erence is
marginal, and in practice the di¤erence between QRC and QG is very small in all cases.
6. The nonnegative prot constraint, Q#, does not constrain the quality set under
mutual recognition in any of the cases examined.
7. In all cases examined, mutual recognition would lower the standard compared to
noncooperation. As this is a move towards the global optimum ( bQ is still greater than
QG), we would expect this to be welfare-improving.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 summarise the degree to which the constrained quality under
noncooperation exceeds that under mutual recognition, and the degree to which the
mutual recognition quality exceeds the global optimum in these simulations.
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( eQRC   eQMR)=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.06
0.4 0.38 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.10
0.5 0.57 0.46 0.37 0.28 0.20 0.14
0.6 1.85 0.69 0.55 0.42 0.30 0.20
0.7 1.32 1.07 0.85 0.64 0.46 0.30
0.8 1.57 1.49 1.44 1.10 0.79 0.51
Table 4.3: di¤erence between standards under noncooperative standard-setting and
under mutual recognition, taking account of the nonnegative prot constraint.
( eQMR  QG)=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.4 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02
0.6 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03
0.7 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06
0.8 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09
Table 4.4: Di¤erence between the standard set under mutual recognition (taking ac-
count of the nonnegative prot constraint) and the global optimum standard.
As with any numerical simulations, a word of caution is needed: it is not possible
to conrm that the results carry over to parameter values other than those investigated.
Due to the nonlinearity of the model, values of  or  less than 0:3 or greater than 0:8
could not be investigated. Also, some di¤erent functional forms might give qualitatively
di¤erent results.
187
Alternative equilibria In theory, with a complex model structure such as that un-
der investigation in this section, it is not possible to rule out the existence of multiple
equilibria - either multiple symmetric equilibria or asymmetric equilibria. These could
potentially happen where the gradient of national welfare with respect to the national
standard changes sign more than once (for a given foreign standard), so causing reac-
tion functions to double back on themselves. However, even when a model consists of
a number of simultaneous nonlinear equations, as in this case, where no simple reduced
form equation can be derived, this does not necessarily mean the reaction functions will
be highly nonlinear, and even if they are, there is no necessity that they cross in more
than one place, at least within the range of feasible solutions (which is limited by the
assumed inability of regulators to make rms set standards less than QU , or higher than
Q#).
Numerical simulation can be of assistance in this case, as it can be used to show
whether national welfare is wellor badly-behavedwith respect to domestic and foreign
regulatory standards, over a range of parameter values ( and ). As an illustration, I
show below a plot of welfare in country 1, calculated over a grid of values for Q1 and
Q2, in the case where  =  = 0:5:
Looking down each column, taking Q2 as given, W1 rst improves and then declines
with respect to Q1. In each column, the cell where W1 is maximised is shaded. These
form almost a horizontal row (and the mirror-image points, which, by symmetry, would
maximise W2 with Q1 given, are almost vertical). The point where these two reaction
curves meet is a single, symmetric equilibrium with a value of Q1 and Q2 between 3 and
3.3 (conrming the model, which indicates a solution of 3.14).
This exercise has been repeated for all combinations of  = 0:3; 0:5 and:7 and  = 0:3;
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WELFARE IN COUNTRY 1 AS A FUNCTION OF BOTH FIRMS
QUALITY
Rho=0.5; Beta=0.5
Firm 2's quality
Firm 1's
quality 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.4 2.7 3 3.3 3.6 3.9
1.5 11.45 11.44 11.45 11.47 11.50 11.53 11.57 11.62 11.67
1.8 11.78 11.76 11.75 11.75 11.76 11.79 11.81 11.84 11.88
2.1 12.03 11.99 11.96 11.96 11.96 11.97 11.98 12.00 12.03
2.4 12.20 12.15 12.12 12.10 12.09 12.09 12.10 12.11 12.13
2.7 12.32 12.26 12.22 12.19 12.18 12.17 12.17 12.17 12.18
3 12.40 12.33 12.28 12.25 12.22 12.21 12.20 12.20 12.20
3.3 12.43 12.36 12.30 12.26 12.23 12.21 12.19 12.19 12.18
3.6 12.43 12.35 12.29 12.24 12.21 12.18 12.16 12.15 12.14
3.9 12.39 12.31 12.25 12.20 12.16 12.12 12.10 12.08 12.07
Points where Q1 is optimised subject to Q2 being given
Points where Q2 is optimised subject to Q1 being given
0:5 and:7: In all cases, the reaction functions were relatively straight and monotonic and
intersecting at a single symmetric equilibrium.
It should be borne in mind that numerical search techniques cannot rule out the
existence of multiple equilibria for parameter values which have not been specically
investigated: in particular, for extreme values where  or  is close to 0 or 1.
4.5 Horizontal quality regulation
The discussion above has concentrated on vertical regulations, which raise some measure
of quality experienced by consumers for all goods within an industry. By contrast, much
of the literature on TBTs focuses on pure, horizontal regulations, which discriminate
between suppliers in one country against another, or between those using one technique
rather than another, and which do not directly a¤ect consumer utility.
A horizontal TBT involves imposing a resource cost on imports. Any changes in
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import share could equally be achieved by an equivalent tari¤, which would, by contrast,
raise revenue for the importing country. It follows that pure, horizontal TBTs are only
likely to appeal where tari¤s are ruled out (e.g. by trade agreements), or where TBTs
are regarded as less visible, and hence less likely to provoke retaliation. Again, it is
worth bearing in mind that in a perfectly competitive model, horizontal TBTs just lower
national welfare, since they impose a resource cost which worsens both the importing
and the exporting countriesterms of trade.
Horizontal TBTs may, however, appeal to regulators in four circumstances, where
the alternative of tari¤s is ruled out: (i) given monopolistic prot, there may be a prot-
shifting incentive to raise domestic suppliersmarket share, to raise their prots, even
when this involves imposing a cost on consumers; (ii) agglomeration economies may
mean that a country which raises output by imposing TBTs can either lower production
costs or raise local factor rents; (iii) there may be agency capture so that the regulator
represents local producers rather than the importing country as a whole; (iv) horizontal
legislation may to some extent be inevitable where there are network externalities.
In this paper I consider the rst of these motives only.
4.5.1 Pure, horizontal technical barriers to trade
Consider rst a pure, horizontal TBT in the non-cooperative Cournot duopoly model
where there is no vertical regulation. I assume the horizontal TBT adds a cost of T per
quality-adjusted unit of the good imported into country c1, while having no e¤ect on the
vertical quality experienced by consumers.26 By contrast, it does not a¤ect the costs to
26One could, of course, consider an alternative specication where the pure horizontal
barrier adds a xed cost to rm 2, but this would not a¤ect behaviour unless it were so
high as to induce market exit.
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domestic suppliers. It is assumed that tari¤s are ruled out by agreement.
From (4.5), where there is no vertical regulation, marginal costs of producing X are
constant at MCU . However, since we have introduced the horizontal TBT, marginal
costs for rm 2 selling to country 1 are now
MC2H=MC2U+T; (4.57)
where the subscript H denotes the case with horizontal barriers.
Firm 1 will set its output in market 1 as determined by (4.24a). However, the
corresponding equation for rm 2; (4.24b), requires modication
(Xc1H +X2H)
 1 + (   1)X2H(Xc1H +X2H) 2 = (MC2U + T )=: (4.58)
Equations (4.24a) and (4.58) dene the reaction functions of the two rms.
Adding the two equations, and setting Xc1H = X1H and X
c
2H = X2H , we can derive
ZH :
ZH = (X1H +X2H) = [(MC1H +MC2H + T )=((1 + ))]
1= 1: (4.59)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation 4.59
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(MC1H +MC2H + T )= = 2(X1H +X2H)
 1
+(   1)(X1H +X2H)(X1H +X2H) 2;
= (X1H +X2H)
 1(1 + ):
ZH = (X1H +X2H) = [(MC1H +MC2H + T )=((1 + ))]
1= 1: (4.59)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
We can note that, since consumers will equate price to marginal utility, the quality-
adjusted price in this case, PXH = Z
 1
H , so we can easily derive the price from (4.59):
PXH = Z
 1
H = (MC1H +MC2H + T )=(1 + ): (4.59a)
As before, I denote X2H=X1H = , then X1H = ZH=(1+ ) and X2H = ZH=(1+ ).
This allows us to deduce
 = (MC1   (MC2 + T ))=((MC2 + T )  MC1): (4.60)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation 4.60
The derivation is essentially the same as (4.26), but replacing rm 2s marginal cost
with MC2 + T .
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
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(4.60) yields non-negative values for X1H and X2H so long as
1= > (MC2 + T )=MC1 > : (4.61)
In practice (4.61) sets an upper limit on the horizontal TBT a regulator can set, unless
he is prepared to let the foreign rm exit the market.
I shall start by assuming that the regulator does not wish to drive the foreign rm out
of the market completely (on the grounds that this would presumably reduce consumer
welfare). Focusing on the case where there is no vertical regulation (only horizontal
regulation), then marginal production costs (before the cost of the barrier is added) will
be constant and equal for both rms. Hence MC1H = MC2H = MC; so the limit to T
implied by (4.61) will be
T# =MC(1  )=: (4.52a)
I will rewrite T in terms of this constant marginal cost, so that T = tMC. Note that
(4.57) implies
ZH = [(1 + )=(2MC + T )]
1=1  = [(1 + )=((2 + t)MC)]1=1 :
Consumer surplus is
UH = (1  )ZH :
Price
PXH = Z
 1
H = (2 + t)MC=(1 + );
which conrms that an increase in t will have a more marked e¤ect on prices, the lower
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is :27
Revenue by rm 1 is
R1 = (1=(1 + ))Z

H ;
which implies prots to the home rm,
1H = (1=(1 + ))(Z

H  MCZH):
If the regulator acts to maximise
WH = UH + 1H ;
= (1  )ZH + (1=(1 + ))(ZH  MCZH);
and can only alter the pure, horizontal TBT, T , then the problem can be solved by the
rst order condition dWH=dT = 0 ==> dWH=dt = 0;
(1  )Z 1H dZ=dt+ (1=(1 + ))(2Z 1H  MC)dZ=dt
 (1=(1 + ))2ZH(Z 1H  MC)d=dt = 0: (4.62)
These terms can be interpreted as follows:
1. (1   )Z 1H dZ=dt is the marginal change in consumer surplus from imposing
the TBT. Since the TBT raises prices and reduces consumption, this will be negative.
2. (1=(1+))(2Z 1H  MC)dZ=dt is the marginal e¤ect of changing total consumer
27Since the price elasticity of demand " = 1=(1   ); it follows that when  = 0; " = 1 and the price
will equal (2+ t)MC. When  = 1; " =1 and the price is (1+ (t=2))MC. Hence, the more price-elastic
demand is, the lower prices will be and the less the cost of a pure horizontal barrier will be passed on to
consumers.
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demand on rm 1s prots, based on its initial market share. Raising T causes sales
volume to fall, but if this reduction is towards the collaborative level, it may cause a rise
in producer surplus.
3.  (1=(1 + ))2ZH(Z 1H   MC)d=dt is the marginal shift of prots towards
rm 1 caused by a discriminatory barrier, T , shifting market demand towards rm 1.
This is positive, but clearly its size depends, inter alia, upon the size of initial prots
ZH  MCZH :
If we look at the three components of dWH=dt; the conicting signs of these e¤ects
indicate that there may in principle be plenty of circumstances where, even at the point
where there is no initial TBT, the marginal gain to domestic welfare from a TBT will be
negative, even when there are no tari¤s and no other regulatory interference in prots,
since initial prots may be insu¢ cient to provide enough prot-shift incentive to outweigh
the net e¤ect of the other two e¤ects. This is investigated more formally below.
For ZH , note that
ZH = [(2 + t)MC=(1 + )]
1= 1:
Also
dZH=dt = ( ZH=(1  )(2 + t)): (4.63)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation 4.61
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For dZH=dt, note that
ZH = [(2 + t)MC=(1 + )]
1= 1;
dZH=dt = (1=(   1))[(2 + t)MC=(1 + )](2 )=( 1)(MC=(1 + ));
= (1=(   1)(2 + t))[(2 + t)MC=(1 + )]1=( 1);
= ( ZH=(1  )(2 + t)):
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
When t = 0; (4.63) will become
dZH=dt =  ZH=2(1  ): (4.63a)
Also note that
 = (1  (1 + t))=((1 + t)  );
and
d=dt =  ( + )=((1 + t)  ); (4.64)
which is negative.
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equation 4.64
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When both rms face identical marginal costs, (4.62) can be rewritten:
 = (1  (1 + t))=((1 + t)  );
= (1  (1 + t))((1 + t)  ) 1;
d=dt =  ((1 + t)  ) 2(1  (1 + t))  ((1 + t)  ) 1;
=  ( + )=((1 + t)  ): (4.64)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
When t = 0 and  = 1; this is
d=dt =  (1 + )=(1  ): (4.64a)
We should also note that
Z 1H  MC = ((1 + t  )=(2 + t))Z 1H ; (4.65)
and
2Z 1H  MC = (((1 + t)   1))=(2 + t)Z 1H : (4.66)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of equations 4.65 and 4.66
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Note that
Z 1H = (2 + t)MC=(1 + );
Z 1H  MC = (1 + t  )MC=(1 + );
= ((1 + t  )=(2 + t))Z 1H ; (4.65)
since
MC = ((1 + )=(2 + t))Z 1H :
It follows that
2Z 1H  MC = ((2 + t)   (1 + ))MC=(1 + );
= ((1 + t)   1))MC=(1 + );
= (((1 + t)   1))=(2 + t))Z 1H : (4.66)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Looking in turn at the three terms in (4.66),
(1  )Z 1H dZ=dt = (1  )Z 1H ( ZH=(1  )(2 + t));
=  ZH=(2 + t); from (4.61) (4.67)
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(1=(1 + ))(2Z 1H  MC)dZ=dt = (1=(1 + ))(((1 + t)   1))=(2 + t))Z 1H
(( ZH=(1  )(2 + t))); (4.67a)
=  (1=(1 + ))(((1 + t)   1))ZH=((1  )(2 + t)2):
 (1=(1 + ))2ZH(Z 1H  MC)d=dt =  (1=(1 + ))2ZH((1 + t  )=(2 + t))Z 1H
( ( + )=((1 + t)  )); (4.68)
= (1=(1 + ))2( + )ZH=(2 + t):
Hence (4.66) can be written
dWH=dt =  ZH=(2 + t)  (1=(1 + ))(((1 + t)   1))ZH=((1  )(2 + t)2)
+(1=(1 + ))2( + )ZH=(2 + t): (4.69)
To understand the properties of (4.69), rst consider the di¤erential when t = 0 and
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 = 1 :
dWH=dt =  ZH=2  (1=2)((   1))ZH=((1  )4) + (1=4)(1 + )ZH=2;
=  ZH=2 + (1=8)ZH + (1=8)(1 + )ZH ;
= (1=8)ZH( 4 + 1 + (1 + ));
= (1=8)ZH(   2): (4.69a)
Note for values of  between 0 and 2 this means that, at the margin, raising a TBT will
reduce welfare. In fact, we have assumed (and in the monopoly case at least, non-negative
pricing requires) 0 <  < 1.
Because of the complicated nature of (4.69), which becomes a cubic function in t and
; simply examining the gradient of welfare at the point where t = 0 is not enough to rule
out that a larger horizontal TBT may increase domestic welfare, while comparative static
analysis is likely to prove excessively tricky. For that reason, Appendix 4.1 summarises
the welfare e¤ects of varying the TBT from zero to the value at which rm 2 leaves the
market completely, for a range of assumed values of  at steps between 0:05 and 0:95.
The conclusion is clear: the downward gradient of national welfare with respect to t
continues up to the point where rm 2 leaves the market for all values of  between 0:05
and 0:95. This implies that the regulator in country 1 will never prefer marginal rises in
t to shift prots to rm 1.
What about the possibility that the regulator might choose to exclude rm 2 alto-
gether? Firstly, we note that, as T is increased to T# and beyond, rm 2s market share
gradually falls to zero, and then stays there. There is no sudden shift of market share
towards rm 1 caused by rm 2 exiting the market. Secondly, when T passes T#, the
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prot shift towards rm 1 ceases. Therefore the marginal e¤ect of raising T on country
1s welfare diminishes. This implies that totally excluding rm 2 is unlikely to be an
attractive strategy for regulator 1.
We can therefore suggest proposition 4.8:
PROPOSITION 4.8: Where basic production costs of the two rms are the same,
the cost to consumers of a pure, horizontal technical barrier to trade will outweigh the
prot-shifting gain to local producers.
This conclusion may not apply in all model formulations, notably in a multiple-
country model, where a subset of countries may gang upon others.28
It is also worth noting that the horizontal TBT formulation which has been examined
here is in terms of an increased variable cost. Alternatively, a horizontal TBT could, in
principle, involve placing an additional xed cost upon the foreign rm: this could have
quite complicated implications for the behaviour and regulation of the domestic rm,
which I do not examine here.29
4.5.2 Interaction with vertical regulation
The previous section suggests protectionist horizontal trade barriers are unlikely to be
attractive in an identical cross-hauling duopoly even when there is no vertical product
regulation. When the possibility of vertical regulation (which improves standards ex-
perienced by consumers) is introduced, this conclusion is likely to be strengthened. In
28Wallner (1998) showed that, in the case of a Cournot tripoly, two large countries would choose to
institute a mutual recognition agreement between themselves, but still imposing costs on the rm from
a third country.
29E¤ectively, if the horizontal TBT places a large enough xed cost on the foreign rm, the domestic
rm would, under many circumstances, engage in a limit pricing strategy (and so would not charge as
high prices as a pure domestic monopoly). This could be seen as a surrogate means of regulating a
monopolist, though it would be less attractive if other forms of regulation (including setting minimum
vertical quality standards) were available.
Detailed examination of this possibility is seen as beyond the scope of this chapter.
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section 4.5, Table 4.2, it was shown that, in many circumstances, in our model, a cross-
hauling duopoly will be regulated to raise standards to the point where prots are zero,
producing the highest possible quality-adjusted output, Z#, where rms do not exit the
market. Imposing a horizontal TBT on rm 2 at this point would raise its cost of pro-
ducing, while if rm 1 increases its share of total output (keeping Z at Z#), this means
raising its cost of supply. Such a solution is highly unlikely to be welfare-increasing.
4.5.3 Cost di¤erences between countries
Even purevertical standards may of course have a protectionist element if production
costs di¤er. In this case, the country with the lower marginal costs of raising quality
may have incentives to raise its vertical quality standards above the socially optimal
level for what we are dening as protectionist, rather than simply strategic reasons:
higher minimum standards may raise the market share of the domestic producer at the
importers expense.
To see how this can happen, consider the case where the two rms are initially
unregulated and produce quality-adjusted output X at the same price. However, rm
2 has higher marginal costs of raising quality and lower marginal costs of raising crude
output Y than its rival. Formally, b2= b1, in which case raising quality is more expensive
for rm 2 than rm 1 if  > 1. If unregulated marginal costs are the same, it is easy to
show that
a2 =  
( 1)= : (4.70)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.70):
Unregulated marginal costs (from equation (4.5)):
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MC1 = (a1=)((a1=b1)((1  )=)) 1 = (a2=)((a2= b1)((1  )=)) 1 =MC2;
(a2=a1)
 =   1: (4.70)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
In this case, in the absence of regulation (denoted with subscript D) the less quality-
suited rm 2 will set a lower quality than rm 1:
Q1D=Q2D=  
1= : (4.71)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of Equation (4.71):
Unregulated quality chosen by supplier f is
QfD = (((af=bf )(1  )=))XfD:
But we assume unregulated costs for the two rms are initially the same, so
they produce the same quantity. Also a1 = 1. Hence
Q1D=Q2D = (1=b1)=(a2=b2) = (1=a2)=(b1=b2) =  
(1 )==(  1);
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=  1= :
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
To analyse what happens in this case, rst, consider a situation where the globally
optimal regulatory standard Q1G in country 1 lies between Q2D and Q1D. In this sit-
uation, raising the regulatory standard Q1R at the margin will raise the costs of the
importing rm f2, lowering its market share and prots, but not a¤ect the costs of f1.
Since in this situation demand will shift towards f1, its prots will actually improve
as Q1G is raised (up to the point where Q1R = Q1D). In the absence of international
cooperation, the regulator will only take account of the (rising) consumer welfare and
f1s rising prots, and hence will keep raising QR at least to Q1D, even if this is above
the globally optimal level. In this case, Q1R> Q1G and we clearly have not just strategic
distortion but (on our narrow denition) protectionism as well, since the higher standard
reduces trade and benets local prots at the expense of foreigners.
What about the case, though, where Q1G > Q1D ? It is fairly easy to show that,
once Q1R is raised above Q1D; market shares of the two rms cease to change any more.
The ratio of marginal costs of the rms beyond this point is given by
MC2=MC1 = a2
(1 )= ; (4.72)
which is constant, and since prices depend only on nmarginal costs and prot markup,
the shares of the two rms and , once Q1R rises above Q1D, further rises in Q1R will
not a¤ect rmsmarket shares, with marginal costs and prices rising at proportionally
the same rate for both rms, so there is no prot-shifting motive.
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............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Derivation of (4.72)
We concentrate on the point where rm 2 is forced to raise its quality to that which
rm 1 would choose freely, Q1U . At this point, rm 1s marginal cost is given by
MC1U = (1=)((1=b)((1  )=)) 1 = (1=)(X1U=Q1U )(1 )= : (4.5)
Firm 2s marginal cost is
C2R = aX
1=
2R Q
( 1)=
1U + bQ1U ;
MC2R = dC2R=dX2R = (a2=)X
(1 )=
2R Q
( 1)=
1U ;
= (a2=)(X2R=Q1U )
(1 )= ;
MC2R=MC1U = a2(X2R=X1U )
(1 )= : (4.72)
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Hence the next proposition:
PROPOSITION 4.9: Where rmsmarginal costs of raising quality di¤er, there
may be a prot-shifting motive for the regulator in the country with the lower marginal
cost of raising quality to raise vertical standards above the global optimum. However,
this motive only exists if the global quality optimum lies below what the domestic rm in
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that country would choose if unregulated.
It follows from the above discussion that, while a prot-shifting motive for introducing
cost-increasing pure, horizontal TBTs is conceivable, the circumstances in which this is
likely to occur, and the degree to which it is likely to apply are greatly reduced compared
to the implications of previous studies (e.g. Baldwin, 2001, Wallner, 1998).
4.6 Prohibitive costs of providing di¤erent standards to
di¤erent markets
We have so far assumed producers are able to supply at di¤erent qualities to di¤erent
markets. Generally speaking this is the case (for example, the same producers can
provide left- and right-hand drive cars, or TV sets for sale in the UK and USA), though
usually at a cost. It is worth considering the e¤ects of the extreme alternative case,
where the cost of supplying di¤erent qualities to di¤erent markets is prohibitive.30 In
this case, if a rm is to supply both markets, it must produce at the same quality for
both. This does produce somewhat more complicated solutions: I shall concentrate on
the case where there are two countries but just one producing rm, in the exporting
country.
Under autarky, the optimal quality standard in the exporting country would be given
by
dd=dQd + dUd=dQd = 0; (4.73)
where d refers to the exporting countrys domestic market. The rst term is negative,
30An example being the claim by US soya producers that separately labelling GM and non-GM soya
for sale abroad would be prohibitively expensive.
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the second positive.
I shall assume consumerstastes are identical and that the cost structure is such that
this is also the global optimum standard Qd.
Now consider a mutual recognition agreement. The analysis proceeds much as above:
the exporting country regulator sets quality standards for both countries, and since he
will take account of the (negative) e¤ect of regulations on the exporting rms prots,
but not of the (positive) e¤ect on foreign consumersutility, he will seek to set
dd=dQd + dUd=dQd + df=dQd = 0: (4.74)
Given df=dQd < 0 (bearing in mind that we are now assuming there is only one rm,
so no prot shift) and d2f=dQ2d < 0; it is fairly trivial to show that this will result
in a standard eQd lower than the socially optimal Qd. In general, we would expect the
larger the export markets relative to the domestic market, the greater the incentive to
the regulator to set suboptimal standards.
Now consider what happens where there is no mutual recognition, but non-cooperation
between the regulators. Assume the exporting country regulator has initially set Qd.
When the regulator in the importing country raises its quality standards Qf , it does
not care that the foreign rm has to raise quality in both countries (and so makes less
prots than with a lower standard). Hence the regulator will choose to raise quality, up
to the point Qf = Qd + 'ffQdg, at which the rm would exit the market. 'f is given
by solving the equation
dfQdg = dfQd + 'fg+ ffQd + 'fg: (4.75)
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In this case, the point at which the rm exits the export market will depend upon Qd,
and upon the relative size of the two markets - a rm will much more readily abandon
a small market, implying that, ceteris paribus, 'f will be less the smaller the export
market.
This produces a bargaining game between the two countries regulators, the outcome
of which will involve a degree of uncertainty. If the importing country regulator sets
its standard above Qf = Qd + 'ffQdg, the rm will not be prepared to export. The
exporting countrys regulator, in turn, will not set Qd higher than the level QHd ; where
UdfQHd + 'ffQHd g) + dfQHd + 'ffQHd gg+ ffQHd + 'ffQHd gg = UdfQdg+ dfQdg;
(4.76)
in other words it will only go above Qd so long as it makes enough prots from sales
abroad to compensate it for the loss of prots at home. For this reason QHd is likely to be
higher the larger the foreign country. Standards in the importing country will exceed QHd
by 'ffQHd g: At the other extreme, the minimum level the exporting countrys regulator
would ever set is QLd , which satises
ddfQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd + dUdfQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd + dffQLd + 'ffQLd gg=dQd = 0;
(4.77)
where the only di¤erence from the mutual recognition level eQd is given by the fact that
the foreign regulator will maintain somewhat higher quality (and hence lower prots)
abroad.
Between these two extremes, the outcome quality levels will be determined by bi-
lateral bargaining, reecting the bidding process and the sizes and institutions of the
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countries. It is not possible to come to a rm conclusion as to whether the outcome will
exceed or fall short of the globally optimal regulation level.
The rm conclusions we can come to from this section are
PROPOSITION 4.10: Where only one country produces the good, mutual recog-
nition will produce quality below the global optimum, and the importing country will be
unambiguously worse o¤ than under non-cooperation.
PROPOSITION 4.11: When goods cannot be produced at di¤erent qualities for
di¤erent markets and there is no cooperation, goods will be produced to the standard set
in the importing country, which will exceed that in the exporting country. The latter
however will set a ceiling on how high the importing country can set standards without
exports ceasing. There will be a bargaining game to determine the two standards.
Looking at the current stando¤ between the EU and the USA over separate labelling
of GM foodstu¤s, the block to trade looks like a disequilibrium phenomenon while nego-
tiation proceeds. The EU, as the expected importer of GM soya, would clearly be better
setting testing and labelling standards independently. The USA by contrast would like
a mutual recognition agreement, under which it could export GM soya with subopti-
mal safeguards. The current stando¤ will presumably continue until there is a clear
understanding of whether mutual recognition will be enforced.
4.7 Conclusion
The WTO Agreements recognise the danger of regulatory protection when setting na-
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tional standards, but also acknowledge legitimate reasons for such standards. The idea
that regulations are trade reducing seems to result from counterfactual studies which
implicitly assume standards are purely cost-increasing, with no e¤ect on quality experi-
enced by consumers. The conclusions of this literature are contradicted by the (largely
ignored) empirical studies such as Swann et al (1996) which show increasing use of
standards tends to go with increased trade. At the other end of the literature is a small
amount of theoretical work, mainly based on the Shaked/Sutton di¤erentiated consumers
with oligopoly model, which indicates that strategic policy distortions are likely in the
presence of trade, and suggests that mutual recognition will increase welfare.
Unlike previous studies, this paper looks at more classical monopolistic distortions.
On the functional forms investigated, unregulated monopoly power leads to suboptimal
quality as well as quantity of goods supplied. Regulation increases both quantity and
quality available, and there is therefore a valid economic reason for quality regulation of
a form which actually increases trade.
It is further shown that where the sole supplier is foreign, there can potentially be
an incentive for the domestic regulator to set an excessive minimum standard, reducing
prots but beneting consumers (though this may be limited by the nonnegative prot
constraint). This strategic distortion, however, does not conform to traditional ideas of
protectionism. On the contrary, it will actually lead to excessive trade volumes, and does
not necessarily involve bias against foreign producers. This conclusion holds even when
producers can only produce a single quality for both markets.
When there are two suppliers (one domestic, one foreign), then, at least on the
assumptions of this paper, the result is that standards will be raised above the global
optimum: however, in many cases, the degree to which this can happen is strongly
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limited by the assumed nonnegative prot constraint.
Mutual recognition in the case where only one country is an exporter is tantamount to
allowing the exporting country to set global standards. In this case, the overregulation
when the importing country sets its standards will be replaced with underregulation:
the net e¤ect on global welfare is ambiguous (though prots gain while consumers in all
countries lose).
Mutual recognition in the case of balanced two-way trade is more complicated, since
there are two opposite-signed e¤ects at work: on the one hand, there is an incentive for
regulators to allow lower than optimal domestic standards, to boost exportersprots
at the expense of foreign consumers. On the other hand, there is a prot-shift e¤ect of
increasing market share by forcing up standards is enough to prevent regulators from
undercutting each other on standards. Numerical simulations show that, given the func-
tional forms in this paper, the prot shift e¤ect outweighs the cost-cutting e¤ect, and
mutual recognition will lead to standards marginally higher than a single global regulator
would choose, though these are less high than under noncooperative standard-setting.31
The implications are that mutual recognition, while not globally optimal, is often welfare-
improving, though it may reduce, rather than increase, trade.
A key result of this analysis is that market structure is central in determining the
best form of regulatory regime (assuming a single, global regulator is infeasible). Mutual
recognition looks much more attractive in cases where trade is reasonably balanced in
both directions. It may be less attractive in the case of trade in new products (where a
single producer holds the monopoly), or of North-South trade, which is more driven by
factor endowments.
31Except where the nonnegative prot intervenes, in which case mutual recognition
and noncooperative setting result in the same standards.
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As for assessing current regulations: actually disentangling how far these regulations
really comprise regulatory protection may not be an easy task. This paper casts a
somewhat sceptical light on the tendency to assume that regulations are trade-impeding
and should be tackled under the auspices of the WTO or other trade bodies. Assessment
of the welfare e¤ects of harmonisation or mutual recognition should not be carried out
on the assumption that regulations are purely cost-increasing, since the above analysis
indicates that if regulators are seeking to maximise national welfare it is unlikely they will
introduce barriers of this kind, and indeed national variations in standards may genuinely
reect di¤erences in national preferences with regard to risk, quality etc. To infer, as
some studies have done, that a high proportion of Treers (1995) missing trade32
is due to horizontal regulatory barriers is probably incorrect. Indeed, the absence of
international cooperation is actually likely to lead to over-regulation of standards which
increases, rather than reducing, trade volumes.
It is likely that regulation will be higher in sectors which are dominated by imports:
this is more likely to be ostensibly for reasons of raising consumer utility, though where
the cost of such regulations falls largely upon foreign rms there is an incentive to
over-regulate (there is a parallel with the tax competition literature). However, this
over-regulation will probably increase, not decrease trade volumes.
In the light of these arguments, it may be that policymakers have been too ready
to view quality regulations simply an issue of protection, to be dealt with through in-
ternational trade negotiations. It may be more appropriate to view it as an issue of
international policy coordination, to avoid a natural bias towards overregulation where
production is global but regulation is national, but also to avoid a bias towards un-
32 Missing in the sense that trade generally falls far short of what gravity models
predict
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derregulation (which may show up as inadequate testing or labelling or the deliberate
introduction of product incompatibilities) where standards are set primarily by the ex-
porting country.
In conclusion, mutual recognition needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis, tak-
ing account of market structure. In addition, it may well be that mutual recognition
makes most sense when it is only one aspect of a package involving elements of both
harmonisation and mutual recognition (so that only countries which meet certain min-
imum standards are allowed into the mutual recognition agreement). In practice, this
does seem to be the route policymakers have followed (e.g. with the European Single
Market).
Policy distortions will also be a¤ected by the degree of exibility producers have to
change specications to supply di¤erent markets. Where there is little such exibility,
then there may be a bargaining game between di¤erent countries in setting regulations
between those (primarily importing) countries who favour over-regulation and those
(exporters) who favour underregulation. Trade may temporarily be obstructed as part
of this bargaining process (as in the GM foods case in recent years), but to interpret this
just as protection on the part of the importing countries is to miss the strategic bias in
policies of the exporting countries, as well.
A few cautions should be added at this point. There are aspects of trade under
imperfect competition which require some further investigation. For example, many
industry standards are produced either by industry associations or by the industry in
conjunction with government bodies (the latter in the cases where compulsory regulations
are applied). However, it would be too simplistic to assume that regulatory standards
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are fully voluntary and protectionist33 by the industry players themselves: rst, they
may be simply a response to the threat of legislation. Moreover, there is a question why
a government should rubber stamp welfare-reducing standards. However, there may
well be scope for analysing the regulatory process as a principal-agent game, where the
government desires higher quality for its citizens but only the rms concerned possess
the relevant information.
There is also some scope for analysing the e¤ects of limit pricing by a colluding
oligopoly - depending upon whether national standards make entry easier or harder.
Both these topics go somewhat beyond the scope of this paper, as does the extension of
the model to a multi-country model.
33There is a possible argument that quality standards are a means of imposing higher xed costs on
new entrants. However, against this, centrally imposed standards may increase product compatibility,
hence making entry easier.
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APPENDIX4.1: Welfare and pure, hor-
izontal trade barriers
In the main text, I established that, for all values of  < 2; the marginal e¤ect on
domestic welfare of a small technical barrier to trade on the foreign rm in an identical,
cross-hauling duopoly is always negative. However, to show that this applies over the
full range of feasible barriers (up to the point where the foreign rm, 2, exits the market)
and over a range of demand elasticities requires numerical simulation.
The model below is simulated using GAMS.
Gross consumer utility
V = Z:
Equating price to marginal utility, net consumer utility
U = V  R;
= (1  )Z:
Revenue
R = Z:
Firm 1s share of the market
S1 = 1=(1 + ):
Given a constant marginal cost, MC, rm 1s prot
1 = S1(R MCZ):
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Domestic welfare
W1 = U + 1:
Now introduce a horizontal TBT, T = tMC: This allows us to derive  and Z, once we
have assumed a value for :
 = (1  (1 + t))=((1 + t)  ):
Z = [(2 + t)MC=(1 + )]1= 1:
We are interested in the range 0 <  < 1: Also note that rm 2 exits the market at the
point where  = 0: This will occur at value t, where
1  (1 + t) = 0;
t = (1  )=:
I start by assuming  = 1 and MC = 1 (without loss of generality in either case).
Simulation results: price elastic demand.
National welfare is calculated over a range of values of  between 0:05 and 0:95. This
corresponds to a price elasticity for Z of between 1.05 and 20. The technical barrier to
trade is scaled here relative to t (the value which makes rm 2 exit the market), so that
the horizontal scale is 100t=t.
With price elastic demand, a pure, horizontal TBT is never welfare-increasing.
Price inelastic demand.
It is worth noting that, with price inelastic demand ( > 1) the above rst order
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National welfare effects of a pure horizontal TBT
Cases with eta<1 (demand is price elastic).
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condition equations would yield negative values for net consumer utility. Consequently,
I assume these elasticity values are ruled out.
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APPENDIX4.2: Properties of the Cournot-
Nash model with constant elasticity de-
mand
Constant elasticity demand models are more complicated in their properties than
linear demand functions (which explains the fact that the latter are far more frequently
used in duopoly models): however, the constant elasticity demand model is more easily
combined with a Cobb-Douglas quality model than is a linear demand function, which
is why I have chosen this functional form here.
Plotting the functions (4.24a and b) numerically shows the shapes of the two rms
best response curves. Typically, these bend back on themselves, so that when one rm
produces very low levels of output, its produce is a strategic complement to its rival rm,
while at higher levels of output they become strategic substitutes. These results are in
line with Collies (1996) ndings.
Despite the curved reaction functions, there will be at most one equilibrium where
both rms produce positive output, as given by equations (4.25-4.26), which will occur
as long as the cost ratio for the two rms satises (4.26a).
Uniqueness
Note that  = (1   M)(M   ) 1, where M is MC2=MC1. First of all, in the
unregulated case, marginal costs are constant, so M is constant, which implies there will
be an unique value of :
Now consider the case where each rm f produces to a constant quality Qf .
MC1 = (1=)(X1=Q1)
(1 )= ; (4.30)
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and similarly for rm 2. Consequently
M = MC2=MC1 = 
(1 )= ; where
 = (Q1=Q2)
(1 )= and is constant.
Consequently
 = (1  M)(M   ) 1;
= (1  (1 )=)=((1 )=   );
1=    = 1  (1 )= ;
1=(1 + ) = 1 + ;
1= = 1=;
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which will give an unique solution for :
Note also that, if the two rms produce with identical costs, their equilibrium outputs
will be strategic substitutes (in other words, the two best response curves are both
backward-sloping at the point where they intersect). We start by totally di¤erentiating
(4.24a), giving
0 = (   1)(X1 +Xc2) 2(dX1 + dX2)
+(   1)(   2)X1(X1 +Xc2) 3(dX1 + dX2)
+(   1)(X1 +Xc2) 2dX1;
[(   1)(X1 +Xc2) 2 + (   1)(   2)X1(X1 +Xc2) 3
+(   1)(X1 +Xc2) 2]dX1
=  [(   1)(X1 +X2) 2 + (   1)(   2)X1(X1 +X2) 3]dX2;
[(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1 + (X1 +X2)]dX1
=  [(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1]dX2;
dX1=dX2 =  [(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1]=[2(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1]:
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This will have a negative sign (X1 and X2 are strategic substitutes) as long as [(X1 +
X2)+( 2)X1] and [2(X1+X2)+( 2)X1] have the same sign. Substituting X2 = X1,
the numerator and denominator become X1[ +    1] and X1[2 + ] respectively. The
second of these terms is clearly going to be positive, so that implies X1 and X2 are
strategic substitutes as long as  +    1 > 0, which means  > 1  :
In a Cournot-Nash equilibrium we have established
 = (MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1);
so this implies
(MC1   MC2)=(MC2   MC1) > 1  ;
(1  M)=(M   ) > 1  ;
where M = MC2=MC1. Since for 0 <  < 1 we can only have positive X1 and X2 if
both (MC2  MC1) and (MC1  MC2) are both negative. Hence, multiplying both
sides by (M   ), the condition becomes
(1  M) > (1  )(M   );
M + (1  )M < 1 + (1  );
M < (1 +    2):
Since we are assuming 0 <  < 1, when MC2 MC1 the two rmsoutputs will always
be strategic substitutes at the equilibrium point. It is therefore only whereMC2 exceeds
MC1 (or when regulation or other policies increase MC2 compared to MC1) that the
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Cournot duopoly with constant elasticity of
aggregate demand: cost ratios for strategic
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possibility of strategic complementarity emerges.
Note that if MC2 MC1=; rm 2 will exit the market anyway. However, the chart
shows that as  falls below 1 there is an increasingly signicant range of possible values
of MC2=MC1 for which the rmsoutputs will be strategic complements.34
Stability
There is a question mark over the stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the
constant elasticity case (in other words, would the rms always return to the equilibrium,
if they followed an iterative Cournot process following a shock. Stability requires rm1s
reaction function to slope downwards more steeply than rm 2s, if drawn with rm 1s
output on the horizontal axis. In other words, we want  (dX1=dX2) >  1=(dX2=dX1),
34The most signicant e¤ect of strategic complementarity is that it greatly increases the likelihood
that the rms will behave in a de facto collusive manner. (Thanks to Vasileis Zikos for this point).
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which implies  (dX1=dX2) ( (dX2=dX1)) > 1: But
 (dX1=dX2) = [(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1]=[2(X1 +X2) + (   2)X1];
and
 (dX2=dX1) = [(X1 +X2) + (   2)X2]=[2(X1 +X2) + (   2)X2];
neither of which exceeds 1, so the stability conditions are not satised.
Whether this is a signicant drawback of the model depends upon the interpreta-
tion being given to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (e¤ectively, whether it is seen as the
outcome of an sequence process of disequilibrium moves, or as the product of simulta-
neous decisions). To cite one recent text: The modern reinterpretation of the Cournot
game is that it involves simultaneous choice of outputs in a single period. Firms select
output only once, and neither rm ever gets the chance to react to its opponent. In-
stead we construct and use the best-response functions only to nd the Nash equilibrium
quantities.35
35Church and Ware: Industrial Organization: a strategic approach (McGraw Hill, 2000 ). Page 281.
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APPENDIX 4.3: Numerical simulation model for e¤ects of elasticity and
share parameters in a cross-hauling duopoly model.
The model is programmed in GAMS, and calculates solutions under a variety of
regulatory regimes for regulatory quality given a variety of assumptions regarding , the
Cobb-Douglas value share parameter attached to quality and , the inverse of the price-
elasticity of demand. Simulations also conrmed that varying b, the linear cost scalar for
quality, and ; the market size parameter, do not a¤ect the ratios of the various quality
standards derived by the model, and so these have been dropped from the grid search.
Consequently, I concentrate on the case where b = 1 and  = 10. Values investigated for
 and  are 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 0:6; 0:7 and 0:8. Solutions for values outside this range proved
harder to compute in the mutual recognition case, due to the nonlinearity of the formulae
involved.
Unregulated behaviour of the duopoly
I start by calculating
	 = (1 + );
 = (1  )=(1  ):
From these, I derive
QU = 	
1=(1 )2(2 )=( 1)((1=b)(1  )=)1=(1 ): (4.28)
Behaviour of a duopoly under noncooperative regulation
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I start by deriving the parameters
K1 = (=2)	
=(1 2(1 2)=(1 ); (4.34)
K2 = 2(1  )=; (4.36a)
K3 = (1 + )=2: (4.36b)
The formula for QRC is then given by
QRC = ((K2 + 1 K3)K1=b)1=(1 ): (4.40)
Point of exit for rms
The quality standard at which rms exit the market is then given by
Q# = ((1 K3)K1=b)1=(1 ): (4.38)
Global optimum standard
The standard chosen by a single global regulator (which corresponds to the global
optimum) is
QG = (((K2=2) + 1 K3)K1=b)1=(1 ): (4.42)
Standard under mutual recognition
The standard chosen by regulators under mutual recognition is harder to solve for,
and I have opted for setting out the problem as a set of simultaneous equations, rather
than solving a single, reduced-form version. I start by dening
K 0 = (=)	=(1 )2(1 2)=(1 ); (from 4.31)
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where K 0 is (=) times the ratio in equilibrium of combined sales of the two rms, Z
to the quality set by the regulators, Q=MR: Consequently, our rst equation is
Z1M = (=)K
0Q=1M ; from 4.31. (i)
Note that
dZ1M=dQ1M = K
0Q( )=MR ; di¤erentiating 4.31. (ii)
Our third equation relates to the e¤ect of changing just one countrys standard, while
keeping the others constant :
dZ1M=dQ1M = (1=2)dZ=dQRC ; from H (iii)
For rm 1s revenue in each market
dR01M=dQ1M = (
2)(Z
( 1)
1M =2)(dZ1M=dQ1M +2(Z1M=)dS1=dQ1M ); from 4.47a. (iv)
where dS1=dQ1M is the marginal e¤ect of changing the quality standard in country 1;
Q1M ; on rm 1s market share. Likewise, the e¤ect on rm 1s variable costs in each
market
dV C 01M=dQ1M = (1=)2
 1=(Z1M=Qc2)
(1 )=)(dZ=dQ1M + 2Z1MdS1=dQ1M (v)
+(   1)Z1M=Qc2); from 4.47b.
For the marginal e¤ect on rm 1s xed cost, associated with each market
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dFC=dQ1M = b: (vi)
The marginal e¤ect of changingQ1M on rm 1s prots in each market is consequently
d1;c=dQ1M = dR
0
1M=dQ1M   dV C 01M=dQ1M   dFC=dQ1M : (vii)
The marginal e¤ect of changing Q1M on consumer surplus in country 1 is
dUM=dQ1M = (1  )Z 11M dZ=dQ1M : (viii)
The marginal e¤ect on country 1s welfare is the sum of the marginal e¤ects of
changing Q1M on consumer surplus in country 1 and on rm 1s prots in the two
markets:
dW1=dQ1M = dUM=dQ1M + 2d1;c=dQ1M : (ix)
The standard the regulator will choose under mutual recognition will be the value of
Q1M in the above equations for which
dW1=dQ1M = 0: (x)
Using GAMS, I solve for the solution to (i)-(x) for each of 36 points on the grid of
f; g: These values can then be compared with those for QU , QRC , QG and Q#. Since
all outcomes di¤er greatly in scale when  and  are altered, I have normalised results
by expressing them all relative to QU .
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Q#=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 2.10 2.01 1.94 1.87 1.81 1.75
0.4 2.24 2.13 2.03 1.94 1.86 1.78
0.5 2.43 2.28 2.15 2.03 1.93 1.83
0.6 2.72 2.52 2.34 2.17 2.03 1.89
0.7 3.19 2.90 2.64 2.41 2.20 2.00
0.8 4.13 3.66 3.24 2.87 2.53 2.22
QG=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 1.83 1.79 1.75 1.73 1.70 1.68
0.4 1.82 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.69 1.67
0.5 1.81 1.77 1.74 1.71 1.68 1.66
0.6 1.81 1.76 1.72 1.69 1.67 1.65
0.7 1.80 1.75 1.71 1.68 1.66 1.64
0.8 1.79 1.74 1.70 1.67 1.64 1.62
QRC=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 3.77* 3.75* 3.75* 3.79* 3.86* 3.98*
0.4 3.71* 3.67* 3.66* 3.69* 3.75* 3.88*
0.5 3.64* 3.59* 3.56* 3.58* 3.64* 3.76*
0.6 3.58* 3.51* 3.46* 3.46* 3.50* 3.62*
0.7 3.51* 3.42* 3.36* 3.33* 3.35* 3.46*
0.8 3.45 3.33 3.24 3.19* 3.19* 3.25*
* denotes values where the nonnegative prot constraint will intervene to prevent the
regulator from achieving QRC . In these cases, the regulator will set Q = Q#.
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QMR=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 1.85 1.82 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.69
0.4 1.86 1.82 1.78 1.75 1.72 1.68
0.5 1.86 1.82 1.79 1.75 1.72 1.69
0.6 1.86 1.83 1.79 1.76 1.73 1.69
0.7 1.87 1.83 1.80 1.76 1.73 1.70
0.8 1.87 1.84 1.80 1.77 1.74 1.71
We can replace QRC with eQRC , the prot-constrained level set by noncooperative
regulators, and QMR with eQMR, the prot-constrained level set by regulators under mu-
tual recognition. In all cases examined, both eQRC and eQMR exceed the global optimum,
QG. eQRC either exceeds eQMR or the two are the same.
( eQRC   eQMR)=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 0.24 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.06
0.4 0.38 0.31 0.24 0.19 0.14 0.10
0.5 0.57 0.46 0.37 0.28 0.20 0.14
0.6 1.85 0.69 0.55 0.42 0.30 0.20
0.7 1.32 1.07 0.85 0.64 0.46 0.30
0.8 1.57 1.49 1.44 1.10 0.79 0.51
It follows that mutual recognition lowers standards compared to noncooperation in
cases where  is relatively high and especially when  is relatively low. We can also see
that eQMR exceedsQG at all grid points investigated, which suggests that the introduction
of mutual recognition is a move towards the global welfare-maximising quality standard.
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( eQMR  QG)=QU  = 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
 = 0.3 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
0.4 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02
0.6 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03
0.7 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.06
0.8 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09
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Chapter 5
Search and the Path Dependency
of Trade
This chapter presents an alternative to the traditional view that trade decisions are
made under perfect information. With di¤erentiated products and suppliers of variable
reliability, detailed knowledge of trading partners is important for many types of goods
and services, yet although there is a relatively new literature exploring the nature of
matching in trade and evidence for its existence, the implications for trade policy and
the dynamics of trade ows have not, to date, been explored. In the presence of imperfect
information, path dependency may conceivably be just as important on the demand as
the supply side of trade. Search theory indicates that not only will the current pattern
of trade reect past costs and policy decisions, but the price elasticity of import demand
will be path-dependent. Equally importantly, todays trade policy decisions will have
important implications for future trading patterns and likely future policy decisions.
To investigate these implications, I build on existing matching models of trade to
incorporate search. I draw a number of propositions, many of which are new to this
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literature, linking trade volumes and elasticities to the parameters of the search process
and to the past history of trade between countries. If economies are seen as moving from
being relatively closed initially,1 then contract periods and the availability of nance will
greatly a¤ect growth of trade. The behaviour of trading rms depends to a large extent
upon whether they are already well-matched or still searching for partners. Countries
with a large initial number of well-matched rms will show relatively low price elastici-
ties of demand for imports and exports, and in particular for trade with new partners.
Apparent home bias in current trade patterns may well reect past, rather than present,
trade costs and protection.
While there are many applications of this theory, I focus here particularly upon the
implications for the sequencing and timing of trade liberalisation decisions. It is shown,
using a fairly simple example, that match-searching theory strengthens the argument
that global welfare is likely to be enhanced by liberalising trade multilaterally rather
than by stepwise bilateral deals. However, individual countries may lose from this route,
and I investigate the circumstances under which bilateral deals may serve as stepping
stones towards global liberalisation.
5.1 Outline of the chapter
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 5.2, I review the relatively recent
literature on matching models of trade. I then develop in section 5.3 a theoretical match-
searchingmodel. This is a very basic model of the search process, which I use to derive
a number of key results expounded as propositions. In section 5.4, I investigate the
1Trade increased from 6 per cent of global GDP in 1950 to 15 per cent by the mid 1990s (source:
Maddison, unpublished).
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signicance of the path-dependency of match-searching models of trade for sequential
trade liberalisation agreements.
Section 5.5 suggests other possible applications of the model. Finally, in section
5.6, I briey consider more realistic but complicated search models. These are seen as
extensions/modications of the basic model, incorporating consumer search or including
networking between rms. Many of the basic properties of the match-searching model
carry across to these situations.
5.2 Background: historicity in demand and supply-side
models of trade
The notion of path dependency on the supply side of international trade is a familiar
one, developed from the infant industry argument and running through the more recent
literature on learning by doing, scale and agglomeration economies in trade, which can
broadly be labelled the New Trade
Theory.2 However, there has been much less recognition of the importance of history
and path-dependency on the demand side.
Two important characteristics of import demand are:-
1) In general countries trade far less between each other than the theory would predict
even when account is taken of transport costs.3
2See eg Grossman and Helpman (1993)
3This was most notably shown by McCallum (1995) who demonstrated that, after
correcting for size of economy and distance e¤ects, trade between Canadian provinces
exceeded that between Canadian provinces and US States by a factor of around 20. This
discrepancy was referred to by Treer as missing trade. Other studies (e.g. Anderson
and van Wincoop, 2003) nd much smaller residual border e¤ects.
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2) Trading patterns between countries frequently follow historical patterns. Hence,
for example, the UK trades relatively more with India and Australia, France with Algeria
or Cote DIvoire.4
Much of the current literature ascribes these patterns to either technical barriers to
trade5 or to exogenous di¤erences in demand patterns, or argues that transactions costs
are underestimated in the gravity literature.6 However, the idea of habit formation in
preferences has gradually been introduced, at least for aggregate import demand.7
I argue these observed patterns may, to a large extent reect not exogenous di¤erences
in preferences, but the rational response of rms and consumers to a situation where
their information on trading partners is incomplete, reecting in turn low historic trade
volumes. This implies that import demand might best be seen in terms of matching
and searching theory. To date, such a theory has been developed primarily for the case
of inter-rm trade. This approach assumes that each rms products have di¤erentiated
characteristics - however, unlike the love of varietymodel,8 it is not variety of choice
that purchasing or selling rms are looking for, but rather the best attainable match
for their individual requirements. The obstacle to nding that best match is that rms
have only imperfect information. For example in Rauch and Trindade (2003) rms are
4Rauch (1999) estimates a cross-country gravity model, with products divided into
homogeneous and di¤erentiated products. Incorporation of dummies for colonial ties
and common language is strongly supported in the case of the latter products, much
less so in the former (indicating that historical trade patterns persist much more where
goods are di¤erentiated and matching/searching is an important element of trade).
5For the economic signicance of this assumption see LeJour et al (2001). A wider
discussion of technical barriers to trade is in Maskus and Wilson (2001).
6Obstfeld and Rogo¤, 2000.
7While I am not aware of specic evidence on habit formation in trade volumes between
any pair of countries, there is some evidence of habit formation with regards to aggregate
imports. For example, De la Croix and Urbain (1998) estimate non-durable import
demand for France and the USA, nding strong support of habit formation (compared
to a standard life-cycle model) at least in the latter case.
8Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
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only able to tell whether a potential partner is better than a certain threshold match
quality: if a rm already has ties to the region, or if there are common language ties
or strong historic trading links the threshold will be higher. Companies are more likely
to set up trading ties with countries with which they have some initial familiarity, even
if there are other, less familiar countries, where potential prots would be higher if
perfect information were available. Another consequence of the one-o¤matching models
currently discussed in the literature9 is that rms will not all initially nd good potential
matches in one country even when there is a change in the average factor prices in that
country relative to other countries: in this way the relative inelasticity and persistence
of trade patterns are explained.10
Such ties, as well as existing patterns of networking may potentially explain observed
trading patterns.11 They also naturally generate a degree of imperfect competition in
trade, since a rm which has a good match with a foreign partner possesses a degree of
monopoly power, as does a country with good historic trade ties with a second country.
Nevertheless, I argue that the above models do not go far enough in the sense that
they treat the relative degree of information rms have about foreign partners as exoge-
nous. In reality, it is probably more sensible to see information as a valuable commodity,
for which people will search if the cost of searching is low enough relative to the potential
gains, and the history of search determines familiarity. Costs of searching may di¤er ac-
cording to many factors, including transport costs and existing language and other ties,
but also according to costs of borrowing (information can be seen as a form of capital)
9Though this characteristic is not shared by the match-searching model derived in this
paper. The reason import demand is not fully price-elastic in a match-searching model
is that not all domestic-domestic matches are of equally high quality.
10See Rauch and Casella, 2003.
11Evidence of similar informational e¤ects in determining cross-border capital ows is
presented by Portes and Rey (1999).
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and according to the exibility of the two trading partners. If this model is combined
with a history where transport costs were much higher, and protectionist barriers much
greater in the past than today, then it is quite conceivable that todays observed border
e¤ects in trade may reect the ongoing informational e¤ects of past barriers.
5.2.1 Match-searching in trade
In this chapter, I introduce the assumption that rms acquire information by a search
process over time. I start o¤ with a simple model: this search is in the form of a series of
successive matches with trading partners, each for a xed contract period. A rm does
not know the quality of a match until it enters into it. At the end of the contract period
it will decide whether to continue the existing partnership, or to start another search.
The cost of searching is the risk of having a series of poor-quality partnerships, while
the benet is the possibility of eventually nding a much better match.
This initial model is deliberately simplied in that it concentrates on modelling the
matching between rms rather than other elements of trade, and excludes important
elements of networking which may a¤ect the search process. The aim is to draw out the
main properties of this basic model, some of which are quite powerful. I then consider
to what extent they carry over to more complex models.
DEFINITION 5.1: I dene a match-searching model as one in which a rm
searches for the most protable partner by undertaking a succession of matches, each
for a xed contract period, until a satisfactory match is found.
The key result of this approach is that a rm will choose to search for a new partner
if its existing match quality falls below a reservation level. This is shown to depend
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essentially upon interest rates and the minimum contract period, as well as upon relative
prices.
5.2.2 A simple model of match-searching
In one-o¤matching models (see Rauch and Casella, 2003), trade takes place between two
rms, one upstream, u, and one downstream, d, and the extent and protability of that
trade is directly proportional to the quality of the match between those rms. Match
quality, ud is assumed to be randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between zero
and unity. In a simple matching model the rms make a one-o¤ random choice of match.
A match-searching model di¤ers from this framework in that matches are for a given
contract period of c years, and it is assumed initially that a rm can only investigate a
new partner by entering into a contract with it, and burning its bridges with its former
partner. However, after the rst contract period, the rms are again free to repeat the
random matching process if their initial match falls short of a reservation quality R.12
To set up a basic theoretical model, I start by assuming that rms are distributed
uniformly, in terms of some key characteristics, along the perimeter of a circle,13 cir-
cumference length 2. The circle is simply a diagrammatic representation of a simple
probability distribution in which rms are evenly and uniformly distributed in terms of
their characteristics, and no rm is intrinsically superior to another. Each rm aims to
match with the rm directly opposite on the circle14: match quality, ud; is equal to
12It is worth noting that, unless relative prices change, if a rm had accurate informa-
tion about the distribution of potential match quality, then if it once decided to abandon
a partner it will never return to that partner, except perhaps temporarily (see Section
5).
13This is an adaptation of Salops model of qualitative di¤erences between rms, and
uses a similar initial set-up to Rauch and Casellas (2003) model, but di¤ers in assuming
that repeated matching is feasible.
14This could be taken as a schematic representation of complementarity between rms.
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the circumference distance between the two rms, and hence is distributed uniformly
between zero and unity with ud = 1 being the perfect match quality. We assume that
both the volume of output of the two rms and the level of prots of each of the two
rms is proportional to this match quality. Hence
Yu; Yd = ud (5.1)
u; d = ud (5.2)
where Yu; Yd represent the real output of each rm (dened here to be equal, so that
one unit of the nal product requires one unit of production at both upstream and
downstream stages). Trade between the rms in real terms will equal Yu. u; d are the
prots of the two rms, which in the simple version of the model are equal, the proceeds
from the match being split evenly.
Starting initially with a single-country model, the match-searching process is as fol-
lows. In the rst period, each rm type u will seek a partner type d selected randomly
from the pool of available rms. Firm u knows accurately the distribution of potential
partners, but not the exact characteristics of any one rm d (and vice-versa). The match
quality is unformly distributed between zero and unity, so that average expected initial
match quality is ud1 = 1=2. Average output and protability of rms in this initial
period are therefore
Y u1; Y d1 = =2; (5.3)
238
u1; d1 = =2: (5.4)
The rst contract period lasts for c years. At the end of that period, each rm can
either renew its contract or start afresh with a new, randomly-chosen match. No rm is
assumed to be inherently superior to any other: it is simply match quality which a¤ects
e¢ ciency. A rm which fails to nd an initially good match, therefore, has as good a
chance as any other rm if it renews the search process. It is also assumed for simplicity
that rms have innite lives.
I assume the industry comprising all rms types u and d is small in comparison to
the economy as a whole, and that wages and prices can be taken as exogenously given
and constant, as are interest rates, r per annum. These partial equilibrium assumptions
simplify the analysis considerably. In particular, they imply that the reservation match
quality, R; above which rms will choose to stick with their existing partner, will be
constant over time. In addition, the symmetry of the two rms u and d and the 50-50
split of prots imply that the decision to stick together or renew search will be mutual,
and that once rms have found a suitable partner they will stay together permanently.15
Importantly, I also assume for simplicity that a rm has accurate prior knowledge about
the probability distribution of match quality with potential partners, even though it
lacks information on the quality of an individual match.
The series of consecutive search or stick decisions can be represented as a tree of
nested probabilities. At the end of each period of the search process, a rm which had
15The analysis is considerably complicated by introducing circumstances where one
rm which thought it had a satisfactory match might be jilted by its partner.
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still been searching in the previous period will assess whether its current match is worth
sticking with (ud  R, which will occur with probability 1  R) or whether it should
again renew search (probability R). After n periods, the probability that it has still not
found a satisfactory match is 1  (R)n, so the proportion of rms which will have found
satisfactory partners by period n + 1 is 1   (R)n while the proportion still searching
will be (R)
n:
Looking in more detail at period n + 1 the expected prot for those rms which
are still searching can be written as =2, where  is a conversion factor due to the
fact that the length of the contract period may not equal 1. Expected prot for those
rms who start initially by searching but which have found a satisfactory partner will
equal (=2)(1+ R); in other words, it exceeds the expected prot of searching rms
by (R=2). Expected prot over all rms in period n+ 1 will therefore be
eSn+1 = (=2)f1 + R   (R)n+1g (5.5)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (5.5)
eSn+1 = (=2)
n
R + ((1 + R)=2)(1  (R)n)g;
eSn+1 = (=2)fnR + (1  (R)n) + R   (R)n+1g:
========================================================================================================
240
By contrast, if initial match quality is ud, then if the rm chooses from the beginning
to stick with its initial partner, its prot in each period will be ud .The net expected
benet BeSn+1 in period n + 1 of having started by searching rather than not searching
is
BeSn+1 = (=2)f1 + R   2ud   (R)n+1g (5.6)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (5.6)
BeSn+1 = 
e
Sn+1   (ud=2) = (=2)f1 + R   2ud   (R)n+1g:
========================================================================================================
Assuming a constant reservation match quality R; and constant interest rate r per
annum, which, crucially, can be converted to an interest rate  per contract period, where
 = (1 + r)c   1; (5.7)
it is possible to derive the expected net present value N eS (to the beginning of the search
process) of prots for a rm which chooses to start by searching. This is a geometric
progression, which can be summed to yield discounted present values
N eS = (=2)(1 + R   2ud)  (=2)(R=(1 +   R)): (5.8)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (5.8)
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N eS =
1X
n=0
(=2)f1 + R   2ud   (R)n+1g=(1 + )n+1;
=
1X
n=0
(=2)f1 + R   2udg=(1 + )n+1  
1X
t=1
(=2)(R=(1 + ))
n+1;
= (=2)f1 + R   2udg=  (=2)[1=((1 + )=R)  1)]:
========================================================================================================
When ud = R, N
e
S = 0: After carrying out some manipulation, it is possible to
show that this is a quadratic equation in R. Of the two solutions, only the smaller one
will fall below unity. Hence, after a little more manipulation we can write
R = 1 +  
p
(1 + ): (5.9)
========================================================================================================
Derivation of equation (5.9)
At any particular value of ud;
N eS = (=2)(1 + R   2ud)  (=2)(R=(1 +   R)): (5.8)
But when ud = R; N
e
S = 0;
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(=2)(1 + R   2R) = (=2)(R=(1 +   R));
(1  R)= = R=(1 +   R);
(1  R)(1 +   R) = R;
1 +   R   R   R + 2R   R = 0;
2R   2(1 + )R + (1 + ) = 0;
R = [2(1 + )
p
4(1 + )2   4(1 + )]=2;
= (1 + )
p
(1 + )(1 +   1):
========================================================================================================
This expression is decreasing in  (for positive values of ), and consequently leads
to our rst proposition:
PROPOSITION 5.1: The reservation match quality R depends only on interest
per contract period , which is a function of the interest rate r and length of contract
period c. Specically, the shorter the contract period and the lower the interest rate, the
nearer R will be to unity.
The implications of this in practice can easily be calculated. For example, with c = 1
year and r = 5 per cent per annum, the reservation match quality R will equal 0.82,
and average match quality in the long run will be (1 + R)=2 = 0:91. By contrast, with
c=10 years and r=15 per cent per annum, R = 0:54 and average long-run match quality
is 0.77.
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While total prots and output in the rst period of search for those rms who choose
initially to search are the same for all values of r and c,16 in the long run both will be
higher the lower is r and the lower is c. This is because with lower r or c rms will
have a higher reservation match R, and so will be prepared to keep searching longer,
leading eventually to a better average quality of match. Subsequent average match
quality increases over time. Average output per rm and prots correspondingly also
increase, and in the long run both are higher the lower is r and the lower is c. We would
also expect, of course, that convergence to the long run value will be faster the shorter
is the contract period c.
5.3 Implications of match-searching for trade
I have shown how the match-searching process in a closed economy moves towards a
long-run equilibrium, in which rm match quality varies only over a limited range from
R to unity. Modelling of trade is more complicated, but I will concentrate in this
section upon the opening up of a formerly autarkic economy to international trade for
the rst time. Specically, I allow upstream and downstream rms for the rst time
to seek matches in a second country. I will assume that the potential maximum prot
of an international pairing in the absence of transport costs or tari¤s is 0, which is
greater than the maximum feasible for domestic-only partnerships by a factor (1 + ).
However, transport costs and tari¤s take proportion  of this prot, so the maximum
prot available to an international pair of companies is (1   )0. If a pairing with a
foreign rm is made at random, the average quality match for a trading rm will again
16This follows since match quality in the rst period of search is assumed to be random.
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range from 0 to 1, and annual prots for an individual rm will be evenly distributed
between 0 and (1  )(1 + )=2.
Crucially, I will initially assume that this extra protability opportunity applies
equally to both upstream and downstream rms in the home country (which we will
denote by uh and dh), and that there is a ready supply of foreign partners. These as-
sumptions maintain the symmetry of the supplier/purchaser relationship, so that with
a 50-50 prot split, rms uh and dh are in agreement over whether to maintain their
current relationship or to start searching abroad.
In the previous, one country, case the expected present value of future prots of a
rm which chose to search was shown to be equal to the prots earned by a rm sticking
with its match partner with match quality R, as determined by equation (5.9).
By analogy, a rm which searches abroad will have an expected present value of
future prots equivalent to a rm which has a constant foreign match quality RF also
satisfying equation (5.9).
But the expected prots of a foreign match quality RF will equal (1 )(1+") times
the expected prots of the marginal existing match at home, R. It follows that, if the
economy has reached equilibrium in autarky before starting to trade, there will be no
rms at home with match quality less than R. If this is the case, and if " > 1=(1 ) 1
(i.e. there is no prot advantage to trade) then no rms will seek overseas partners .
A key conceptual di¤erence in this analysis is between rms who have already found
match partners, and those who are still searching.
DEFINITION 5.2: A rm is dened as initially searching if at the start-point of
our analysis it has not found a satisfactory partner,  > R. Otherwise it is dened as
initially matched.
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An economy is dened here as mature if all rms have found satisfactory partners.17
Of initally matched rms, a small potential prot advantage from a foreign partner,
, will only outweigh the advantages of avoiding the costs of search for those rms whose
matches were only marginally better than the initial reservation match quality, R:Most
other rms will not nd it worthwhile starting a search unless  is considerably larger
than this.
PROPOSITION 5.2: For  > 0, all initially searching rms will choose their
next partner from abroad. By contrast, among initially matched rms, the proportion
choosing to abandon their existing partner to search abroad will only gradually increase
as " increases.
Henceforth, for simplicity, I will assume transport costs and tari¤s are zero (where
there is trade), so  = 0. In these circumstances, the last rms will abandon home
pairings only when "  (1=R)  1, ie when
"  f1=[1 +  
p
(1 + )g   1: (5.10)
Firms will choose to search abroad if
uhdh < RF =(1 + "): (5.11)
Figure 5.1 represents diagramatically the proportion of rms seeking a foreign partner
17In practice, of course, no economy will ever reach complete maturity, but in an
economy where the great majority of rms have found satisfactory partners, we would
expect most of the properties to be close to those of a mature economy.
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when a mature autarkic economy opens up to trade. In the initial case (shown by the
bold diagonal line) the share of rms seeking foreign matches increases steadily as "
increases from 0 to ", where " is the value which makes equation (5.10) an equality.
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Figure 5.1: e¤ect of a fall in the per contract period discount rate on the proportion
of rms seeking a foreign partner related to the foreign cost advantage.
Now if we allow the per-contract-period discount rate  to fall from 0 to 1, due
either to a fall in the interest rate r or a shortening of the contract period c, then the
value of " at which all rms look abroad will fall from " to "0, and the curve showing
the response of the proportion of rms seeking foreign matches in response to changes
in  becomes much steeper.
The implication is that the price sensitivity of imports and of exports increases the
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less lumpyforeign contracts are (the lower is c), and also the lower the interest rate, r.
Next, it is worth considering what happens if the country is not in a long-run equi-
librium at the time when the trade liberalisation takes place. In the above analysis, it
was assumed all rms had found satisfactory long-run partners, before the option of
looking abroad for partners was introduced. By contrast, it is possible that some rms
were still searching for a partner: in this case, the rm does not need to compare the
potential prots from a foreign partner with those if its existing partner, but only with
those of the expected return from the next domestic partner if it continues to search at
home. Consequently, while price sensitivity of import demand for matched rms (those
with long-term domestic partners) is relatively low, all searching rms will switch abroad
if the average price advantage of foreign versus domestic partners, " > 0.
Another way of putting proposition 5.2 is that searching rms who have not yet found
stable domestic partners will be very price-sensitive in choice of their next partner, but
many initially matched rms will not. A related conclusion is that the greater the rate
of new rm startups in an economy, the greater the price-sensitivity of imports.
5.4 Path dependency and implications for the sequencing
of trade liberalisation.
The di¤erence in behaviour between initially matched and initially searching rms un-
derlies the path dependency of import demand. Once a search process has gone on for
long enough, a high proportion of established rms will have found partners and become
matched. Once this has happened, they will be much less sensitive to the arrival of new
potential trade partners.
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This has important implications concerning the sequencing and timing of trade lib-
eralisation with other countries. If country A liberalises trade initially only with country
B, then, if trade with B has a price advantage "B > 0, some or all of the rms in A will
start looking for partners in B (depending on whether their initial match in A was good
enough to outweigh the cost advantages of entering into search). Now consider that A
subsequently decides also to liberalise trade with country C, which has an even larger
cost advantage "C > "B > 0. If this second liberalisation takes place very quickly after
the liberalisation with B, due to the presence of contract periods, many rms in A may
not even have reached the stage of starting their foreign search, and will automatically
choose the most cost-e¤ective foreign partner: i.e. in country C. If the second liber-
alisation takes place slightly later, so that many rms have already started their trial
matches with rms in B, then we would expect proportion R of these to reject their
partners in B at the end of the rst match even in the absence of the second liberali-
sation. These rms, again, will be very price-sensitive and will choose rms from C for
their next partners. By contrast, a proportion 1  R of those rms who had started an
initial match with rms in B will have found their rst foreign partner satisfactory, and
would be less price-sensitive in deciding whether to start trading with C.
If the second liberalisation does not take place until much later, then it is worth
noting that as time progresses, fewer and fewer rms in A would still be searching B for
a new partner: more would have found satisfactory ones. Consequently, the later is the
second liberalisation, the greater the lasting trade advantage country B has over country
C.
LEMMA 5.1: Other things equal, the proportion of rms in a pair of countries
which are searching will fall over time following a trade liberalisation between them.
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From this follows:
PROPOSITION 5.3: The price sensitivity of a countrys trade share with an-
other country, and its vulnerability to being displaced by a new partner, is less the more
established is trade between the two initial partners.
PROPOSITION 5.4: The price sensitivity of imports from a third country is
lower, and hence the level of optimal tari¤s is higher,18 when a customs union between
two countries is established rather than recent.
5.4.1 A numerical example
A worked example shows the importance of the historical sequencing of trade liberali-
sation deals. Let us examine a three country example, starting with complete autarky.
The model is a partial equilibrium model, in which an industry consists of partnerships
between upstream rms, u; and downstream rms, d. The overall price PFi of the nal
good (which is the product of pairs of rms fu; dg) is normalised at unity in all three
markets, i = A, B and C. PFi consists of the upstream price, Pui plus the downstream
price Pdi. However the relative upstream and downstream costs vary: I assume that,
in equilibrium under autarky, PuA = 0:4, PuB = 0:5 and PuC = 0:6. This implies that
of the three countries, A is the most competitive in the upstream part of the industry
and the least competitive in the downstream part, while C is most competitive in down-
stream and least competitive upstream. There is one factor only, labour. The model
approach here is partial equilibrium, where the wage rate W is set at unity in all three
18It is worth noting that for optimal tari¤s to be non-zero the world supply price also
has to vary with respect to demand by country c: i.e. export supply curves have to slope
upwards.
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countries, and total expenditure on the industrys nal products is assumed to be a
constant amount X, equal in all three countries.
The model here is slightly more complicated than that outlined above. For any rm
f of type h (h = u or d) , maximum potential total output is given by
Y f = ihL

f (5.12)
where ih is a productivity scale parameter, depending on country and industry and  is
the elasticity of output with respect to labour input Lf , and assumed to be somewhere
between zero and unity. It is assumed that each rm also consumes a xed amount Fih of
its output per annum to run. Overall output of f and its chosen partner g will fall short
of Y  depending upon the match quality fg, where potential values of  are uniformly
distributed between zero and unity (as above). We assume
Yf = 
1 
fg Y

f (5.13)
It is not di¢ cult to show that, in this model, if wages are set at unity,
Lf = fg(ihPih)
1=(1 ); (5.14)
Yf = fgih(ihPih)
=(1 ); (5.15)
and hence we can derive prots
f = fg
1=(1 )
ih P
1=(1 )
ih (
=(1 )   1=(1 ))  FihPih: (5.16)
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========================================================================================================
Derivation of equations (5.14)-(5.16)
Yf = 
1 
fg Y

f ; (5.13)
= 1 fg ihL

f from (5.12).
@Y f=@Lf = 1 fg ihL
 1
f = 1=Pih;
Lf = fg(ihPih)
1=(1 ); (5.14)
Yf = 
1 
fg ihL

f = 
1 
fg ih

fg(ihPih)
=(1 );
= fgih(ihPih)
=(1 ): (5.15)
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f = PihYf   Lf ;
= fg
1=(1 )
ih 
=(1 )P 1=(1 )ih   fg(ihPih)1=(1 );
= fg
1=(1 )
ih P
1=(1 )
ih [
=(1 )   1=(1 )]: (5.16)
========================================================================================================
It follows that, where prices are constant, output will be proportional to match
quality, as before, as will prots before deducting xed costs.
Firms face an annual interest rate of r and have a match contract period of c, as
before. Consequently, we can calculate the reservation match quality for the search
process, R as in equation (5.9) above. The number of rms of each type, upstream and
downstream in country i, will equal Ni, and output of the upstream and downstream
partners in any pair will be equal.
In equilibrium, prots (after deducting xed costs) for a rm with the reservation
match will equal the expected present discounted value of prots for a new entrant rm,
which in turn will equal zero so that at the margin there is no incentive on rms to enter
or leave the industry. From this we are able to derive a value for ih:
19
Starting with r = 5 per cent per annum and c = 5 years, we have a value of R = 0:68
(as shown in Table 5.1 ). We will assume total initial demand in each country, X = 1000;
and prices accruing to the upstream and downstream sections of the industry are as
suggested before. In a long-run autarkic equilibrium, average match quality will equal
19First we note that iu=iu = (Piu=Pid)
  . We can substitute from this into equa-
tion (5.16) noting that where the number of rms is in equilibrium the net prots of a
rm on the reservation match quality will equal zero. Hence ih = [Fih=(R(
=(1 )  
1=(1 )))]1 P ih .
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(1+R)=2 = 0:84: For simplicity we assume the output elasticity with respect to variable
labour,  = 0:5; and that the xed cost Fih = 1 for all rms, which gives us the following
values for ih and Ni:
Table 5.1: pre-trade equilibrium values for number of rms, output, labour and prot
in three-country model.
Country Price Gamma N of rms For avg rm
& industry Net Output Labour Prot
A & u 0.4 3.83 682 1.47 0.49 0.09
A & d 0.6 3.13 682 1.47 0.74 0.14
B & u 0.5 3.42 682 1.47 0.62 0.12
B & d 0.5 3.42 682 1.47 0.62 0.12
C & u 0.6 3.13 682 1.47 0.74 0.14
C & d 0.4 3.83 682 1.47 0.40 0.09
We now assume countries A andB initiate a free trade agreement between themselves,
but excluding country C with which they still do not trade. This is a partial equilibrium
model, in which the industry comprising rms u and d is small, so we assume no e¤ect
on wages. Consequently the marginal cost at which a new rm will be expect to be able
to enter the market and supply protably is the same as the pre-trade price: in other
words, an upstream rm in A will be able to supply at price 0.4 and a downstream rm
in B will be able to supply at price 0.5, so that the price for the combined nal good in
the two countries falls from 1 to 0.9. However, some downstream rms in country A and
some upstream rms in country B will have such good (pre-trade) matches that they
will continue to produce even after their output price falls. The proportion staying open
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in this way is given by the formula
	i = (1  R(Piu0 + Pid0)=(Piu1 + Pid1))=(1  R) (5.17)
and works out at 76 per cent of the initial rms in both cases. The rms in these
good initial matches will reduce output since their nal prices fall. Total output from
surviving existing matches is therefore reduced to around 63 per cent of its value under
autarky. With total expenditure on the good assumed to be xed (i.e. a Cobb-Douglas
upper level utility function), in the new long-run equilibrium total nal demand rises by
11.1 per cent. The net result is that downstream rms in country B take an eventual 43
per cent of the downstream market in country A, and upstream rms in A take a similar
share of the market in B.
Now consider what happens if countries A and B decide subsequently to open up to
free trade with country C as well. C has an underlying comparative advantage (before
taking account of match quality) in the downstream industry compared to both A and B.
Various dates of liberalisation are considered in Appendix 5.1 Table 1. The price of each
stage of production falls to 0.4, set by the price charged by new entrants to upstream
production in A and downstream production in C. According to equation (5.17), in each
country, just over 46% of the original pre-trade domestic-domestic matches can still be
protable. Output of domestic-domestic matches in each country is reduced to 30% of
the pre-trade levels. This is irrespective of the timing of the second liberalisation deal.
The trade between A and B, when trade with C is liberalised, will depend crucially
upon the timing of the second trade liberalisation: if trade with C is liberalised only one
contract period (5 years) after trade between A and B, then only proportion (1 R) = 32
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per cent of pairings between rms in A and B will be of reservation match quality or more,
before liberalisation of trade with C. The remaining 68 per cent will switch demand very
easily to a new, more protable trading partner. By contrast, after 4 contract periods,
the proportion still searching will be reduced to just 21.4 per cent. 73 per cent of these
A   B matches will survive the opening up of trade with C. Taking account of the
reduced output of each of these rms as prices fall, trade between A and B is 59 per
cent of its level before liberalisation of trade with C.
Inspecting Appendix 5.1 Table 1 we can see that, if trade between A=B and C is only
liberalised 20 years after trade between A and B, then output of the upstream industry
in B will remain at 84 per cent of its initial level, even though it has higher underlying
costs compared to the industry in C, whereas if the liberalisation with C took place just
5 years after that between A and B, output of Bs upstream industry would be just 34
per cent of pre-trade levels, and if the liberalisations were simultaneous it would be just
24 per cent.
Even though long-term prices (after trade between all three countries is liberalised)
and consumer welfare are the same regardless of the sequence and timing of liberalisation,
there are at least two forms of welfare costs of delaying the second liberalisation. Firstly,
the prots of the upstream rms in B which continue to produce because of the delayed
liberalisation with C will be less than the prots of the upstream rms in C which
would have taken their place given earlier liberalisation. We could call this the ongoing
informational trade diversion e¤ect. Secondly, however, in the intervening years, rms
in both A and B will have spent e¤ort (and foregone production) in a search for partners
in A=B which was e¤ectively wasted when the possibility of nding more cost e¤ective
partners in C was allowed. This could be termed the intermediate search diversion cost.
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DEFINITION 5.3: Informational trade diversion is the trade which takes place
between one country and a second, when trade with a third party is potentially more
protable, because the costs of searching for information on partners in a third party
outweigh the potential prots from comparative advantage.
DEFINITION 5.4:Search investment diversionis the additional cost incurred on
partners who search for a match in one country under a preferential trading agreement
when they could potentially have searched for more protable matches elsewhere given
non-discriminatory trade policies.
PROPOSITION 5.5: In a match-searching model, if two countries who have al-
ready liberalised trade between themselves delay liberalising trade with a third country,
there will be welfare costs from both search investment diversion and informational trade
diversion.
5.5 Other areas of application
5.5.1 Search information as capital
We can view information on potential matches as an important, but neglected, form of
human capital. Our model suggests that there are strong parallels between the economics
of accumulation of search information and that of other forms of capital. The lumpiness
of a match (i.e. the length of contract period in our model) is an important aspect of the
cost of accumulation of capital. Our model indicates that import demand elasticities and
export supply elasticities should be lower for lumpyproducts, and also lower during
prolonged periods of high interest rates. The latter property really results from the
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idea that information is a form of capital, involving nance to cover the investment in
attaining better information by searching. In addition, since new rm startups may well
be lower when interest rates are lower, this tends to reinforce the previous hypothesis that
periods of low interest rates globally are likely to favour trade growth and liberalisation.
In general, we would expect that imports and exports should be more price sensitive
the shorter are foreign contracts and/or the lower the interest rate, as well as the better-
developed are nancial institutions. This is to some extent borne out by historical
research: Rousseau and Sylla (2001), examining the history of 17 countries over the
1850-1997 period, found a strong link between nance and economic growth and trade,
especially prior to the Great Depression. Countries with more sophisticated nancial
systems engaged in more trade and were better integrated. Econometric analysis and
case studies suggested that economic growth and the increasing globalization of the
Atlantic economies might indeed have been nance-led.
We would also expect the nancial climate to a¤ect countriesbehaviour with respect
to trade: other things being equal, the lower are interest rates, the lower are optimal
tari¤s and the greater is the likelihood of more open trade policies.
5.5.2 Dynamics of trade
The dynamics of trade are another area where match-searching has potential applica-
tion. The issues of the dynamics of trade adjustment and the importance of history in
determining trade ows in this model are also worthy of investigation. It is worth noting
that, in this model, if there is a one-o¤ trade liberalisation, a rm will face a decision
whether to stick with its existing domestic partner or to enter into a search process, and
unless relative prices subsequently change that decision will not change subsequently.
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Consequently, a rm which is going to enter trade will do so quickly (at the next end of
contract period) after the trade liberalisation.
PROPOSITION 5.6: All rms who are going to enter into trade following removal
of trade barriers will do so as soon as their current contracts expire. However, after
the initial increase in trade volumes from rms entering the search process, trade will
continue to increase more gradually until a new equilibrium is reached.
This latter proposition is related to the increase in output volumes as the search
process procedes, as noted in proposition 5.2. It can be shown that, when "< (1=R) 1,
total output in the rst period of entering trade will only increase if20
" > (2R   1)=(1  R): (5.18)
As r and/or c are reduced to zero, R will tend towards 1 and rst period output is more
likely to increase for any price advantage to trade. 21
As for e¤ects on output: the short run impact of trade liberalisation on output for a
country which is in long-run equilibrium before engaging in trade, will be a reduction if
the price advantage to trade, ", is relatively small and if interest rates are high and the
contract period long. By contrast, the long run e¤ect on total output across countries,
as match quality improves with search, will be positive.
20The proof of this is that, if the economy is in a long-run equilibrium pre-trade, then
only rms whose (pre-trade) match quality lies between R and (1+ ")R will choose to
search. Average pre-trade output of these rms is (2 + ")R=2. By contrast, average
match quality for the rst post-trade match is 1/2 and average output is (1 + ")=2.
21For larger values of ", total output in the rst period will only increase if " > R.
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5.5.3 The e¤ects of variations on the match-search formulation
The model developed above is rather simple in a number of respects. It assumes there
are no specic costs attached to forming a partnership, whether foreign or domestic,
but that the quality of a potential match can only be assessed by entering into a trial
contract of period c. Introducing a xed cost for searching in addition to this would raise
the overall cost of searching relative to sticking with an existing partner, and so tend
to lower the reservation match quality R, encouraging fewer rms to start a search for
a foreign partner once trade is liberalised, and to settle on an eventual partner sooner.
A lower reservation match quality would mean greater variation in the initial quality of
domestic matches. The consequences of these changes are to lower the price elasticities
of trade, making the model less neoclassical in its properties.
Other potential changes would be more likely to increase trade price elasticities. For
example, as an alternative to picking a random foreign partner for a trial period, a
searching rm could expend money (e.g., hiring an agent) to gain better information
on the potential match quality. This would only be done if it lowered the search costs
(which in turn would raise R making trade more price elastic). It would also raise
the possibility that, if two domestic rms investigated foreign partners and found the
combined potential prots from their respective overseas matches were less than joint
prots from sticking together, they could return to each other temporarily for a contract
period c, before renewing search. Again this would serve to lower search costs and make
trade more price elastic. It would also mean that not all rms who eventually want to
trade would necessarily start doing so during the rst contract period.
Extension of this model would suggest that rms could investigate a number of
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potential foreign partners (with diminishing returns to search, since each new partner
costs money to investigate but the probability of its being a better partner than the next
best in the set investigated falls). Such models would involve a lot of bargaining between
a lot of rms (including the original domestic partner) with possibilities of jilting - in
consequence they are likely to be complicated.
Another possible modication would be to allow for a constant probability of rm
death  (perhaps with the constraint that this always happens at the end of a contract).
On the one hand, this would be rather similar to raising the per contract period discount
rate  to + , so discouraging search and lowering R for rms with existing partners.
This would make the model less neoclassical in the sense that trade between rms with
existing partners would be less price elastic. On the other hand, in each period there
would be a proportion of new rms (or newly bereaved rms) entering the market search-
ing for the rst time. These would be very price sensitive in terms of choice of foreign
partner. In the very long run, these new rms would dominate demand, though it may
take a long time for this to happen.
Although the match-searching process outlined here applies to inter-rm trade, sim-
ilar principles could potentially apply to the sale of nal consumer goods as well, though
with key di¤erences, such as the fact that many consumers purchase commodities from
the same suppliers. An investigation into the implications of searching for preferred
suppliers by heterogeneous consumers may well produce important insights into the be-
haviour of import demand over time. Again the key conclusions of the importance of
history in determining current import patterns and the importance of sequencing and
timing of current trade policy decisions are likely to be similar.
The simple model I have set up assumes that rms can only use information they
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have individually acquired. In practice, there are strong reasons to believe there will be
some information-sharing between certain subsets of rms. Mechanisms by which this
networking will take place include ethnic or family ties between rm owners, the presence
of trade associations, the movement of key sta¤ between rms and the employment of
rms to act as agents in the matching process.22 Clearly, networking can take a wide
variety of forms, partly determined by historical, institutional and sociological factors,
and the precise nature of the process by which information spreads can have signicant
e¤ects upon how a country engages in international trade.
The negative aspect of networking is that, if information is freely available to associ-
ation members, there is a free-rider problem regarding the initial search for downstream
partners. Firm f has little incentive to search for new partners (outside the networks
existing pool of partners), since it is likely the benet of the discovery will accrue to an-
other association member rather than itself. Consequently, establishing a new network
pool may be di¢ cult. It follows that, in the presence of network e¤ects, trade with new
overseas partners is likely to be suboptimal, unless there is a good system for reimbursing
members of the network who do the searching. This tends to imply that there may be
welfare benets to policies which actively promote trade search.
A further related aspect of networking is that, once a network has become established
and has developed a good set of matched partners in two countries, say A and B, the very
fact that equilibrium matches between A and B are better than in a solo match-search
model means that it may be even more di¢ cult for a third country, C, to break into the
market, even after trade is formally liberalised. In this way, networking will reinforce
22See the articles by Rauch, Feenstra et al and McLaren in the (1999) JIE symposium
on Business and Social Networks in International Trade, as well as the introduction by
Feenstra and Rauch (1999).
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many of the conclusions of the sections above regarding informational trade diversion.
The precise way in which a network is set up may well determine how condusive
it is to search. This may be a way in which institutional culture of countries may be
reected in their responsiveness to trade liberalisation. Another related extension worth
investigating is that the search process may also be aided by clustering of rms of a given
type in a given locality, or by the use of signals by rms to indicate their type.23
A nal suggested extension is Bayesian search, where rms estimate the protability
of trade with a foreign country only by either searching there themselves, or by observing
the success or failure of other rms searching for partners there. As successful matches
are observed with a foreign country, a rm will revise its Bayesian prior about the prof-
itability of trade. A Bayesian model of search for trade which incorporates information
from observing other rms may well have similar implications to the networking model
discussed in the previous section: namely, that one rms search for foreign partners will
carry external benets in terms of information. Such models will tend to give welfare
benets to active trade-promotion policies.
5.6 Conclusions
This paper builds on a recent literature which seeks to explain import demand patterns in
terms of imperfect information, particularly in the case of interrm trade in di¤erentiated
products. I seek to draw out the potential implications of this class of model by setting
23There is a considerable literature on agglomeration economies and the supply-side
reasons for clustering of rms (see e.g. Krugman, 1991 and 1995). However, it may well
be that the concentration of rms of a particular type in a particular locality (such as
high-quality steelmakers in She¢ eld, UK) may serve as a signal to potential customers
aiding the search process. A cluster which arises for geographical or sociological reasons
may be reinforced by the fact that its presence becomes known aiding matching (see e.g.
the history of the surgical steel cluster in Sialkot, Pakistan, discussed in Schmitz, 1999):
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out a basic match-search model and investigating its properties. This match-search
model goes somewhat further than existing models (e.g. Rauch and Casella, 2003 or
Rauch and Trindade, 2003) in the sense that the degree of information on matches is
treated as endogenous, being the result of a repeated search of each rm for a good
partner by matching successively with various partners for a succession of xed-period
contracts until a good quality match is eventually found. However, perfect information
will never be achieved, since searching is potentially costly in terms of output and prots
foregone in poor-quality short-term matches. As a result, a rm will be reluctant to give
up a reasonably good existing match, especially if contract periods are long and interest
rates are high.
The consequences of this type of model both for explaining observed current trade
patterns and for analysing the e¤ects of trade policy are potentially signicant. It is no
surprise that observed trade patterns between countries do not tally easily with com-
parative advantage, and that considerable home biasand two-way trade in the same
commodity class are common. Such features may well represent, at least in part, the
vestiges of past changes in alternative production e¢ ciency, transport costs, trade pro-
tection and exchange rate movements. Many rms which developed a market foothold
at a time when their home market was relatively sheltered may well be able to maintain
it even when that protection is removed. Likewise, rms will gain export and import
markets at times when comparative advantage, exchange rate uctuations or bilateral
trade deals favour them may well continue to export or import even when patterns of
competitiveness change drastically.
While existing matching models of trade do acknowledge verbally the existence of
historical factors in inuencing trade links, there is perhaps a failure to emphasise that
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todays policy decisions are tomorrows historical factors. Trade diversion from a pref-
erential trading agreement may well persist as informational diversion well after the
preferential agreement has been scrapped. This is perhaps an important argument in
favour of multilateral over bilateral trade liberalisation.
Some of the static and dynamic features of the match-searching framework are per-
haps shared by other potential models of import demand, such as habit-formation or
informational capital models. However, I suggest there are distinctive features of match-
searching models which may have signicance for understanding trade policy issues. In
particular, there is a key di¤erence between import demand by rms still searching for
a satisfactory partner, and demand by rms who have already found such a good part-
ner. In the former case, their demand is very sensitive to changes in prices of relative
supply sources, while in the latter demand may be much less price-sensitive. A conse-
quence is that long-standing trade blocs may well have lower import price elasticities and
higher optimal tari¤s than newer trade arrangements. Countries which are attempting
to break into new export markets may nd themselves needing to compete keenly on
price with other new entrant countries, while established producers may not have the
same price-sensitivity.
I then investigate variations on the search process. While some of the assump-
tions of the basic match-search model here are simplied (such as innite rm life), and
may overstate the degree to which rms can benet by entering into a match-searching
process of trade, on the other hand, there may be incentives for rms to use alternative
information-acquiring processes, such as employing agents24, or copying known competi-
tors with similar characteristics, or by rms in one country congregating in one section
24See Rauch and Watson (2002)
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of the market, in order to speed the match-search process. Multinational rms, which
move into a new country with a list of pre-existing preferred suppliers and purchasers
may also be by-passing the match-search process by making use of existing information
(though with some costs, in the sense that they will be importing parts from existing
overseas suppliers rather than nding potentially cheaper local sources), and presumably
gaining a rent from their ability to re-use existing information across the world. Net-
working between rms is an important variation on the match-searching process: on the
one hand, there is potential for reducing search costs and improving eventual match. On
the other hand, many types of network structure will introduce a free-rider problem, so
that rms are reluctant to initiate a search process, and trade will be suboptimal in the
absence of positive trade promotion policies.
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Appendix 5.1.
Table 1: Importance of the order and timing of trade liberalisation for
eventual net export patterns
Initial situation pre-trade
Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 1000 1000 0
d 1000 1000 0
B u 1000 1000 0
d 1000 1000 0
C u 1000 1000 0
d 1000 1000 0
After trade liberalisation between A and B
Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 1811 1111 700
d 411 1111 -700
B u 411 1111 -700
d 1811 1111 700
C u 1000 1000 0
d 1000 1000 0
If A and B liberalise trade with C after 20 years
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Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 3269 1250 2019
d 240 1250 -1010
B u 240 1250 -1010
d 843 1250 -407
C u 240 1250 -1010
d 2666 1250 1416
If A and B liberalise trade with C after 5 years
Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 3269 1250 2019
d 240 1250 -1010
B u 240 1250 -1010
d 342 1250 - 908
C u 240 1250 -1010
d 3168 1250 1918
If A and B liberalise trade with C in year 1
Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 3269 1250 2019
d 240 1250 -1010
B u 240 1250 -1010
d 240 1250 -1010
C u 240 1250 -1010
d 3269 1250 2019
If trade were always liberalised
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Country Industry Production Consumption Net Export
A u 3750 1250 2500
d 0 1250 -1250
B u 0 1250 -1250
d 0 1250 -1250
C u 0 1250 -1250
d 3750 1250 2500
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Chapter 6
Conclusions/Afterword
This thesis consists of a number of papers looking at various aspects of the current
debates around trade policy: as such, it is not an attempt to answer a single question.
Consequently, the summaries of the chapters need to be looked at individually.
However, repeating some of these ndings in brief:
Chapter 2, with John Whalley, is a comparison of short-run and long-run trade models
in decomposing changes in observed skilled/unskilled wage inequalities. The focus is on
the UK between 1979 and 1995. The use of general equilibrium decomposition tech-
niques means that we are tting a model simultaneously to changes in output, prices
and wages, rather than estimating a reduced-form mandated wage equation, as in most
of the literature to date. The latter technique may be awed as the implicit values of
output changes, say, in an equation based on Stolper-Samuelson linking trade prices to
wages may not correspond to actual observed output changes.
This decomposition work found rst that decompositions are very di¤erent depending
upon whether a short-run model or a long-run model is used to explain the observed
changes. This means that there is a good deal of ambiguity in how we can interpret the
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results seen.
In the long-run model, the usual Heckscher-Ohlin result of factor price insensitivity
holds, so that the rise in relative supply of skilled labour has no e¤ect on skill premia.
The factor-bias of technical change has no e¤ect, while the e¤ects of observed world
price increases are very large. The long-run model can only be made consistent with
the observed output and income changes if the sector-bias of technical change is in the
opposite direction: for UK total factor productivity in the unskilled-intensive sector to
have risen faster than in the skill-intensive sector, so damping the tendency of output to
switch. This is in contradiction of what data on computerisation would suggest.
By contrast, in a short-run model, the rise in the relative supply of unskilled labour
now has a sizeable damping e¤ect on inequality. Factor-biased technical change will raise
relative skilled wages. The e¤ect of trade is less marked though still quite substantial.
The sector-bias in technical progress is relatively minor.
In our alternative Ricardo-Viner model, the e¤ects are even more marked than in
the partial mobility case. Factor-biased change is the main cause of insensitivity in
inequality, o¤set by endowment changes. Sensitivity analysis shows that, even when
only a small proportion of value added is linked to xed factors; the model is greatly
changed compared to the Hecksher-Ohlin formulation.
I discuss a number of reasons why we believe for the short-run model decomposition
to be the more plausible.
Chapter 3 looks at the economics of enlarging the EU single market. The approach is
based on general equilibrium approach of Baldwin et al (1997) and LeJour et al (2001),
but introducing a model-consistent framework of calibration and simulation, assuming
that the 1997 residual country bias in trade between the EU and CEECs reects resource
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costs of regulatory di¤erences which can be eliminated by entry to the single market.
The regulatory barriers which would be needed to explain such di¤erences would be of
the order of 7 to 15 per cent on most goods: consequently, entry into the EUs Single
Market would have large e¤ects in terms of increasing trade between the EU and CEECs
- in fact simulations suggest that Polands trade with the EU could double. As a result,
welfare in the CEECs could rise by 11.5-20 per cent (Poland being the largest gainer)
while the existing EU countries would not lose from enlargement. Output would rise
almost across the board for all industries in the CEECs.
I go on to mention some grounds for doubting whether this interpretation of the
existing trade patterns between the EU and CEECs (as reecting regulatory policy
di¤erences and bureaucratic border costs) is totally realistic. Nevertheless, the paper
concludes on an optimistic note.
Chapter 4, which was written somewhat later, takes a more critical look at the
border cost issue. In particular, I look (probably for the rst time in the literature)
at the implications for trade when regulation is to counter the e¤ects of a classical
monopoly reducing quality of goods. I set up a simple framework in which quality
and output combine to produce a quality-adjusted measure of this output: on certain
fairly restrictive assumptions it is shown that a regulator can increase consumer welfare
by driving up product quality. I also show that this will apply (though with greater
algebraic complexity) in many less restrictive model formulations.
Where one country exports the good and the other imports, the exporting country
will tend to side with the monopolistic producer, and desire below-optimal regulation
(from a global viewpoint), while the importing country will desire excessive regulation.
In an identical cross-hauling duopoly, both countries will opt for excessive regulation if
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there is no cooperation. Under mutual recognition, both will set just marginally higher-
than-optimal standards.
In general, with no cooperation trade is actually greater than globally optimal. This
is a conclusion quite at odds with the standard literature. The welfare implications
of mutual recognition depend upon whether trade is balanced (as in the cross-hauling
duopoly case) or unbalanced (as in the case of an exporting monopolist. In the former
case, mutual recognition seems to be reliably welfare-improving compared to noncooper-
ation. By contrast, with unbalanced trade, mutual recognition leads to under-regulation
and a fall in trade, with benets to the producing rm and losses to consumers.
I then look at di¤erences in country costs or horizontal regulations and show that
the circumstances in which these lead to a prot-shifting bias against trade are far
more restricted than the current literature suggest. Finally, I investigate a case where
a supplier has to produce goods at the same standard for each market: this leads to a
bargaining game between the two countriesregulators. Mutual recognition can lead to
under-regulation: I suggest that this is a warning in the case of the current dispute over
regulation, testing and labelling of genetically modied foodstu¤s.
Chapter 5 builds on a recent literature (notably by Rauch and Casella) linking import
demand patterns to imperfect information, particularly in the case of interrm trade in
di¤erentiated products. I seek to draw out the potential implications of this class of
model by setting out a basic match-search model and investigating its properties.
The consequences of this type of model are potentially very signicant. Observed
home bias and two-way trade in the same commodity class may well represent, in part,
past changes in production e¢ ciency, trade protection and exchange rates. Firms which
developed in a sheltered home market may well survive even after protection is lifted.
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Firms which gained export and import markets may well continue to export or import
even when patterns of competitiveness change drastically.
Todays policy decisions are tomorrows historical factors. Trade diversion from a
preferential trading agreement may well persist as informational diversion well after the
preferential agreement has been scrapped.
There is a key di¤erence between import demand by rms still searching for a sat-
isfactory partner, and demand by rms who have already found such a good partner.
In the former case, their demand is very sensitive to changes in prices of relative supply
sources, while in the latter demand may be much less price-sensitive. A consequence is
that long-standing trade blocs may well have lower import price elasticities and higher
optimal tari¤s than newer trade arrangements.
To draw the chapters together to some extent: the paper in Chapter 5 may well
indicate a direction in which trade analysis may need to move to better understand
the patterns noted in the preceding chapters. In particular, if, as Chapter 4 indicates,
regulation is not necessarily likely to impede trade in the way assumed in the earlier paper
in Chapter 3, the questions still arise - what explains the substantial bias uncovered by
gravity work (and conrmed by the Dixit-Stiglitz calibrations in chapter 3), and what
will be the welfare e¤ects of harmonisation or mutual recognition agreements?
Chapter 5 indicates that, where search is by individual rms in a match-searching
framework, past trade barriers may well have a negative e¤ect upon trade even after they
are removed. Removal of trade barriers today will also have less e¤ect than standard
trade theory might indicate, unless cost di¤erences are large. However, if sharing of
information between rms is ruled out, trade patterns will be e¢ cient in the sense that
rms are acting rationally upon the information they have to hand, and there are no
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external costs or benets involved. By contrast, when we allow for networking e¤ects
(where information can be passed from one rm to another), there is the important issue
of whether a rm can fully internalise the value of informational gains from searching
(i.e. of whether it can recoup from other rms the value they gain from information it
passes on). Assuming mechanisms for doing this are imperfect, then we would expect
there to be a free-rider problem: e¤ectively trade/matching information is a public good
for all members of the network. It is likely that, if trade had historically been more
costly than today, the market will result in under-provision of trade information, since
no one rm will wish to undertake a search for partners in a new country unless costs
look very low, and so trade may well be much less than socially optimal.
To speculate: this may n fact indicate that the welfare analysis of policy harmonisa-
tion in Chapter 3 may well be on the right lines but the primary reason may be rather
di¤erent than laid down in that chapter. Trade between, say, the EU and Eastern Eu-
rope may be low not because current barriers are high, but because they have not so far
been low enough to stimulate the entry into those markets of networks of Western rms
- and since trade in those circumstances is suboptimal, the removal of trade barriers is
likely to have quite sizeable welfare benets.
276
Bibliography
[1] Abrego, L.E. and T.H.Edwards (2003): The relevance of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem to the trade and wages debate, CSGR working paper 96/02.
[2] Abrego, L.E., R.Reizman and J.Whalley (forthcoming): How often are propo-
sitions on the theoretical implications of regional trade agreements curiosa, and
should they guide policy? Journal of International Economics (forthcoming).
[3] Abrego, L. and J. Whalley (1999a), Decomposing wage inequality using general
equilibrium models, NBER Working Paper no 7312, August 1999.
[4] Abrego, L.E. and Whalley, J. (1999b), The form of technical progress in the trade
and wages debate.Mimeo CSGR, University of Warwick.
[5] Abrego, L.E. and Whalley. J, (2000), The choice of structural model in trade/wage
decompositions.Review of International Economics 9, 3 (August).
[6] Abrego, L.E. and Whalley, J. (2001), Decomposing wage inequality using general
equilibrium models.Mimeo, CSGR, University of Warwick.
[7] Anderson, J.E. and E.Van Wincoop (2003): Gravity with Gravitas: a Solution to
the Border Puzzle.American Economic Review, March 2003, 93, 170-192.
277
[8] Anderson, J. and E. van Wincoop (2004): Trade Costs, Journal of Economic
Literature Vol. 42, No. 3, September 2004.
[9] Anderton, R. and Paul Brenton (1999): Outsourcing and Low-Skilled Workers in
the UK. Bulletin of Economic Research, v51, no4, (Oct 1999) pp 267-85.
[10] Akerlof, K. (1970): The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 89 pp 488-500.
[11] Balassa, B. (1964): The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: a Reappraisal.
Journal of Political Economy 72 (Dec 1974) pp 584-596.
[12] Baldwin, R.E. (2001): Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-
Tier World Trading System.In Maskus, K.E. and J.S.Wilson (op cit).
[13] Baldwin, R.E., J.F. Francois and R.Portes (1997): EU enlargement: small costs
for the West, big gains for the East. Economic Policy April 1997, pp 127-176. Also
comments by Rodrik following.
[14] Baldwin, R.E. and A.J. Venables (1995): Regional Economic Integration.In Gene
M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogo¤(eds) Handbook of International Economics, Vol.
3. pp 1597-1644, Elsevier, Amsterdam.
[15] Baxter, Marianne (1992), Fiscal Policy, Specialization, and Trade in the Two-
Sector Model:The Return of Ricardo? Journal of Political Economy 100, 4. (Au-
gust), 713-744.
[16] Bentolila, S. and Bertola, G. (1990), Firing Costs and Labour Demand: How Bad
is Eurosclerosis?, Review of Economic Studies 57, 3, 381-402.
278
[17] Bergstrand, J.H. (1989): The Generalised Gravity Equation, Monopolistic Com-
petition and the Factor-Proportions Theory of International Trade.Review of
Economics and Statistics 71, pp 143-153.
[18] Bhagwati, J. (1997): Trade and Wages: A Malign Relationship.In Kuyvenhown,
A.,Memedovic, O. and Molle,W. (eds), Globalization of Labour Markets. Kluwer:
Dordrecht, pp.31-65.
[19] Borjas,G., Freeman, R. and Katz, L. (1992): On the labour market e¤ectsof immi-
gration and trade, in Borjas, G.and Freeman, R. (eds) Immigration and the Work
Force, NBER, 213-44. Cambridge,MA.
[20] Brander, J.A. (1995): Strategic Trade Policy. NBER Working Paper 5020,
reprinted in GM Grossman & K. Rogo¤
(ed.) Handbook of International Economics, Elsevier.
[21] Brander, J.A. (1981): Intra-industry trade in identical products, Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 11, 1-14.
[22] Brander, J. and B. Spencer (1985): Export Subsidies and Market Share Rivalry,
Journal of International Economics 18 pp 83-100.
[23] Brander, J. and P.Krugman (1983): A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International
Trade. Journal of International Economics 15 pp 313-21.
[24] Brenton, P., J.Sheehy and M.Vancauteren (2001): Technical Barriers to Trade
in the EU: Data, Trends and Implications for Accession Countries. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 39, 241-260.
279
[25] Brown, D., A. Deardor¤, S. Djankov and R.Stern (1995): An economic assess-
ment of the integration of Czechoslocakia, Hungary and Poland into the European
Union.In S.W.Black (Ed) Europes Economy Looks East, Ch 2. CUP, Cambridge
UK.
[26] Clarete, R.L, Trela, I. and Whalley, J.(1991), Equilibrium with quasi-xed fac-
tors(in mimeo).
[27] Collie, D.R. (1996): Gains and losses from unilateral free trade under oligopoly.
Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 62(2), 1996.
[28] Das, S.P. and S.Donnenfeld (1989): Oligopolistic Competition and International
Trade: Quantity and Quality Restrictions. Journal of International Economics
Vol 27 (304) pp 299-318.
[29] Deardor¤, A. (1998): Determinants of Bilateral Trade: Does Gravity Work in a
Neoclassical World? In J.A.Frankel (ed): The Regionaliation of the World Econ-
omy, University of Chicago Press.
[30] De La Croix, D. and J-P Urbain (1998): Intertemporal Substitution in Import
Demand and Habit Formation.Journal of Applied Econometrics 13 pp 589-612.
[31] DTI, Department of Trade and Industry (2005): The Empirical Economics of
Standards. DTI Economics Paper No. 12, June 2005, London, UK.
[32] Dixit, A., and Stiglitz, J.E. (1977): Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity.American Economic Review, 67, pp 297-308.
[33] Eaton, J. and S.Kortum (2002): Technology, Geography and Trade, Economet-
rica, 2002, 70(5), 1741-1779.
280
[34] Edwards, T.Huw (2003)(1): Quality Standards under Classical Oligopoly and
Trade: Regulatory Protection or Just Over-Regulation? CSGR working paper
126/03, Nov 2003.
[35] Edwards, T.Huw (2003)(2): History Matters for Import Demand: a Match-
Searching Model of Inter-Firm Trade.Mimeo, CSGR Warwick.
[36] Edwards, T.Huw. and J.Whalley (2002): Short and Long Run Decompositions of
OECD Wage Inequality Changes, NBER Working Paper 9265.
[37] Feenstra, R. T-H Yang and G.G. Hamilton (1999): Business groups and prod-
uct variety in trade: evidence from South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.Journal of
International Economics Vol 48 Issue 1 Pages 71-100.
[38] Feenstra, R. and J.E.Rauch (1999): Symposium on business and social networks
in international trade.Journal of International Economics Vol 48 Issue 1 Pages
1-6.
[39] Fehr, H., C.Rosenberg and W.Wiegard (1995): Welfare E¤ects of Value-Added
Tax Harmonisation in Europe, Berlin, Springer.
[40] Fisher, R. and Serra, P. (2000): Standards and Protection. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics Vol 52 Issue 2 pp 377-400.
[41] Freund, Caroline L. and J.McLaren (1999): On the Dynamics of Trade Diver-
sion: Evidence from Four Trade Blocs.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, International Finance Discussion Paper no 637, June 1999.
[42] Friedman, M. and R (1980): Free to Choose, Harmondsworth.
281
[43] Gandal, N. (2001) Quantifying the Impact of Compatability Standards and Bar-
riers: an Industrial Organisation Perspective.In Maskus and Wilson (op cit).
[44] Greenaway, D. and C. Milner (1986): The new theories of intra-industry trade.
Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
[45] Greenaway, D. , Upward, R. and Wright, P. (1999), Sectoral Mobility in UK
Labour Markets.Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets (now
GEP), University of Nottingham, Research Paper 99/1.
[46] Grossman, G.M. and E.Helpman (1993): Innovation and Growth in the Global
Economy.MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
[47] Harrison, G.W., T.F. Rutherford and D.G.Tarr (1996): Increased Competition
and Completion of the Market in the European Union: Static and Steady State
E¤ects. Journal of Economic Integration, September 1996 pp 332-365.
[48] J.E. Haskel and M.J.Slaughter (1998), Does the sector bias of skill-biased tech-
nical change explain changing wage inequality ? NBER Working Paper 6565,
Cambridge, MA.
[49] Haynes, M., Upward,R. and Wright, P. (1999): Smooth and Sticky Adjustment:
a Comparative Analysis of the US and UK.Centre for Research on Globalisation
and Labour Markets (now GEP) Research Paper 99/7, University of Nottingham.
[50] Hillberry, R.(1999): Explaining the Border E¤ect: What Can We Learn from Dis-
aggregated Commodity Flow Data. Indiana University Graduate Students Eco-
nomics Working Paper Series 9802.
282
[51] Hufbauer, G.C. and B.Kotschwar (1998): The Future Course of Trade Liberaliza-
tion. Paper for the World Bank Challenges for the Twenty-First Century, Oct
1998. Available on www.iie/com/publications/papers/hufbauer1098.htm.
[52] Johnson, H.G. (1966), Factor Market Distortions and the Shape of the Transfor-
mation Frontier.Econometrica 34, 686-98.
[53] Katz, L.F. and K.M. Murphy (1992), Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987:
Supply and Demand Factors.Quarterly Journal of Economics 35.78.
[54] Kemp, M.C. and H.Y.Wan (1976): An Elementary Proposition concerning the
Formation of Customs Unions, Journal of International Economics 6, 95-7.
[55] Kose, M.Ayhan and Riezman, R. (1999), Understanding the welfare e¤ects of pref-
erential trade agreements.CSGR Working Paper 45/99, University of Warwick,
UK.
[56] Krugman, P. (1979): Increasing Returns, Monopolistic Competition and Interna-
tional Trade; Journal of International Economics, 9: 469-79.
[57] Krugman, P. (1991): Geography and Trade.MIT Press, Cambridge Mass.
[58] Krugman, P. (1991b):Is Bilateralism Bad?, in E.Helpman and J.Razin (eds) In-
ternational Trade and Trade Policy, CUP, Cambridge, UK.
[59] Krugman, P. (1995): Development, Geography and Economic Theory.MIT Press,
Cambridge,
[60] Krugman, P.R.(1995), Technology, Trade and Factor Prices.NBER Working Pa-
per 5355, Cambridge, MA.
283
[61] Kruse, D.L. (1988), International Trade and the Labor Market Experience of
Displaced Workers.Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41 (April) 407.
[62] Leamer, E.E. (1998), In Search of Stolper-Samuelson Linkages Between Interna-
tional Trade and Lower Wages. In Susan Collins (ed) Exports, Imports and the
American Worker. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution.
[63] Leamer, E.E., and Levinsohn, J. (1995), International Trade Theory: The Evi-
dence.In Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogo¤ (eds) Handbook of International
Economics, Vol. 3. Amsterdam: North Holland, pp 1338-1394.
[64] Leech, D. (2003): "The Utility of the Voting Power Approach", European Union
Politics, 4:4, December 2003, pp. 234-42.
[65] LeJour, DeMooij and Nahuis (2001): EU Enlargement: Implications for Countries
and Industries. Report CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis .
[66] Lutz, S. (1996(1)): Vertical Product Di¤erentiation, Quality Standards and Inter-
national Trade Policy.CEPR Discussion Paper No 1443, London.
[67] Lutz, S. (1996(2)): Trade E¤ects of Minimum Quality Standards With and With-
out Deterred Entry.CEPR Discussion Paper No 1384,London.
[68] Maskus, K.E. and J.S.Wilson (eds 2001): Quantifying the Impact of Technical
Barriers to Trade.Michigan University Press. Chs 1 and 2 by the editors.
[69] Mayer, W. (1974), Short-Run and Long-Run Equilibrium for a Small Open Econ-
omy.Journal of Political Economy, 82, 5, 955-967.
[70] McCallum, J. (1995): National Borders Matter: Canada-US Regional Trade Pat-
terns.American Economic Review , 85: 615-23.
284
[71] McLaren, J. (1999): Supplier relations and the market context: A theory of hand-
shakes.Journal of International Economics Vol 48 Issue 1 Pages 139-150.
[72] Moenius, J. (1999):The role of standards in trade.Mimeo, University of California,
San Diego. http://weber.ucsd.edu/~jmoenius/hp/research.htm#Papers
[73] Murphy, K. and F. Welch (1989), Wage Premiums for College Graduates: Recent
Growth and Possible Explanations.Educational Researcher 18, 17-26.
[74] Mussa, M. (1974), Tari¤s and the Distribution of Income: the importance of
factor specicity, subsitutability and intensity in the short and long run.Journal
of Political Economy 82, 1191-204.
[75] Neary, J.P. (1978): Short-Run Capital Specicity and the Pure Theory of Inter-
national Trade.Economic Journal 88, 351, 488-510. .
[76] Neven, D. and Wyplosz, C. (1996), Relative Prices, Trade and Restructuring in
European Industry.CEPR Discussion Paper No 1451.
[77] Nielsen, C. and K.Anderson (2001): GMOs, Trade Policy and Welfare in Rich and
Poor Countries.In Maskus and Wilson, op cit.
[78] Obstfeld, M. and K.Rogo¤ (2000): The Six Major Puzzles in International Macro-
economics: Is There a Common Cause? in NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 15
(2000), MIT Press.
[79] Portes, R. and H.Rey (1999): The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity Flows.
NBER Working Paper 7336, Sept 1999.
[80] Rauch, J.E. (1996): Trade and Search: Social Capital, Soco Sosha and Spillovers.
NBER Working Paper w 5618.
285
[81] Rauch, J.E. (1999): Networks versus markets in international trade.Journal of
International Economics Vol 48 Issue 1 Pages 7-35.
[82] Rauch, J.E. and A.Casella (2003): Overcoming Informational Barriers to Inter-
national Resource Allocation: Prices and Ties.Economic Journal 113 (January
2003): 21-42.
[83] Rauch, J.E. and V.Trindade (2003): Information, International Substitutability,
and Globalization.American Economic Review 93 (June 2003): 775-991.
[84] Rauch, J.E. and J.Watson (2002): Entrepreneurship in International Trade.
NBER Working Paper 8708.
[85] Richardson, M. (1995): On the Interpretation of the Kemp/Wan Theorem, Oxford
Economic Papers 47, 696-703.
[86] Rousseau, P.L. and R.Sylla (2001): Financial Systems, Economic Growth, and
Globalization.NBER Working Paper 8323.
[87] Salop, S. (1976): Information and Monopolistic Competition.American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-eighth Annual
Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1976), pp. 240-245.
[88] Schmitz, H. (1999): From ascribed trust to earned trust in exporting clusters.
Journal of International Economics 48 (1999), pp 139-150.
[89] Shaked, A. and J.Sutton (1982): Relaxing Price Competition Through Product
Di¤erentiation.Review of Economic Studies, Vol 49 pp 3-13.
286
[90] Slaughter, M, (1999): Globalisation and Wages: a Tale of Two Perspectives.
Research paper 99/5, Centre for Research on Globalisation and Labour Markets,
University of Nottingham.
[91] Stiglitz, J.E. (2002): Globalization and its Discontents. New York, W.W.Norton.
[92] Stolper, W. and P. Samuelson (1941), Protection and real wages.Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 9, 58-73.
[93] Swann, P., P.Temple and M.Shurmer (1996): Standards and Trade Performance:
The UK Experience. Economic Journal 106: 1297-1313.
[94] Sykes, A.O. (1995): Product Standards for Internationally Integrated Goods
Markets.Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
[95] Treer, D. The Case of the Missing Trade and Other Mysteries. American
Economic Review 85 (December 1995): 1029-1046. (Lead article.) Reprinted in
Worth Series in Outstanding Contributions: International Economics edited by E.
Leamer. New York: Worth Publishers, 2001.
[96] Wallner, K. (1998): Mutual Recognition and the Strategic Use of International
Standards.Stockholm School of Economics Discussion Paper.
[97] Wood, A. (1994), North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.Mass.
[98] World Bank (various years): World Development Indicators.
[99] World Trade Organisation: Agreement on Technical Barri-
ers to Trade. From the Uruguay Round documents available
on http : ==www:wto:org=english=docse=legale=finale:htm :
287
[100] Young, A. (1995), The tyranny of numbers: confronting the statistical realities of
the East Asian growth experience, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp.641-
680.
[101] Zahariadis, Y. (2002): Modeling Deep Integration in the Context of the EU-Turkey
Customs Union: Working Notes. Prepared for the GE Assessment of Transition
and EU Enlargement Workshop, 25 January, 2002, CSGR, University of Warwick.
288
